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ABSTRACT
In Fiscal Year 2020, the City of Lewiston received a $30 million Choice Neighborhood
Implementation Grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The grant
will fund revitalization efforts in the downtown Tree Streets neighborhood based on the Growing
Our Tree Streets Plan. It primarily focuses on several housing initiatives, including the
development of new and replacement housing, lead abatement, and increasing ownership and
community control. Given Lewiston’s past and the issues facing the Tree Streets today (e.g.,
high poverty, un/underemployment, food insecurity, etc.), which reflect widespread national
issues (particularly in deindustrialized communities), the City acts as a case study for
disinvestment and reinvestment in local communities. This thesis seeks to contextualize
Lewiston’s Choice Plan within historical trends of national housing policy and a dominant
neoliberal housing paradigm. In this pursuit, I ask: In what ways does Lewiston’s Growing Our
Tree Streets Choice Transformation Plan conform to or depart from historical housing trends,
particularly contemporary neoliberal precedent? What contradictions arise within the plans’
strategies and partners? Through a survey of 150 years of national housing policy history and an
analysis of Lewiston’s plan, I explore possible community outcomes resulting from Choice
reinvestment. This thesis argues that despite the many radical intentions expressed in Lewison’s
plan, the broader neoliberal housing paradigm imposes constraints on realizing a truly radical
community vision. This analysis takes a place-based examination of the broader question – what
visions of housing does society articulate and value, and how does this impact accessibility to
safe, healthy, affordable communities?

Keywords: Affordable Housing, Gentrification, Community Reinvestment, Choice
Neighborhoods
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INTRODUCTION
Lewiston, Maine grew and was shaped by the mill economy, but as the mills were
shuttered – with the last mill closing in 2001 – thousands of jobs were lost. In the decade
between 1990 and 2000, as the final mills shut their doors, 5,000 people, an eighth of the
population, left Lewiston (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 25). It would be difficult to overstate
the ways the mills shaped Lewiston. They brought investments and grew the population. The
physical landscape of the city was changed as canals were dug to provide power to the mills. In
large and small ways, they comprised the economic backbone of the region: around 1950, after
paying their employees for a week in $2 bills, the Bates Manufacturing Company asked local
businesses to report where they were used, and the bills “popped up everywhere” (Skelton 2021).
Without romanticizing the mill era, given its brutalities, the decades of industrial decline
– and certainly the mills’ absence – have left profound marks on Lewiston, its people, and
surrounding communities. In Lewiston’s downtown Tree Streets neighborhood, many of
deindustrialization’s social ills are manifest. Levels of unemployment and underemployment are
high, and average incomes are around $20,000 – barely more than a third of the median Maine
income. Less than half of residents are food secure, and 96 percent are renters (Healthy
Neighborhoods 2020b). Aging, unhealthy, and unsafe housing in the Tree Streets may be the
most visible and pernicious remnant of Lewiston’s industrial past. The dangerously high levels
of lead and structurally unsound buildings make rental costs particularly outrageous for
neighborhood residents.
Despite the real and continuing scars of deindustrialization, the Tree Streets is a vibrant
demonstration of community resilience and possibility. It is rich in human and community
resources not easily monetarily quantified. Its residents, many of whom are recently arrived
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central and east African refugees with limited English literacy skills, collectively speak more
than 36 languages and dialects. The neighborhood contains numerous community and backyard
gardens (and a wealth of farming knowledge), a community credit union, a housing cooperative,
informal and semi-formal networks of mutual aid, and many community-based organizations.
There is a rich history of community activism, including mobilization to successfully resist a
2004 “urban renewal” proposal by the City of Lewiston which would have razed more than 800
housing units to make room for a four-lane boulevard connecting the suburbs to downtown.
To address pertinent and persistent issues in the neighborhood and more fully recognize
its real assets, the city has most recently turned to the Choice Neighborhood Initiative (“Choice”)
run by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Choice provides grants to
communities to aid neighborhood redevelopment and reinvestment efforts. Through this
program, the city was the recipient of a $1.3 million planning grant in 2017 and a $30 million
implementation grant in 2020. Much of the city’s plan, and the national Choice program, centers
around correcting issues of housing in the neighborhood to aid in broader revitalization efforts.
Because of its industrial past, current challenges, and involvement in Choice, Lewiston
offers a window into broader national issues around disinvestment and reinvestment in local
communities. Manufacturing jobs have decreased across the U.S., particularly in New England
and the Midwest, where such jobs were the economic engines of communities (Cobb 1984;
Harris 2020). Aging housing stocks, and related health issues with lead and radon, are also
national issues. These too are most common in regions that have experienced a steep
manufacturing decline (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2021). Such
conditions, in Lewiston and beyond, are the result of cycles of disinvestment on the part of both
private capital and the government.
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In response to the local challenges resulting from disinvestment, the U.S. government,
through HUD, has proposed reinvestment solutions primarily targeting housing and utilizing
private capital investment. At its core, however, Choice (and the HUD mandate more broadly) is
shot through with a number of critical constraints, perhaps most notably its reliance on a narrow
set of neoliberal policy tools to treat the symptoms of deindustrialization (i.e. poor housing
conditions and neighborhood disinvestment) rather than addressing the political-economic roots
of these problems in any meaningful way. At the same time, as this thesis will show, Choice
seems designed to gentrify neighborhoods like the Tree Streets, raising the very real prospect of
displacing the very residents most in need of its transformative potential.
While HUD’s reinvestment solutions have targeted housing using private capital for
many years, the pandemic has laid bare the many challenges Americans face in accessing safe
and affordable housing and has brought reinvigorated attention to national housing issues. Many
in the U.S. have been unable to afford rent and other basic living expenses during the pandemic
due to loss of income (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2021; U.S.
Census Bureau 2022). Simultaneously, there has been a rapid rise in home buying and home
prices, straining an already tight market (Dowell 2021; Duca and Murphy 2021). Similar
disparities were highlighted by the foreclosure and financial crisis of 2008 (Schwartz
2015). These crises have reenergized debates about housing – how it is provided, who benefits,
and how to ensure a more equal and equitable system, and highlight why this research and others
examining the provisioning of housing in America is necessary.
Through a review of 150 years of U.S. housing policy and an examination of Lewiston’s
Growing Our Tree Streets Choice Transformation Plan, this thesis seeks to highlight
contradictions arising within the dominant neoliberal housing paradigm. Lewiston’s envisioned
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transformations, for all their community input and radical intentions, are constrained by a
housing paradigm that prioritizes the desires of private capital over community needs. These
issues are emblematic of those occurring in cities nationally, and as such, Lewiston can act as a
case study of the ways in which broader housing policy may constrain more radical solutions to
urban issues.
With this aim, this thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter I introduces a theoretical
framework for understanding housing policy. This begins with an analysis of issues with
traditional housing narratives and then lays out an alternative framework to understand housing
policy, both historically and today. The chapter then applies this framework to three urban
planning and policy traditions spanning 150 years of history to contextualize the current housing
paradigm and alternate conceptualizations of housing. Chapter II analyzes Lewiston’s Growing
Our Tree Streets Choice Transformation Plan. It first reviews strategies and partners pertinent to
housing, then looks to the expected financial and social returns on investment of various
stakeholders. Chapter II concludes with the evaluation of contradictions arising within the plan
and analyzes what these contradictions could mean for current residents’ right to return or remain
in their homes and neighborhoods. Finally, Chapter III discusses the ways that Lewiston’s
current plan adheres to or departs from the current dominant housing paradigm. This chapter
closes with a brief reflection on how the dominant housing paradigm structures society, and what
a departure from it would entail.
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CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The later chapters of this thesis evaluate and analyze the Growing Our Tree Streets
Choice Transformation Plan in Lewiston, Maine. Chapter II first looks at the plan’s partners and
implementation mechanisms to discuss contradictions arising in the plan. Chapter III then
discusses more broadly how this plan conforms to or departs from the dominant housing
paradigm. This evaluation and analysis require the establishment of a theoretical and historical
framework on which to draw. This chapter will detail theoretical frameworks used to analyze
housing policy and its historical trajectory and provide a history of housing policy in the United
States. After providing background and critique on the ways housing narratives are commonly
analyzed this chapter presents an alternative materialist framework for considering housing
policy. Then this materialist lens is used to consider the history of urban housing traditions in
the U.S. beginning in the mid-1800s. This history is split into three urban traditions ascendant at
different times throughout the period: industrial urbanism, neoliberal urbanism, and radical
urbanism, which differ in their power structures and the purpose of housing they envision and
enact. This provides the historical and political-economic context, as well as the theoretical
background, that this thesis uses to examine Lewiston’s Choice housing strategies.

1. Issues Arising in Traditional Housing Narratives
Conventional histories of urban planning and public housing – examples being Kenneth
Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier, Mel Scott’s American City Planning, and John Rep’s The Making
of Urban America – generally follow a common narrative arc. They first establish that housing
conditions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were bad in cities, with crowded
living environments that lacked proper sanitation. In response, progressive reformers sought to
pass legislation and pressed for better living conditions on religious and moral grounds.
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Following the Great Depression, the government became involved in financially aiding
homeowners and began a public housing program. Growth in housing from these efforts slowed
during WWII but grew significantly in the war’s aftermath as liberal ideals and economic
prosperity swept through the country. The suburbs grew and flourished during this time, while
inner cities became plagued by poverty and crime. Johnson’s War on Poverty in the 1960s
aimed to address some of these issues, but ultimately Reagan-era neoliberalism became a more
dominant way of thinking about provisioning housing and social services. Throughout the last
several decades of the 1900s, there were continuing divides between cities and suburbs in racial
and class demographics and rates of crime. In more recent years, many cities have begun to
undergo processes of revitalization – sometimes called urban renewal, sometimes called
gentrification – which has resulted in reinvestment in cities and lower rates of poverty and crime.
While these mainstream narratives are not necessarily incorrect, they and others adopt a
largely idealist view of history, which is limiting. Reps’ The Making of Urban America (1965)
and Scott’s American City Planning Since 1890 (1971) mainly focus on the ideological
motivations of those designing urban areas more broadly, although they make some references to
those advocating for and creating housing policy. Similarly, Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier,
which traces the creation of the suburbs, centers how particular suburban ideals and aesthetics
drove low-density and racially segregated sprawl. Although Jackson (1987) acknowledges the
material forces driving pro-suburban ideology, this is in passing, and he finds it more important
to focus on the results of policies drawing on these various ideologies. Idealist narratives are not
just confined to scholarly work. An idealist narrative is espoused by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development in their online housing timeline. It can also be seen in the public
housing history timeline published by the National Low Income Housing Coalition, one of the
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country’s largest non-profits addressing housing insecurity. While it is certainly important to
understand the ideological traditions behind any given policy, and while these ideological
understandings are not necessarily wrong, these narratives often ignore the material conditions
within which such ideologies evolve and are implemented.
Peter Marcuse (1995) expands the critique of this idealist lens by laying out three
fundamentally flawed idealist paradigms through which these histories are often understood.
Marcuse lays out these paradigms in an analysis of what is incorrect about conventional
understandings of public housing history. However, his analysis can be expanded to a more
general concept of conventional housing policy history, as outlined above, to highlight common
fallacies. Awareness of these fallacies also helps to inform critiques of specific housing policies,
both historic and contemporary. These three paradigms are:
1. The benevolent state paradigm, where “a benevolent government tries to shape a
housing program so as to meet the most severe housing needs of its members, learning
(or trying to learn) from the mistakes of the past.” (Marcuse 1995, 241);
2. The meddling state paradigm, where “a faceless government attempts, out of a
perverted ideological bias, to tamper with a free private market in housing, with a series
of disastrous results, each stage as futile as the preceding because the fundamental error
persists.” (Marcuse 1995, 241); and
3. A pluralist paradigm, where “either housing reformers, sincerely concerned to solve
the housing problem, confront a host of special interests in the real estate industry and try
to push through good programs, or in which a multitude of conflicting interests jostle
with each other about housing programs and produce somewhat at random periodic
changes in the shape of housing policies.” (Marcuse 1995, 241-242)
Marcuse primarily critiques these paradigms for relying on the incorrect assumption that there is
a continuous and coherent housing policy that consistently aims to primarily address issues of
housing. This assumption allows those adopting one of these idealist paradigms to pass on any
structural analysis of the forces that produce urban space. In reality, there are several forces
policymakers and urban planners contend with, and concern for the ill-housed is rarely at the
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forefront of housing decisions. Nor is housing policy a singular or static force. It exists not just
in the minds of policymakers, but in response to on-the-ground conditions shaping policymakers’
choices. Responding to these ideas, Marcuse (1995, 242) writes “public housing programs have
in fact been the product of widely differing forces, ranging from fear of social unrest to the desire
to abate unemployment to concerns for the ill-housed to the search for profits in the real estate or
allied industries to the needs for redevelopment to racism and anti-racism to political
considerations of constituency stabilization (among other forces); that a large, not random,
pattern can be discerned from the interaction of these forces.” This is true not just of public
housing programs but of housing policy more broadly. The analysis below expands on the
myriad forces that animate housing policy, as well as the conditions that drive them.
Another pitfall encountered by many housing narratives stems from their narrowly
defined foci or from subscribing strictly to one of the three paradigms outlined above. Housing
policy is historically and politically contingent, and many analyses, in their singular historical or
political focus, miss various nuances, minor and significant. As Richard Foglesong (1986)
remarks in Planning the Capitalist City: The Colonial Era to the 1920s, this is true for the two
basic histories of American urban planning, both of which he criticizes for taking an idealist
view of urban planning. Fogelsong (1986, 9) comments that because John Reps’ The Making of
Urban America and Mel Scott’s American City Planning Since 1890 “fail to relate the history of
planning to the organizing structure of American society […] [they] do not provide an adequate
explanation of the development of planning.” In more recent years, Richard Rothstein’s The
Color of Law has gained national prominence for its explanation of the ways the United States
systemically shaped an explicitly and fundamentally racist national housing policy. While
correct in his historical analysis and core argument that the federal government played a key role
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in the creation and reproduction of racially segregated neighborhoods, Rothstein leaves the
question of why the government engaged in these practices left unanswered (Nelson 2021). That
is, Rothstein fails to fully reveal and interrogate the material conditions and political-economic
forces underlying the development and ideology of de jure segregation. Keeanga-Yamahtta
Taylor (2019, 10) critiques Rothstein’s work: “While it is true, as Richard Rothstein […] argued,
that the federal government played a critical role in extending the logic and practices of
residential segregation with the invention of its housing practices in the 1930s, government
agents did not act in a vacuum, nor did they act alone,” going on to explain the tremendous
power and influence of the real estate market. Without this deeper reading, an understandable
conclusion to address de jure racism is to correct racist policy. While that is certainly a step in
the right direction, without understanding and curtailing the broader forces that use racism as a
tool for labor exploitation and capital accumulation, society will continue to experience the
detrimental effects of previous racist policy, and effects from new iterations of such policy.

2. Framing an Alternative Approach to Housing History
If there are conclusions to be drawn from histories of housing policy and urban planning,
as I believe there are, the focus should be on the various configurations of the state, capital, and
labor in the urban traditions outlined below, and the policies that have resulted from the way
these idealized classes interact with each other. As such, this thesis will primarily utilize a
materialist lens, historically grounded in the various social and economic realities of the day.
This will contrast with those idealist narratives critiqued above. Taking a materialist stance
provides an explanation for the actions of groups that is attributable not just to their beliefs but
understands that choices are made in response to the political-economic contradictions of the
time (Harvey 2013a; Foglesong 1986). This materialist stance will draw on the structural
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emphasis of Marxist urban theory. It will deal primarily with the ideal types of state, capital, and
labor, although there will be some nuances acknowledged within these groups. There are of
course limitations to this lens, and Marxist urban theory cannot explain all decisions, all places,
and all times. Per a critique from post-colonial urban theory, Marxist urban theory is particularly
bad at understanding the nuances and topographies of various local actors (Rugkhapan 2014).
However, by flattening and abstracting these histories to some extent, not only is it manageable
to analyze a century and a half of urban housing policy and material conditions, but it is also
possible to pull legible trends and urban traditions from that overall history. The latter two
chapters of this thesis will then focus on Lewiston, and through a place-based case study, further
interrogate the nuances arising within the City’s Choice housing plans.
2.1 Ideal Class Types
In structural Marxist theory, configurations of the state, capital, and labor take different
forms. Structural Marxists describe an inherently unstable system under capitalism (Harvey,
2001, 2013a). This system is plagued by contradictions and internal rifts between various groups
of capitalists, as a result of their highly individualistic perspectives, but also within the labor
class, as a result of actions by capitalists (either independently or in collusion with the state).
The state, when understood as all levels of national, state, local and municipal government, as
well as urban planners, also introduces the possibility of internal rifts and differential
motivations. Throughout much of the mainstream history outlined in the sections below
(particularly industrial and neoliberal urbanism), the state’s primary concern is maintaining
balance and reproducing contemporary structures of power. This puts the interests of capital in a
primary position. Capital, or capitalists, is the class that holds the means of production. For the
purpose of analyzing U.S. housing history, capital has two main subtypes, which tend to have
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contradictory interests. The first is industrial capital, which seeks to profit from manufacturing,
extractive industry, and other related fields. Their means of production are factories, mines,
quarries, water treatment plants, oil wells, oil refineries, and more. Industrial capital is primarily
reliant, especially historically, on the physical labor of the labor class to produce profit from
these resources. The second applicable capital subtype is real estate capital, which creates profit
by building, buying, and renting land and properties. Banking and investment capital act as a
partner in these pursuits, particularly during the latter half of the 20th century up through today.
Real estate capital does not rely as heavily on the actual physical or mental labor of the labor
class to create and accumulate capital. Rather, it primarily does so by exploiting the wages of
the labor class. The broad labor class is defined as those who do not own the means of
production and therefore sell their labor to make a living. This class is heavily stratified, with
very different wages and skills for different types of jobs. For example, a university professor
and a factory worker would both be included in this broad category. There are many divisions
within the labor class along professional, racial, ethnic, and other lines. These divisions are not
fixed and shift over time but are often exploited by the capitalist class or the state for capitalist or
state interests. The interests of different groups within the labor class will vary depending on the
job, time, and place, but common interests are in safe working environments, fair wages, and
safe, healthy, and affordable communities to live in.
2.2 Contradictions in Urban Planning
This materialist version of capitalist urban housing history is defined by two main
contradictions, the first being the property contradiction. The property contradiction “describes
the unhappy tension between capitalists’ desire for certain types of planning interventions, and
their antipathy towards anything that restricts their operations” (Stein 2019, 30). Capitalists’
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interest in socializing control of land comes from the need to cope with negative externalities
that arise from the commodification of land; to create environmental amenities needed for the
reproduction of labor’s role in the system; to maintain the physical infrastructure necessary for
production; and to ensure the efficient spatial coordination of these infrastructures and amenities
to enable efficient circulation of people and goods (Foglesong 1986, 20-21). Essentially,
capitalists desire state intervention that allows them to increase or retain profits while lowering
costs but are also deeply protective of their private property rights, which are critical to
maintaining control over their businesses. They often reject planning action as “governmental
overreach.” The property contradiction is further complicated by the different desires of various
capitalist groups – industrial capital, real estate capital – described above. For example,
industrial capitalists desire state intervention to ensure the construction of affordable housing
near factories for their workers. They also want rents to be kept low, so wages can remain low
as well. In contrast, real estate capitalists are most interested in making money from rents. As
such, they would like to charge high rents, and to do so may push for zoning that puts industry
further from housing and for laws imposing environmental restrictions. Additionally, they may
reject the construction of affordable housing.
The second contradiction that defines the capitalist system in America is the capitalistdemocracy contradiction. This contradiction arises in the attempts of a liberal democratic
government to address the property contradiction. The capitalist-democracy contradiction
describes the pressure that arises when “[i]n a nominatively democratic capitalist republic, the
state and its planners have to perform a delicate balancing act: planners must proceed with
enough openness and transparency to maintain public legitimacy, while ensuring that capital
retains ultimate control over the process’s parameters” (Stein 2019, 31). Essentially, planners
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and the state are tasked with maintaining state control and validity in the eyes of the public while
ensuring that decisions made align with the interests of various capitalist classes. For example,
the implementation of public works projects, zoning changes, new development, or a new master
plan for a city may all challenge a city’s ability to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry
while implementing a project where the outcome is predetermined. In this situation, the state
may try to maintain balance within the capitalist democracy contradiction by engaging in
participatory planning (by way of planning commissions, comment periods, community focus
groups, etc.) to maintain a façade of democratic processes within urban land-use decisions.
Generally, the state ultimately makes decisions that align with the interests of the relevant
capitalist groups involved. In the rare case in which the state does not, it makes no fundamental
change to the capitalist system or reorders the prioritization of the ideal types of capital and
labor.
These contradictions both inspire and arise around and within various state actions
throughout American history. These contradictions emerge from a central conflict between the
“social character of the land” – or in simpler terms, its value as a collective public resource – and
private ownership and control of land (Foglesong 1986, 22). The property contradiction rises
internally within capitalism. Which capitalist interests are seen and supported in the resolution
of the property-contradiction is connected to broader worldwide trends in labor, manufacturing,
and the creation of wealth. In contrast to the property contradiction, the capitalist-democracy
contradiction results from the interactions between political and economic structures in a
democratic-capitalist society. The state will consistently intervene in the property contradiction,
by way of urban planning or other actions that maintain democratic legitimacy, in attempts to
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balance, maintain, and reproduce the social character of land and private property rights in an
inherently unstable, contradictory system.
2.3 The (Re)Creation of Urban Space
In his theory on the making of cities, David Harvey (2013a, 5) writes that cities have
always arisen “through the geographical and social concentration of a surplus product.” For
example, this concentration could be of (and necessarily included) food surpluses. Control over
surplus products coalesced in the hands of specific groups and individuals, and their ability to
leverage this surplus product equated to power. Reflecting on growth in ancient cities, Smith
and Lobo (2019, 5) write: “This power allows the leaders to extract wealth out of the hinterland
and distribute it in the [city]. Migrants come to the city because of the demand created by the
concentration of wealth, desire to influence leadership, the transfers given by leadership to quell
local unrest, and the safety of the capital.” Put more simply, the concentration of resources
encourages urbanization for myriad reasons. From this base truth, Harvey (2013a, 5) posits that
to claim the right to the city is to “claim some kind of shaping power of the processes of
urbanization.” Different groups of actors will envision a city best fit to their own needs quite
differently; ultimately the city – which is not some predetermined natural entity – will reflect
whoever is best able to make their claim. “The financiers and developers can claim it, and have
every right to do so. But then so can the homeless and the sans-papiers. We inevitably have to
confront the question of whose rights are being identified, while recognizing, as Marx puts it in
Capital, that ‘between equal rights force decides’” (Harvey 2013a, xv).
The question of how urban spaces are created and remade by these three typified actors
then has no static or inherent answer. What might a system primarily controlled by capital look
like? Such a system would look relatively akin to dominant paradigms, current and historic, in
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the U.S., which are detailed in the history below. It would be shaped by the property and
capitalist-democracy contradictions. As a political-economic system, capitalism is characterized
by the unending creation of profit. Capitalists must compete with other capitalists to survive in
this system, consistently growing their profits to accumulate more surplus value than their
competitors. To do this, capitalists must constantly reinvest as least a fraction of their profits to
ensure continued growth. This growth may come from increases in the total quantity of product
produced, or from the more efficient production of product. Without making these necessary
reinvestments, capitalists are in danger of falling behind, unable to maintain their place in a
competitive market. Capitalism is also reliant on space to pour this surplus product into;
urbanization plays a role by creating a consumer of the surplus product that is produced, adding
to the capitalists’ wealth. Harvey (2013a, 5) explains this by saying “capitalism needs
urbanization to absorb the surplus product it perpetually produces.” In a society where real
estate is the dominant form of capital, such as Stein (2019) posits we live in in the U.S., capitalist
reinvestment is in the real estate itself. Increased urbanization or urban revitalization then adds
direct value to capitals’ wealth. Here begins a cycle between the accumulation of capital and the
growth of cities, where urbanization is a key process in creating an ever-expanding consumer
base (Harvey 2013a, 5).
This system is impossible to sustain without intervention by the state. There are a
significant number of barriers to such constant growth – limited natural resources, land capacity
restrictions, finding new markets for products – as well as the conflicts that arise between
different types of capital. Thus, capital needs the state to maintain balance in the system, spur
the creation or opening of new markets, maintain control of labor, and more. As Stein (2019, 26)
has noted, “[t]he history of capitalism clearly shows that market economies require planning.
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[…] They rely on massive legal, logistical, infrastructural, and technological capacities all of
which must not only be imagined and developed by likewise maintained and reproduced.” This
is where current urban planning structures become relevant. Although planning sometimes has
the effect of impeding markets, and often individual planners come to the job with good and
even radical intentions, if the state is, as Marx and Engels (1933) describe it, “the executive
committee of the bourgeoisie,” then planning will remain caught in the property-democracy
contradiction and continue the maintenance, defense, and expansion of capitalism (Stein 2019,
27).
However, it is not inherent that capital will hold such a primary place of control in the
process of urbanization and the production of urban space. Another radical option, the right to
the city, articulated by Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey, describes urbanization reproduced
based on the interests, desires, and actions of the labor class within it. Lefebvre (1996, 158),
translated by Kofman and Labas, writes “[t]he right to the city cannot be conceived of as a
simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a
transformed and renewed right to urban life.” Lefebvre writes about the right to the city in
opposition to what he saw as the crisis of the city in 1960s France. Lefebvre saw this crisis as
the growth of a homogenous culture of suburbanization for the middle-income earners and the
creation of a monoculture in the apartments of the working class. The danger in this was the lack
of excitement or heterogeneity within the cycles of labor, bureaucracy, or the actions of daily
life. In response to the civil unrest in May of 1968 (the May 68 movement) which rebelled
against American and western imperialism, consumerism, and capitalism, and the discrimination,
marginalization, and general alienation these forces wrought, and through observed parallels to
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the Paris Commune in 1871 (Schmid 2011, 42-43), Lefebvre writes about this idea of the right to
the city:
“In these difficult conditions, at the heart of a society which cannot completely oppose
them and yet obstructs them, rights which define [...] civilization find their way. These
rights which are not well recognized, progressively become customary before being
inscribed into formal codes. They would change reality if they entered into social
practice: right to work, to training and education, to health, housing, leisure, to
life. Among these rights in the making features the right to the city, not to the ancient
city, but to urban life, to renewed centrality to places of encounter and exchange, to life
rhythms and time uses, enabling the full and complete usage of these moments and
places, etc.” (Lefebvre 1996, 178)
This right to urban life necessitates that the city – as a place of encounters, prioritizing use value,
and presence in current space and time – be paramount, a reordering of societal values that can
only be brought about by the working class (Lefebvre 1996, 158). This is the right to a city
created through the daily labor of its citizens and the preservation of the complex and unsanitized
social dynamics of its residents, which Jane Jacobs (1962) has claimed make the city what it is
(Lefebvre 1996).
What actual rights the right to the city conveys upon its citizens has been widely
interpreted by various scholars to apply to issues of gentrification, housing, immigration,
citizenship, social exclusion, and more (Attoh 2011). It is useful to consider the right to the city
through the lens of generational rights as outlined by Jeremy Waldron. Waldron (1993) defines
first-generation rights as traditional liberties associated with democratic citizenship in the
western democratic tradition – free speech, a fair trial, voting, religious liberty, etc. Secondgeneration rights include socio-economic entitlements – housing, food, fair wages, etc. Thirdgeneration rights are rights attached to individuals and groups in the protection of communal
goods – minority language rights, the integrity of a culture, and the right to distribute intangible
goods like values of peace or environmentalism (Attoh 2011). In the definition above Lefebvre
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outlines several (second-generation) rights that we in America today might consider the domain
of social programs – the right to work, an education or job training, housing, and healthcare.
Created in the context of May 68, these are expectations of what a government must provide its
citizens. Out of this exercise of first-generation rights – the right of free speech, the right to
protest – grew an idea of a third-generation right – the right to a collectively held city, which
would be experienced through the enjoyment by individual citizens of second-generation rights –
the right to housing, a fair wage, a job. Other scholars also reaffirm that the right to the city falls
into this category of third-generation rights. David Harvey (2013a, 4-5) argues the right to the
city is a collective right to change and reinvent the city according to our desires by holding the
power over processes of urbanization, and that to claim the right to the city is to also claim the
power to shape urbanization. When city planners and the state act on behalf of capital, and there
is not democratized decision making in urban planning and policy, the internal social dynamics
that make a city what it is are disrupted and the rights of some citizens to the city will inevitably
be infringed upon (Harvey 2013a; Jacobs 1962).
The relationship between these three ideal class types and the creation of urban spaces
goes both ways. Urban spaces are not only influenced by the state, capital, and labor; cities also
play a role in creating and shaping these three classes. Available resources and zoning often
determine the types of capital that can and will thrive. Physical spaces and urban form can
impose impediments to, or create spaces for, labor to come together and find common ground or
consensus. If labor so chooses, they can articulate this consensus through voting or protest,
which can have real political ramifications on the dominant ideologies in power at different
levels of government (Harvey 2013b).
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2.4 Historical Housing Policy Traditions
The remainder of this chapter unpacks the historical roots of the traditions shaping
housing policy today. It begins this framing of urban housing policy history at the end of the
Civil War and Reconstruction and the beginning of the Gilded Age in the late 1800s. Of course,
relationships between forms of production and urban spaces start well before this point, going
back centuries. Indeed, cities have existed throughout the world for far, far longer than the
settler-colonial nation of the United States of America. Throughout history, there have been
many significant moments in the creation, planning, and reproduction of urban environments.
Many of the tensions and contradictions – including the property contradiction and the capitalistdemocracy contradiction – expressed in the history below have roots prior to the mid-1800s but
became increasingly pressing with increased urban development. Many early housing policies
and actions were situated within the material conditions of rapidly increasing populations in
urban centers and industrial jobs in the late 1800s (Haines 1994; Hirschman and Mogford 2009).
Other scholars also mark this period as distinct from earlier urban planning precedent.
Richard Foglesong (1986, 25) notes such a break, writing that many of the “community-serving
features of colonial town planning were vitiated by the speculative mania that gripped American
cities during the rapid urbanization and industrialization of the last two-thirds of the nineteenth
century.” Foglesong (1986, 25) posits that urban development after the mid-1800s sits in
contrast to the “largely pre-capitalist era” it follows. To call this era “pre-capitalist” is somewhat
misleading – the United States was colonized in the pursuit of wealth, and various capitalist
influences contributed directly to its urban growth from its inception. Both the U.S. and
colonialism more generally are inherently exploitative projects aiming to generate wealth for a
select few at the expense of people – their health, their communities – and the land and its
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resources. The U.S. and colonialism cannot be seen as separate from capitalism. However,
Foglesong is right to separate the sorts of capitalist traditions that perpetuated urban space
preceding the American industrial revolution from those that followed it.
Starting from this point in the mid-to-late-1800s, with brief mentions to other places or
times, one can separate U.S. urban planning around housing policy into three different traditions
– industrial urbanism, neoliberal urbanism, and radical urbanism. These urbanisms are distinct
in who holds power to dictate policy and the purpose of housing they articulate, but exist on a
continuum, ascendant at various times, and are intricately interconnected in their respective
peaks and valleys. By tracing housing policies in the U.S. from the late 1800s to the present day,
with brief mentions of other non-American movements and earlier periods, the rest of this
chapter sets out to define the three urban traditions to which current housing policies adhere to
varying degrees, as well as provide background to the current housing environment in the United
States. Collectively, these three urban traditions will form the baseline to analyze the varying
actors, strategies, and power dynamics in Lewiston’s Growing Our Tree Streets Choice
Transformation Plan.

3. Industrial Urbanism
Overview
The understanding of the period beginning in the mid-1800s and ending in the mid-1900s
laid out in this section is based on histories of housing and urban planning by Foglesong, Shi,
Marcuse, Drier, Stein, and others. Compiling many of their ideas and reflecting on the outsized
role of industrial capital during this time (particularly in comparison to later neoliberal
urbanism), it seems most accurate to term this period’s dominant urban philosophy industrial
urbanism. Within the political-economic landscape of industrial urbanism, the state was the
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central arbiter. The capital class (further divided into industrial and real estate capital) held
relative power, and although placed in an inferior position, labor made significant strides at
various points throughout the period. The state was somewhat distrustful of both classes, and so
intervened in urban and housing issues to manage competing needs of capital and labor groups in
ways that benefited sectors of both classes. This intervening power was afforded to the state by
both classes to solve issues arising from the material conditions on the ground. Through a high
degree of central planning and with reliance on internal self-sufficiency, the state both assisted
capital in the accumulation of wealth and made policies that worked on behalf of certain labor to
gain better conditions. State police power was used to maintain order and reproduce this regime,
and targeted labor in the defense of both capital and the state, as seen through incidents like the
Haymarket Riot and its precipitating strike or the urban rebellions that swept the U.S. in the
1960s.
Within the urban industrial tradition, urban space was ordered and produced based on the
desires of both industrial and real estate capital. These two forms of capital have different
desires within urban systems, and tensions arise from these conflicts. Industrial capitalists
desired a source of cheap labor to work in their factories, and for basic societal needs or services,
such as homes or schools, to be located close to centers of production. Homeownership was
relatively uncommon and public housing did not yet exist for much of the beginning of this
period. This created a role for real estate capital in the production of cities. and especially in
housing. Many of the state’s interventions in housing throughout this period balanced precarious
economic or social situations that threatened the stability of the country and the structural
regime.
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This section covers the era from the mid-1800s to the late 1960s. It is further structured
around eight sections: (3.1) Progressive Reformism; (3.2) City Beautiful; (3.3) City Practical;
(3.4) the Great Depression and the New Deal; (3.5) WWII and suburbanization; (3.6) the Civil
Rights Movements; (3.7) the War on Poverty; and (3.8) the decline of industrial urbanism. The
final section will remark on the confluence of factors leading to the decline of industrial
urbanism. The first three subsections cover sub-traditions that helped to contribute to the
formation and evolution of industrial urbanism early on, helping to solidify the tradition’s
priorities and processes. These are a mix of grassroots and urban planning movements, generally
led by and to the benefit of societal elites. The movements grew out of different material
conditions and had slightly different configurations of state, capital, and labor. Mentions of
housing are often absent from early planning doctrine. Housing began to be articulated in
national policy as an outgrowth of post-depression and post-war economic needs (Marcuse
1980a, 154-155), which is shown in sections on the Great Depression and the New Deal to the
War on Poverty. Whether or not it was explicitly articulated as such, throughout the 80 years
encompassed in industrial urbanism’s heyday both the creation of and destruction of housing
were used as a means of control over the labor class.
Historical Analysis
A formalized industrial urban tradition arose from two interconnected phenomena – the
rapid industrialization and urbanization of America. Following the Civil War, Panic of 1873,
and end of Reconstruction in 1877, the country entered a period of growth and prosperity which
set a path forward for highly centrally planned cities (Barreyre 2011; Stein 2019, 17). From
1880 to 1920, the U.S. economy shifted from a rural agricultural society to an industrial
economy located primarily in large urban centers (Hirschman and Mogford 2009, 897).
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Although some tendencies seen in industrial urbanism began earlier, and some cities passed laws
in the mid-1800s that can be directly understood through an urban industrialist lens, the increase
in urban population and industrialization in the late 1800s made the industrial urban tradition
much more widespread. Before 1870, manufacturing had been more limited to small firms,
which were highly specialized and created goods for local markets. Technological innovation,
including the development of commercial electricity allowed for the creation of larger factories
in urban areas engaged in the mass production of goods. From 1880 to 1920 the number of
American manufacturing jobs grew from 2.5 million to 10 million (Hirschman and Mogford
2009, 898). Job growth tracked population growth in urban areas. A quarter of the population in
1880 lived in cities, but by 1920 this was over half the population. Urban regions attracted
immigrants with the promise of relatively high occupational mobility and job opportunities
(Guest 2005). Immigration accounted for significant population increases; the foreign-born
population almost doubled in these 40 years (Hirschman and Mogford 2009, 898).1
American socio-economic classes became more pronounced throughout the gilded age.
The period was marked by massive economic inequality, with the capitalist upper class holding
the vast majority of wealth, and labor classes fighting to attain a decent wage and safe living and
working conditions. This widening gap came from a structural economic shift to wage labor
from independent production. Whereas in earlier eras, employers may have faced an obligation
to provide some guarantee of living conditions to employees, this was not guaranteed in a wagelabor system (Foglesong 1986, 62). Challenges over how to avoid wage labor and attain a living
wage underwrote much of the contemporary class struggle (White 2020, 316). As wage labor
made no guarantee of “secure employment, good health, decent living conditions, and freedom
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Counting both first- and second-generation immigrants, over a third of the total population in the 1920s belonged
to communities of immigrants (Hirschman and Mogford 2009, 898).
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from want,” demands were made to the government and other collective institutions for
assistance (Foglesong 1986, 62). Class stratification also followed to some extent racial and
cultural divisions. In 1900, native-born white and older immigrant groups, such as British,
German, and (although to a lesser extent) Irish immigrants and their decedents were
overrepresented in better-paying occupations. Newer immigrant groups and Black Americans
were entrenched in lower-paying, more undesirable jobs like laborers, domestic workers, and
service jobs (Joseph 1989, 496). There was also ethnic segregation within specific occupations
throughout the last two decades of the 1800s (Joseph 1989, 496).
Inequality also fueled racist and xenophobic rhetoric, further separating labor groups by
culture, race, or immigration status. New immigrants and non-white peoples were often
ineligible for jobs that paid highly; when they took lower-paying jobs, racist and xenophobic
groups promoted ideas that immigrants took jobs away from native-born white Americans
(rhetoric that continues to persist today) (Martinot 2000, 55). Partially stemming from the
increased ethnic competition in the labor market, the early 1900s saw explosive growth in labor
unions. Union membership often came with racial requirements. Most early unionized peoples
were white (Rosenfeld and Kleykamp 2012, 1461), helping native-born and older white
immigrant groups to gain better conditions and maintain their preferred racial status. These
factors resulted in increased ethnic and racial violence around work (Olzak 1989). Such violence
can be seen in situations where non-white strikebreakers were brought in to break white union
strikes. One such incident of violence occurred in 1917 when the Aluminum Ore Company in
St. Louis brought in Black strikebreakers. A mob of white union workers randomly attacked
strikebreaking-unaffiliated Black residents of the area, killing between 100 and 200 people and
leaving 6,000 more homeless (Olzak, 1989; American Federation of Labor and Congress of
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Industrial Organizations 2017, 65). Racial violence did not have to be precipitated by strikes,
there were also general incidents of racial violence. For example, in 1908, out of tensions arising
from the Springfield Riots, white and Black Chicago dockworkers began fighting, resulting in
injuries to six men (Olzak 1989, 1304).
Labor stratification was exploited by capitalists in the form of racialized rhetoric and
actions but was also realized in different living conditions. The urban poor often lived in rundown tenement housing. In the mid-1800s, tenement housing was characterized by “filth,
dilapidation, overcrowding, degradation, dark rooms, offensive privies, lack of water, high rents,
and exorbitant profits [for landlords]” (Foglesong 1986, 56). Foglesong (1986, 56) describes
these conditions as a direct result of land commodification and lack of government regulation,
noting the connection to workplace and wage exploitation in what housing was available to the
lowest social classes. The early housing for industrial workers was often built by companies to
help attract labor for their factories, especially in places where such infrastructure did not exist.
However, with the influx of immigration beginning in the late 1800s there was no longer a need
to offer company housing to attract workers (Belcher and Rejent 1993). As such, many workers
rented from private landlords. The types of buildings low-wage workers occupied in cities, like
the tenements, were often of poor quality. However, little scholarly research addresses real
estate capitals’ role in the production of housing in this early period (Drier 1982).
3.1 Progressive Reformism
The Progressive Era and progressive reformism arose in response to these conditions.
The progressive tradition is relatively broad, both in temporal component and scope, and while
there are urban socialist and democratic socialist strains within the tradition 2, much of the action
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These will be further explored in the Municipal Socialism subsection of the Radical Urbanism section below.
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was more conservative as well. As the country rapidly urbanized, cities became sites of growing
concentrations of power and wealth. Elites in these spaces, often white, Anglo-Saxon,
protestant, educated professionals who held some measure of wealth and religious or moral
values, lead the progressive movement. Reformers looked to reorder space in ways that aligned
with religious morals and racialized, xenophobic, and moralistic fears of uprisings – political,
social, or towards work – by immigrant laborers, as well as fears about possible outcomes of
monopolistic behavior from industry (specifically consolidated control by robber barons)
(Foglesong 1986, 57; Shi 2020, 1446). Acutely aware of these threats, progressive reformers
attempted to “reshape [cities] towards three simultaneous ends: to ensure the social reproduction
of a rapidly growing labor force; to quell the urban rebellions that were rocking nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century cities; and to boost profits” (Stein 2019, 18). To these ends, progressive
reformers campaigned for housing reform, better labor conditions, to clean up slums, stop
corruption, and more (LaGrand 2020, 13). While progressive reformers and those who
sympathized with their causes ultimately made their way to the highest seats of government, the
early movement was less centralized. Across different American cities, reformers worked for
both tenement housing reform and expanded social services, which both aligned with their moral
values and served to appease the lower classes.
Outside of the socialist wings of the tradition, actions by reformers rarely made
fundamental changes to governing power structures. The politics of Robert Veiller, early
housing reformer, commissioner of New York State’s Tenement House Department, and
Director of the National Housing Organization, exemplify this type of limited reform. Veiller
believed housing changes were needed to integrate the working poor into the social structures of
dominant society, that charity would “only subsidize the slothful ways of the poor,” and that
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increasing wages would not better housing conditions (Foglesong 1986, 73). While there were
efforts to better living conditions in slums out of concerns for the welfare of their residents,
Foglesong (1986, 75) posits groups were motivated as much or more by concerns of the possible
externalities of slums onto broader society – the possible spread of social degeneration and
immorality, as well as concerns for physical sicknesses like typhus and cholera. As such, those
immigrants not considered a drain on society could be integrated into it, so long as wages were
kept low for industrial capitalists and American society remained dominantly white, AngloSaxon, and Protestant.
Progressive housing reformers instituted policies that included minimal government
intervention and continued reliance on the private housing market. Significantly, building codes
were introduced, which promoted health and safety by providing basic construction standards
(Stein 2019, 18). Stein points to New York City Tenements Laws from 1867, 1879, and 1901,
which ensured infrastructure like fire escapes, air shafts, widows, and toilets in new residential
construction as examples of such legislation. These laws resulted in safer housing conditions but
also increased social inequity. The poorest were unable to afford the rents in these new buildings
and were consequently relegated to those buildings in the worst conditions. During this time,
rising land and construction costs made new development the domain of the wealthy elite (Stein
2019, 18-19). Together, these forces increased wealthy elites’ capacity for profit within this
system.
3.2 City Beautiful
City Beautiful was another noteworthy movement that helped mainstream important
tenets of industrial urbanism. Beginning in 1909, it was one of the earliest urban planning
movements in the U.S. (Stein 2019, 19). It sprung from many of the same impulses that
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animated progressive reformism – a desire for more ordered cities, distaste for that classified as
unsanitary, a specific brand of Euro-American exceptionalism (Peterson 1976; Marcuse 1980a;
Foglesong 1986), and a level of distrust for unincumbered capitalism insofar as its creation of
cities (LaGrand 2020, 17). The movement focused on the creation of large-scale public
infrastructure and connected architectural and urban form to art, often in a neoclassical and
beaux-art style, with projects like monuments, grand boulevards, parks, and more (Peterson
1976). Implemented in both large and small cities, the creation of this sort of public
infrastructure-art required a high degree of central planning and control. City Beautiful projects
include Chicago’s World Fair, Central Park in New York, and the McMillian Plan for
Washington DC’s National Mall. Rarely, if ever, was housing mentioned in City Beautiful
plans; the movement paid little attention to housing beyond the classification of some housing as
unsanitary, and thus a target for destruction (Marcuse 1980a, 158-160). Many of these projects
were built on land that was occupied by low-income people, immigrants, or Black people, which
was desirable because of its central location (Stein 2019, 19). Projects were generally built with
public funds, but financial benefits were realized for the wealthy who were able to accrue profit
from the rise in property values around a project location (Stein 2019, 20). As poorer people had
been displaced to implement the projects, they had less access to the public benefits these
projects provided, such as those that come with green space in parks.
The reorganization of space previously occupied by Black, immigrant, or low-income
peoples, coupled with rhetoric of cleanliness and order is used very specifically in both City
Beautiful and progressivism more generally. The racialization of cleanliness and sanitization –
how it allows for moralistic discourse around and protection of a white body politic against a
racialized other – is well documented (Kristeva 1982; Goldberg 1993; Berthold 2010; Councilor
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2017). This discourse set a standard for which voices are listened to in planning debates (Stein
2019, 20), and whose housing is demolished, which enabled capital accumulation by upper-class
whites at the expense of Black, immigrant, and low-income groups. Racialized language and
fears were used explicitly in many cities across the U.S. in City Beautiful and progressive
planning. Even in places where scholars say that such rhetoric was not employed – such as
Historian James LaGrand’s (2020, 17) claims about Harrisburg, Pennsylvania – the results of
City Beautiful projects were the same, disproportionately effecting Black, Jewish, immigrant, or
low-income peoples.
3.3 City Practical
The final noteworthy movement in the creation of industrial urbanism is City Practical.
The transition from City Beautiful to Practical occurred with increasing demand for municipal
government intervention in city planning to resolve urban problems. Stein (2019, 20) has
classified the City Practical planning movement as “formaliz[ing] and expand[ing] the scope of
planning in the U.S. in order to rationalize urban and peri-urban expansion.” The large-scale
public works projects City Beautiful created were made significantly easier by the development
of a bureaucracy to implement them. However, City Practical reoriented development from
creating a beautiful or aesthetic city to creating more economical and efficient systems of land
use for the needs of a growing business system (Foglesong 1986, 199). City Practical offered a
response to the property contradiction by prioritizing economical and efficient systems of land
use as a social need. Streets and transit systems were necessary for systems of private
production, and the creation of these systems as publicly owned and produced assets eliminated
costs and risk for capital. The creation of city planning commissions across the U.S. (Stein 2019,
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20) and the emergence and mainstream implementation of city planning and management
professions (Muller 1991, 65) made intervention and coordination of such resources possible.
During this period, broader American society was institutionalizing anti-immigrant
rhetoric in the form of various immigration laws. Growing from concerns over labor
competition and the maintenance of racial and moral purity and American superiority, this had
begun with the Page Act of 1875 and Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 but expanded significantly
in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Together, the Immigration Act of 1917, the 1921 Emergency
Quota Act, and the Immigration Act of 1924 restricted immigration primarily to Britain, Ireland,
Scandinavia, and Germany (U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Bureau of the Census 1949, 33).
Zoning was an innovation in urban planning used in City Practical, allowing for control and
segregation within urban areas. From its introduction, zoning was used in racialized ways. A
contemporary proponent of zoning wrote:
“It is obvious that under the intense conditions of modern urban life with its density of
population, problems of housing, difficulties of circulation, lack of locally produced
sustenance, and highly specialized human activities, individual freedom of action is
necessarily curtailed […] curtailment naturally applies in some degree to property as well
as persons. Natural physical limitations automatically impose some degree of limitation,
but beyond that, organized social restrictions are logically and necessarily resorted to.”
(Whitnall 1931, 3-4; emphasis added)
De jure racial exclusion through zoning in cities paralleled racially exclusionary policies on
immigration. The first zoning law was introduced in California in 1885 to bar Chinese people
from various areas of the city. Zoning was first implemented in New York in 1916, at least
partially at the behest of high-end merchants on 5th Avenue who were concerned about Jewish
garment workers in the vicinities of their stores and customers (Stein 2019, 21). Zoning was
actively promoted to protect individual property from the encroachment of slums. In a 1922
zoning primer, the U.S. government wrote:
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“Suppose you have just bought some land in a neighborhood of homes and built a cozy
little house. There are two vacant lots to the south of you. If your town is zoned, no one
can put up a large apartment house in those lots, overshadowing your home, stealing your
sunshine and spoiling an investment of 20 years saving.” (Bassett et al. 1922, 2)
In this action and supporting rhetoric, the state showed preference to a class of land-owning
capitalists over a poor labor class.
City Practical also marked a move to national policies, including the implementation of
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA), which facilitated individual state action, and
the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (SCPEA), which facilitated municipal action. Both
laws allowed municipalities to create master plans for their cities, which were implemented
through zoning ordinances that set standards for types of land uses and size of buildings (Stein,
2019, 20). Use of zoning, planning commissions, master plans, and property controls was (and
is) nominally contrary to the desires of many capitalists, both industrial and real estate. It limits
their ability to shape cities unburdened by government intervention, as was generally true before
the 1900s (Stein, 2019, 20). In the tradition of the City Beautiful and progressive reform
movements’ distrust of capital, these strategies did place limits on capitalist’ reproduction of
space (LaGrand 2020, 17). However, as Herbert Hoover’s government argued, such measures
were in the interest of capitalists, as they allowed for an understanding of public reaction to
proposed projects, and thus a higher likelihood of acceptance. (Stein 2019, 20-21). Also
included in the zoning primer published by Hoover’s Department of Commerce is the statement:
“[c]ities do not do better when they allow office buildings so tall and bulky and so closely
crowded that the lower floors not only become too dark and unsatisfactory for human use but for
that very reason fail to earn a fair cash return for individual investors” (Bassett et al. 1922, 1). In
this, one can see the capitalist-democracy contradiction at play, as zoning and planning
commissions allow the State to maintain an air of democratic legitimacy in decision making
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while streamlining processes of capital accumulation within their control. While some measures
may have had benefits for certain members of the labor class – not having to live and work on
the dark crowded floors of buildings deemed “unsatisfactory for human use” – the ultimate
concern is with economic productivity and efficient capital gain.
These planning movements, taken together, helped stage policies enacted by housing
reformers and New Deal Democrats. These policy decisions were often made in response to
economic conditions, either post-war or post-depression. The government’s first large-scale
intervention into housing occurred during World War I. Because of government restrictions,
high building costs, and movement of capital to other activities, private home construction
essentially ceased. Simultaneously, the concentration of labor in war-production centers caused
massive housing shortages (Riley 1958, 856). The federal government intervened and
constructed new housing in those cities. Construction was overseen by two bodies, the United
States Housing Corporation of the Department of Labor, and the Housing Division of the
Shipping Board. Homes built during this time set improved standards for small home design and
community development through housing programs, indicative of the possible power of
government intervention in the provisioning of housing, but construction returned to the domain
of the private market upon the end of the war (Riley 1958, 856).
3.4 The Great Depression and New Deal
The next significant historical event to inspire planning and housing policy changes was
the Great Depression. The economic needs of this era led to the adoption of a public housing
program and greater accessibility to homeownership for individuals. This accessibility created a
greatly expanded market for single-family housing to the benefit of real estate capital. The Great
Depression strained many aspects – both financial and social – of Americans’ daily lives (e.g.,
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employment, housing, etc.). Before the Great Depression, financing for home purchases was
both scant and expensive. Many borrowers had to obtain second or third mortgages to make
buying possible, as lenders were often unwilling to cover more than 60 percent of a property’s
value (Schwartz 2015, 69). While most people continued to rent, homeownership rates had risen
in the years leading up to the depression. The non-farm homeownership rate was 36.9 percent in
1890, had risen to 40.9 percent by 1920, and 46 percent by 1930 (Snowden 2013, 54). There
was a residential housing boom following WWI (White 2009, 6-7), which peaked in a bubble
from 1925 to 1926, although the following dip is generally obscured by the Great Depression
(Wheelock 2008, 137). The price downturn in 1926 led to a rise in the foreclosure rate.
Although analysis of the Great Depression often focuses on family farm foreclosures, non-farm
homeowners and renters also felt the effects (Wheelock 2008).
When the depression began, housing prices dropped sharply, comparable with the decline
in consumer prices, while residential mortgage debt continued to grow (Wheelock 2008, 138).
Unemployment was high overall but varied across race and gender (Sundstorm 1992, 417).3
Overall, between 1929 and 1932, personal disposable income fell 41 percent, and non-farm
residential wealth fell 25.7 percent (Wheelock 2008, 138). Rising mortgage debt, coupled with
household income and property value declines, was a problem for homeowners, who had no way
to repay their debts. Two and a half years into the depression, over half of home mortgages were
in default and more than 1,000 mortgages were foreclosed on daily (Schwartz 2015, 69-70).
From the earliest days of the depression, the unemployed and dispossessed began to rise
up in protest. Piven and Cloward (1979) note organized “mob looting” of food from New York

In a 1931 survey of unemployment in ten industrial cities – Manhattan, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Cleveland,
Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, Birmingham, New Orleans, and Houston – white men were unemployed at a rate of 27.2
percent, Black men at 40.5 percent, white women at 16.8 percent, and Black women at 43.4 percent (Sundstorm
1992, 417).
3
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City to Henryetta, Oklahoma. Cities across the U.S. experienced rent riots. These were often led
by Black people and other low-income people of color who were already at a distinct
disadvantage in American society and were laid off at higher rates. The state response was often
violent (Piven and Cloward 1979, 49-55), but labor action was effective – Boyer and Morais
(1972, 261) claim rent riots and active resists of evictions allowed 77,000 evicted families to
remain in their homes in New York City alone. Evictions in other cities were halted as well and
government officials were forced to distribute rent relief payments. People protested under
communist and socialist banners, such as “‘Work or Wages’ and ‘Fight—Don’t Starve’” (Piven
and Cloward 1979, 50), a direct rebuttal to capitalism. Based on estimates from average dues
payments, the National Communist Party had just under 7,000 members in 1929 and 1930,
which grew to just under 10,500 in 1931, then 14,000 in 1932, and almost 23,000 in 1934. Party
officials estimated actual registration was 10 to 20 percent greater than these estimates (Gregory
and Flores 2015).
This was the reality in America when Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office in the spring
of 1933. FDR’s New Deal, which immediately began to be implemented, contained two
provisions that directly affected housing – the creation of the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation
and the Federal Housing Administration. In the June of 1933, the Home Owner’s Loan Act
created the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC), which purchased mortgages that were in
default using federal bonds and rewrote the mortgages on more favorable terms. Prior to HOLC,
private lenders typically set mortgages to be due in two to 11 years; HOLC extended the period
to 15 years. It also created the self-amortizing loan and increased the proportion of property
price a loan would cover. This made it easier to acquire a loan and less likely more than one
loan would be necessary. About 40 percent of eligible homeowners utilized the program
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(Schwartz 2015, 71-73). The National Housing Act of 1934 established the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), which continued and expanded the work of the HOLC. Critically, the
FHA insured mortgages from qualified lenders, removing the risk for lenders of borrowers going
into default. For the mortgages it insured, it extended HOLC’s 15-year repayment period,
requiring 25-to-30-year terms. Additionally, loans could now cover up to 93 percent of a
property’s value. Finally, the FHA set minimum construction standards for new home
construction and required a physical inspection before offering insurance (Schwartz 2015, 7375). With these interventions, the state bailed out many Americans whose mortgages were
foreclosed on and over their heads in debt. It also made homeownership an option for many
more Americans. However, state action was also highly beneficial to capital. These
interventions expanded the market for private homeownership, removed risks for lenders, and set
a policy precedent that would be greatly expanded following WWII.
It is critical to understand the ways that FHA actions utilized and interacted with racist
ideologies, why they promoted racial segregation, and who benefitted from those actions because
of the lasting impacts on American society. As Taylor (2019, 13) explains “a key to Black
housing inequality has been how residential segregation circumscribed space, inferred inferiority
through special isolation, and incentivized substandard maintenance and care from property
owners while driving up the costs to the better housing options for white residents.”
Understanding racial segregation in housing through the lens of racial capitalism 4 allows for a
deeper understanding of who benefits from the material conditions in the markets that are

4

The lens of racial capitalism comes from Cedric Robinson (2020, 9-10), who posited that racialism predated the
advent of capitalism and that capitalism made use of evolving racial ideologies, broadening, and ingraining them
into society.
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created. Racial attitudes are exploited for the accumulation of wealth by the capitalist class by
valuing certain people and the places they inhabit over others (Fluri et. al 2020).
In the financial uncertainty of the Great Depression, the government faced the challenge
of stabilizing markets across many sectors. This was done through New Deal policies, which
intervened in many markets for the first time. Uncertainties and volatility depressed the private
real estate market and dampened lenders’ willingness to back prospective homeowners,
especially first-time buyers. The FHA stepped into the market to provide stability and backstop
urban real estate markets, which necessitated deciding where investments would be safe and
where there was danger in the market. To do this the FHA created specific criteria to assess the
value of properties and whether they would be able to maintain that value over time, which they
outlined in the Underwriting Handbook manuals. An important part of risk assessment on the
part of the private real estate industry, which was endorsed in the policy of the federal
government, was understanding who lived in an around a neighborhood. To understand this, it is
helpful to look at HOLC maps.5 Qualities that could earn a neighborhood an “A” or green
designation on a HOLC map included high percentages of single-family homes, median incomes,
and owner-occupancy rates, and the people that lived there were white, non-immigrant families,
often of Anglo-Saxon descent. Qualities that could earn a neighborhood a designation of D or
red on a HOLC map included high percentages of multi-family units, large numbers of renters,
presence of undesirable immigrant groups or non-white people, or other visually unaesthetic
elements. Since the “kind and social status of its inhabitants” were viewed by the real estate
industry as being a core determinate of risk assessment, the presence of “adverse influences”
including “‘infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality groups’” were assumed to be

5

The FHA had their own maps but destroyed them in 1969 in response to a discrimination lawsuit.
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detrimental to the maintenance of property values (quoted in Schwartz 2015, 73). This meant the
properties that could be guaranteed financing, and where real estate capital was willing to invest,
were single-family homes in white middle- and upper-class neighborhoods (Schwartz 2015, 7475; Fishback et. al. 2022). It was significantly easier to obtain a mortgage in suburban areas,
which almost exclusively exhibited these “desirable” characteristics. This created a market for
white suburban home ownership that did not extend to urban neighborhoods or non-white
people. By ensuring that only white suburban families living in all-white neighborhoods were
almost exclusively able to access the privilege of homeownership, the government created a way
to private protect investments in such neighborhoods.
The Depression also inspired the creation of a public housing program. Housing
construction was an employment generator, and the government hoped it would appease the
widespread social unrest to have additional jobs as well as housing. On the matter of public
housing, as with tenement reform, New York City was a leader; the New York City Housing
Authority, established in 1934, was the first department of its kind. The Housing Act of 1937
established a way to provide subsidies from the federal government to local public housing
authorities (PHAs). Comments by Langdon Post, the first chair of the NYCHA made it clear
where the state felt the danger lay – “‘All revolutions are germinated in the slums: every riot is a
slum riot. Housing is one of the many ways to forestall the bitter lessons which history has in
store for us if we continue to be blind and stiff necked’” (quoted in Marcuse 1995, 242).
Housing projects such as First Houses, Harlem River Houses, and Williamsburg Houses, all in
New York, were constructed with the goal of jobs for the unemployed explicitly articulated
(Marcuse 1995, 242). There were a variety of reformers who worked to influence the early days
of public housing, especially in New York City. These included government officials like Post,
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people involved in leftist political movements, and social workers, all of whom had different
thoughts on how and where to implement public housing.6 These sorts of debates, as well as
those around questions of race, civil rights, segregation, and later gender, would continue to play
a major role in conversations around public housing construction. There was opposition to
public housing stemming from two main directions. The first was ideological opposition to the
use of government programs to ameliorate social ills (Marcuse 1995, 243). The second was from
the private housing industry, which bristled against encroachment into their market. However,
other groups of capitalists, such as the construction industry, were able to profit from public
housing projects and were thus at times aligned with reformers’ public housing goals.
3.5 World War II and Suburbanization
New Deal programs began to arrest the decline in the U.S. economy, halting 43
consecutive months where the economy shrunk. However, the transition to a wartime system
would be what most effectively reinvigorated the U.S. economy (Milward 1979). The U.S.’s
gross national product as measured in constant dollars grow from $88.6 billion before the war in
1939 to $135 billion in 1944. War-related production grew from two percent of the GNP in 1939
to 40% in 1943 (Milward 1979, 63). New housing starts also dropped substantially and
manufacturing was refocused on wartime necessities. The aftermath of the war, however, would
pose two new problems: (1) how to effectively transition the economy out of a wartime economy
and avoid another financial meltdown, and (2) the rising threat of communism globally. The
construction of single-family homes in the suburbs offered a solution that helped address both

6

Government looked to minimize costs. This meant first building on open land, which would then drive down costs
of slum land and more public housing could then be built there more affordably. Socialists did not want to see slum
landlords benefit through the purchase of their land so agreed to some extent with the government. Social workers
preferred building on slum land, as social work activity was already concentrated in those neighborhoods (Marcuse
1995, 245).
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challenges. New home construction not only reinvigorated the construction sector; suburban
single-family homes also required products from other industries – appliances and soft goods to
fill each home, and cars to travel. It also further tied the labor class, particularly the white labor
class, to the system of capitalism by offering to this group for the first time on a mass scale an
appreciating asset.
With New Deal programs before the war, the housing economy began to grow again,
with growth in the construction of both non-farm single-family units and multifamily units. By
1941, there were just over 700,000 units under construction (Reily 1958, 859), around 70 percent
of which were single-family units. Government policies through the HOLC and FHA, and
subsequent increases in non-governmental entity involvement in mortgage insurance,
jumpstarted a larger private housing market (Schwartz 2015; Snowden 2013). WWII brought
this development to a halt. While construction was started on 619,500 private units in 1941,
construction was started on 301,200 units in 1942, 183,700 units in 1943, 138,700 in 1944, and
325,000 in 1945 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1966, 18). This placed production far behind what
was needed to keep up with population growth, especially in growing urban defense centers
(Reily 1958, 859). There was some public housing built in major shipbuilding and defense ports
that prioritized workers producing goods for the war. The housing built was often temporary.
While already built under the auspices of war production, utilizing temporary structures avoided
addressing the long-term viability of publicly provided housing (Marcuse 1995, 250).
The U.S. had also become increasingly concerned about the rise of communism at home
and abroad. Communist party membership had risen steadily in the years leading up to the
beginning of World War II. Party membership continued to rise in the war’s aftermath, reaching
a peak of 75,388 in 1947 (Gregory and Flores 2015). Communist involvement in the labor
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movement also proved particularly concerning. The labor movement and labor militancy in the
U.S. grew throughout the early 1900s. To impose control on labor systems and regulate disputes
between capital and labor, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was established by the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as part of the New Deal. There was a huge growth in
unions after the passing of this act, along with a sustained campaign on the part of industrial
capital, established union elites, and the state to crush union power (Piven and Cloward 1979,
120-165). Communist groups were heavily involved in and critical to the successes of the labor
movement throughout this period, especially the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)
(Piven and Cloward 1979, 120-165). The outbreak of WWII allowed the government and
industry to define questions of labor action as questions of patriotism (Piven and Cloward 1979,
165). Strikes after this point became explicitly branded as communist in government rhetoric
and the press. There was another significant uptick in labor strikes in 1945 and 1946, inspired by
rising unemployment and decreases in real wages as overtime was cut back on, all resulting from
the cancellation of war contracts and demobilization. Piven and Cloward (1979, 168) classify
the danger this posed: “[b]y 1945, the CIO claimed 6 million members, the AFL claimed nearly
7 million. If ever there was a time for labor to demonstrate the force of organized numbers
voting in electoral politics, a force no longer constrained by the imperatives of war and the spirit
of patriotism, now was the time.” The response from capitalists to the widespread strikes in
1946 was severe; capital compelled the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act which greatly limited
union activity and forced unions to expel communist party members from their ranks.
Suburbanization also played a role in ensuring that there was an adequate way to stave off further
union backlash by allowing an outlet for a particular subset of the working class.

40

Drawing comparisons to communism and fascism also became an effective way to argue
against public housing programs. Politicians claimed public housing had been created in the
image of a Russian program, and that those who lived in public housing were communists,
agents of foreign powers, or otherwise unscrupulous (Argersinger 2010, 801). The beginning of
WWII furthered these claims – “longstanding appeals to isolationism and the connection of
public housing to foreign sources made more persuasive the opposition's insistence that America
could remain free of foreign problems only by perusing a uniquely American commitment to
homeownership” (Argersinger 2010, 803). This idea was validated by the unrest that swept
urban and defense areas across the U.S. in response to housing shortages and ongoing racial
discrimination, even though protesters often made comparisons between the U.S.’s segregated
policies and Nazism (Argersinger 2010, 804). The end of the war in 1945 necessitated a shift in
the economy and job creation for veterans returning from fighting overseas. Traditionally, there
had been increases in instances of homelessness following wars, especially for veterans from
those wars (Coalition for the Homeless, 2003). In the case of WWII, rapid demobilization also
exacerbated the existing housing crisis. Argersinger (2010, 804-805) describes the “sorry
spectacle of veterans sleeping in abandoned cars, chicken coops, and wooden crates” and quotes
the American Veteran’s Committee, who stated the need for a “V-H” day to house Americans,
particularly former service members, in need.
In response to these conditions, the U.S. government passed the Veteran’s Readjustment
Act of 1944, commonly referred to as the G.I. Bill. The bill provided for higher education, a
year of unemployment benefits, low-interest loans to start businesses, and more. Critically, it
also provided veterans a government guarantee of loans to purchase homes. The Veterans
Administration, rather than the FHA, insured these loans. However, the VA followed the system
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set by the FHA, including using its loan Underwriting Manual, which ensured that this was
disproportionately beneficial to white service members. As with the Great Depression, this
spurred immense growth in housing construction. In 1945 construction was begun on 326,000
new non-farm units. In 1946, there was an almost 215 percent increase, with construction
beginning on 1,023,000 new non-farm units. Between 1946 and 1964, almost 27.5 million new
homes were constructed in the United States. The vast majority of these were constructed as
private units, rather than as part of public housing, at a rate of nearly 40 to 1 (U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1966, 18). VA guaranteed loans were a significant part of this boom in the housing
market. Between 1949 and 1953, on average 24 percent of the mortgage market were VAguaranteed loans. The role of the government in the mortgage market post-depression and
through the war was significant. In 1940, FHA-backed loans made up 13.5 percent of the
market. In 1945 the FHA and VA combined insured 24.7 percent of loans. By 1950, the
agencies combined insured 41.9 percent of all loans (Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf
2012, 7). Most of these houses new were built in the suburbs, rather than in cities, which
encouraged the purchasing of homes outside the city. In the 1950s, roughly 70 percent of new
residential construction in metropolitan areas was in the suburbs rather than cities (Reily 1958,
861). These actions opened homeownership to middle-class white Americans in a way that it had
not been previously. In the early 1940s, the homeownership rate was around 43 percent. By
1960, it had increased almost 20 percent to 61 percent (Wachter and Acolin 2016). The Bureau
of Labor Statistics found that buying was cheaper than renting equivalent living areas in most of
the nine large metropolitan areas they studied in 1949 and 1950 (Reily 1958, 860). Not only was
it advantageous in the long term for individual members of the labor class to invest in
homeownership, but it was also a more practical economic choice at the time.
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3.6 The Civil Rights Movement
Throughout American history, Black Americans have been engaged in a continuous
struggle to realize basic human, democratic, and economic rights. Starting before and continuing
throughout the period described above, Black people in America engaged in consistent action
against the systems of oppression produced by racial capitalism. The end of WWII helped to
bring on two notable changes in the racial caste system of the U.S., which are in tension. First,
the rise of communism abroad created a need for liberal racial ideology emphasizing democracy
and freedom, to win over non-white newly decolonizedcountries abroad, which spilled into
domestic life as well. This undermined some of the potency of overtly racist laws and favorably
shifted the political terrain – especially at the federal level – on which the civil rights struggle
was waged (Piven and Cloward 1979 193-194). Second, although segregationist policies, both
governmental and private, had long maintained divisions between racial and ethnic divisions of a
broader labor class, the creation of stability and prosperity for white workers helped further
ingrain divides. The state was successful in placating white middle-class labor through the
creation of the suburbs and access to homeownership. Different racial groups occupied different
spaces and had highly differential access to homeownership – arguably the most successful
process of wealth accumulation for a labor class individual – which created new differences in
interests to be exploited.
Prior to the Civil War, much of the Black population in the U.S. was enslaved on
plantations in the South. Even after slavery was abolished, many Black Americans remained
bound to plantation agriculture by violent oppression from southern whites and the
implementation of exploitative systems of sharecropping and debt peonage. However,
industrialization and urbanization, particularly in Northern cities, helped facilitate the movement
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of Black people to other parts of the U.S. Outmigration spiked in times of industrial growth,
such as during wars, as Black people were able to access jobs in cities. Cities were highly
segregated (Price et al. 1970). While this had been true to some extent in the rural south, the
concertation and segregation of cities provided a measure of security and numerical advantages
when organizing (Piven and Cloward 1979, 203). Groups like the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and the
Congress of Racial Equality, among others, began in primarily urban spaces. In contrast to the
rural plantation south, where two factors – (1) less dense society, which resulted in relative
geographic isolation from other Black people, and (2) campaigns of violent white terror to
maintain racial order, as evidenced by the murders of Emmett Till, James Chaney, Andrew
Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and many, many more – urban areas in both the North and South
allowed more easily for gatherings, marches, and more. This is not to discount the extreme
racism, discrimination, and violence also present in cities. It is just to note the important and
visible role urban environments played as sites of organizing and action during the civil rights
movement, as they did in other types of labor movements as well.
Black soldiers returned from WWII to highly segregated and racist societies, often less
easily able to access the benefits of homeownership and other privileges afforded to their white
peers. With the need to show capitalism’s appeal to newly decolonized non-white countries,
having just fought a war against a country championing eugenics and the “Aryan” race,
American racism also became less easily justified. This gave Black Americans, who had long
been fighting for civil rights, a political opportunity. From the end of the war through the 1960s
Black Americans engaged in many mass protest actions and won numerous legal victories.
Well-known major protests include the Montgomery bus boycott (1955-1956); sit-ins in
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Greensborough, SC, Salisbury, NC, Chattanooga, TN, San Antonio, TX, and many other cities
(beginning en-mass in 1960); the Freedom Riders (1961); the March on Washington (1963); the
Mississippi Freedom Summer (1964); and more. While these were mainly in the South, there
were also significant protests and unrest in the North and West. On September 4, 1966, Martin
Luther King Jr and other peaceful demonstrators protested in Cicero, IL, a segregated suburb
known to be particularly hostile to Black people. These sorts of protest actions precipitated
larger riots in many cities. The summer of 1967, also referred to as the long, hot summer, was a
time when riots erupted in cities across the U.S., including Detroit, Atlanta, New York City,
Milwaukee, Newark, Cincinnati, Portland OR, and Tampa. There were several legal victories
during this time as well. These included, but were not limited to, the desegregation of the
military by executive order (1948); Brown v. Board of Education (1954); The Civil Rights Act of
1964; The Voting Rights Act (1965); and Loving v. Virginia (1967).
These sorts of protests cannot be divorced from the economic and housing conditions of
the day, evident in the protesting choices made by organizers and the conclusions of the Federal
government. The ingraining of race in American society was motivated by and key to processes
of economic exploitation (Robinson 2020), and so actions in response often specifically targeted
economic systems. The Montgomery Bus Boycott and sit-ins both disrupted the business of their
targets and were strategies that had been used in the past by the labor class in protest (Piven and
Cloward, 1979). Rioting in the summer of 1967 also led to the widespread destruction of
property. The Kerner Commission was formed to investigate these riots – what had occurred,
why it had happened, and what actions would prevent reoccurrence. The commission concluded
that America lived as two societies – Black and white, separate and unequal. It also explicitly

45

outlined housing as an area that contributed to discontent and necessitated intervention to correct
past injustices. A summary in the report’s housing section wrote:
“Many homes were physically inadequate. Forty-seven percent of units occupied by
nonwhites in disturbance areas were substandard. Overcrowding was common. In the
metropolitan areas in which disorder occurred, 24 percent of all units occupied by
nonwhites were overcrowded, against only 8.8 percent of the white-occupied units.
Negros paid higher percentages of their income for rent than whites. In both the
disturbance areas and the greater metropolitan area of which they were a part, the median
rent as a proportion of median income was over 25 percent higher for nonwhites then for
whites. The result has been widespread discontent with housing conditions and costs. In
nearly every disorder city surveyed, grievances related to housing were important factors
in the structure of Negro discontent.” (Kerner et al. 1968, 259)
The commission indicated poverty and discrimination were the two main reasons for this
disparate reality. They claimed the creation of ghettos was through market interventions, and
that such conditions would not exist in a “truly free and open market” (Kerner et al. 1968, 259).
Government intervention on the behalf of capital created situations favorable to capital’s
accumulation of wealth through the exploitation of various segments of the labor class. The
commission did not mince words about what practices created this situation. It wrote:
“To date, federal programs have been able to do comparatively little to provide housing
for the disadvantaged. In the 31-year history of subsidized Federal housing, only about
800,000 units have been constructed, with recent production averaging about 50,000 units
a year. By comparison, over a period only 3 years longer, FHA insurance guarantees
have made possible the construction of over 10 million middle and upper-income units.
Federal programs also have done little to prevent the growth of racially segregated
suburbs around our cities. Until 1949, FHA official policy was to refuse to insure any
unsegregated housing. It was not until the issuance of Executive Order 11063 in 1962
that the agency required non-discrimination pledges from loan applicants.” (Kerner et al.
1968, 259-260)
Overall, the Kerner Commission’s report indicated a developed understanding of the forces that
led to rioting, created by white capitalist society, and imposed onto Black Americans. After the
publication of the report, and in the immediate aftermath of Martin Luther King’s assassination,

46

the U.S. government passed the era’s final piece of major civil rights legislation. The Civil
Rights Act of 1968 had several provisions, but most notable is the Fair Housing Act. The act
prohibited housing discrimination in buying and renting based on race, color, religion, or country
of origin. Reflecting on the Fair Housing Act 50 years on, Jargowsky, Ding, and Fletcher (2019)
write: “The [Fair Housing Act] could well have been written with stronger enforcement
mechanisms, but the larger reason it failed to deliver integrated living patterns is that it was
undercut by the laws, regulations, institutions, and subsidies that govern and shape the
production of housing.” Furthermore, this was not the first time the U.S. had outlawed housing
discrimination based on race – the 1866 Civil Rights Act had outlawed housing discrimination as
a remnant of slave status, although did not include enforcement mechanisms (Rothstein 2017,
ix).
3.7 The War on Poverty
The War on Poverty also began during this time. There was an increased understanding
of the prevalence of poverty and unjust conditions in America, in large part inspired by the Civil
Rights Movement, although other factors included the publication of John Kenneth Galbraith’s
The Affluent Society in 1958 and Michael Harrington’s The Other America in 1962 (Bailey and
Danziger 2013, 5). Regardless of the exact matrix of factors that inspired the extensive welfare
reform package, poverty was still a significant issue in what was generally considered a time of
prosperity, and one that LBJ choose to focus on. Prior to the adoption of the official poverty
measure in 1965, having an income below $3,000 per year was the measure for poverty used by
the Council of Economic Advisors. By this measure, poverty had declined since 1947, but the
rate of decline slowed after 1957. In 1964, one-fifth of American families and the population as
a whole were considered poor (Bailey and Danziger 2013, 5).
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The War on Poverty included programs expanding healthcare, childcare, access to food,
housing, and more. Johnson’s primary housing goal was to ensure all American families lived in
units that met minimum housing standards. In 1964, eight million U.S. households lived in
substandard housing. Just over half a million families received low-income housing assistance
(Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 212). Johnson’s early actions sought to reform and expand existing
programs – his administration oversaw the construction of over a quarter-million public housing
units, roughly twenty percent of all public housing units ever built. In 1965, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development Act created the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), which would be the central governmental actor in housing going forward.
He also expanded two programs to subsidize the private construction of low-income housing,
which will be further detailed in the neoliberal urbanism section below. This reform indicated
the beginnings of a systematic turn towards more fully realized neoliberal housing policy
tradition. Although the government was massively involved in the provisioning and
management of affordable housing through LBJ’s policy, partnerships with private firms,
turnkey public housing projects, the leased housing program, and the rent supplement program
through the 1965 Amendment to the U.S. Housing Act all mark a shift towards an increased
reliance on, and not just action for, real estate capital and a free market system (Olsen and
Ludwig 2013, 213-217).
While this increased reliance on private entities marks a developmental shift in policy for
providing affordable housing, the War on Poverty marked an ideological shift as well, which
would soon have broader consequences. Historians and urban scholars have marked the Great
Society and the War on Poverty and the national civil rights policy occurring concurrently, as
distinct from other sorts of major national policy that came before. While policy like the New
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Deal was chiefly concerned with righting economic crisis, American society was not in an
economic crisis in the 1960s. During this time, Black Americans were seen as an increasingly
critical part of a winning Democratic coalition (Piven and Cloward 1979, 181-258) and specific
policies were crafted around the demands of Black Americans. This accounts for the passage of
both civil rights legislation and policy targeted towards predominantly Black urban areas –
“[d]emocratic leaders […] responded to the demands of the civil rights movement”; and “[w]hen
the largely nonviolent protests of 1960 were augmented by the urban riots of 1965 to 1968, the
Democrats’ sense of urgency increased, and their focus shifted from the abolition of legal
segregation in the South to the economic concerns of the Northern Urban ghettos” (Hays 2012,
92). In this way, a specific party of state power sought to strengthen its own position and ensure
its continued power through the strengthening of a specific base of support among Black
Americans. This also helps to explain the change in implementation mechanisms for social
programs. While in much of the early twentieth century the federal government directly
subsidized state governments and agencies, with civil rights and the War on Poverty it began to
work directly with local government jurisdictions and non-governmental entities (von Hoffman
2013, 168). This reliance was driven by fears that state officials would fail to enforce or poorly
implement civil rights laws but increased the power and influence of the federal government to
the detriment of the states governments’ power (von Hoffman 2013, 168).
3.8 The Decline of Industrial Urbanism
Industrial urbanism’s downfall stemmed from attempts to manage and control the labor
class. As the state sought to stave off the possibility of rebellion and restart to transition the
economy post-depression or war, it utilized policies that benefitted two capital groups – the
construction and real estate industries. Beginning post-Great Depression and booming in the
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post-WWII society, national housing policy pushed suburbanization, creating a sense of housing
individualism. Crucially, homeownership and the value that could be accrued from it set
homeowners as a class of mini capitalists over their own small kingdom, often in opposition to
any interference by the state and apart from other members of the labor class. The state often
sided with capitalists in labor struggles. Through siding with capitalists to maintain the security
of the system of capitalism in America as a whole, certain choices made were to the benefit of at
least certain members of the labor class. These forces, combined with the limiting of union
activity through the Taft-Hartley Act, decimated the collective power held by the labor class.
There was also a widespread backlash from white America to the Civil Rights Movement and the
strides it made. The War on Poverty’s significant spending program, untethered to depression or
war, also proved controversial.
This was crystallized in neoliberal Nixon and Reagan era rhetoric that reframed debates
around personal achievement and collective responsibility, ignoring the material forces at the
time various political decisions were made. This was possible in large part because of the
breaking of the power held by the working class, which allowed for more explicit and consistent
actions on behalf of capital without backlash from labor. For all the material gains made by
workers during the expansionist New Deal era, thirty years of growth- and individual-oriented
housing policy ironically led to industrial urbanism’s downfall. By tethering the private, uneven,
creation of wealth through subsidized homeownership – most notably via the postwar project of
suburbanization – industrial urbanism systematically divided and eroded its political base within
organized labor. Ultimately, the Vietnam War and racialized suburban backlash to school
integration drove a wedge even further into a divided working class, and created, in part, the
conditions under which neoliberal urban housing policy became ascendant.
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4. Neoliberal Urbanism
Overview
Neoliberalism arrived as a set of ideological and policy solutions to the crisis of
stagflation, arising in part from the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 and 1974 and the sovereign debt
crisis. It can also be seen in part as a backlash to the expansion of civil rights and social safety
nets through the War on Poverty. Neoliberal urban policy became the preeminent urban tradition
beginning in the mid-1960s-1970s and continuing through today. Within neoliberal urbanism,
there is waning power of industrial capital. As increased globalization and free trade made labor
cheaper overseas, industry has moved out of the U.S. Simultaneously, there is a continuous rise
in the power of real estate capital and its apparatus (particularly banking and investment capital),
so much so that capital takes a preeminent role over the state. In contrast to industrial
urbanism’s centralized and balancing state, in neoliberal urbanism, the state’s primary role is to
make capital accumulation as efficient as possible. This is done through deregulation,
privatization, austerity measures, increased reliance on free market mechanisms, public-private
partnerships, and the crushing of labor organization. Labor exists to create value for capital but
has little power and is disconnected internally and from the state. Housing is envisioned as a
market, thus the solutions and policies implemented to correct housing issues are market
interventions. In this market thinking, policies often prioritize the exchange value of real estate –
often beneficial to developers, the real estate industries, banks, and other private entities – over
the use value of a home as a place to live, which is first and foremost beneficial to the home’s
occupant (Taylor 2019).
This tradition also occurs on a political spectrum on which society travels back and forth
over time. On one side, a conservative neoliberal urbanism that dominates from the mid-1970s
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to the early 1990s in the style of Reagan and Thatcher; on the other, a progressive neoliberal
urbanism that reemerges in the 1990s promoted by Clinton, Obama, and Biden, harking back to
the Great Society programs of LBJ. These rise in nominal opposition to each other, although
both continue to enforce the same power structures and ideological orientation with capital above
all. Progressive neoliberalism continues the preeminent traditions of progressivism seen in
industrial urbanism, which make no changes to the power structures but does assist, be it for
humanistic, religious, moral, or other reasons, poorer members of the labor class in accessing
some basic rights and services. Conservative neoliberalism takes a harder line against such
measures, which are considered government overreach and intervention into what the free
market could do better.
Within neoliberal urbanism, across both conservative and liberal administrations, the
creation of affordable housing has relied almost exclusively on the government subsidizing
private construction or rents to private landlords. Persistent throughout this chapter and
consistent across affordable housing programs introduced under neoliberal regimes are
significant issues in the preservation of affordable housing. The urban landscape also becomes
an increasingly attractive investment for capital interests (Stein 2019 47-49).7 Governmental
responses to financial crises and capital freezes, combined with years of disinvestment created
spaces for unbridled profit creation and government incentive to allow it. Under the guise of
urban renewal programs, the government either implicitly or explicitly created opportunities for
for-profit economic investment throughout this period. These opportunities expanded greatly in
the latter half of the 1990s, continuing through the early 2000s to today (Stein 2019 47-48). This

7

This is not an entirely new phenomenon. Earlier policies such as Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 used public
funds to clear blighted urban areas which were then sold to private real estate developers at a reduced cost (von
Hoffman 2013, 169).
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means real estate capital always has options – utilize continuing government subsidies to provide
affordable housing and/or take advantage of opportunities for investments that will reap financial
returns as the real estate market grows. Taken together, these neoliberal policies have ensured
housing remains squarely within the domain of private capital and the free market, and access to
affordable housing remains out of reach for many. This section will trace the development of
these policies through eight historical periods: (4.1) the War on Poverty; (4.2) the Neoliberal
Response to Fair Housing; (4.3) Nixon’s Housing Program Freeze and its Aftermath; (4.4)
Reaganomics and Housing; (4.5) the 1980s Housing Crises; (4.6) Directions of Housing in the
1990s; (4.7) the 2008 Housing Crisis and Choice Neighborhoods; and (4.8) the Covid-19
Pandemic and Housing Today.
Historical Analysis
As seen in the industrial urbanism section, specific U.S. policies, most notably the
National Housing Act of 1937 and the G.I. Bill, were responsible for significant increases in
homeownership and rapid expansion of the suburbs. Such policies and their implementation
were heavily racialized, and when combined with white flight in response to the civil rights
movement and desegregation efforts (Heathcott 2015), created unequal two societies, one Black
and one white. The overall homeownership rate increased by almost 20 percent between 1940
and 1960 (Wachter and Acolin 2016, 4); but the increase was distributed unequally, with
homeownership rates in 1960 under 40 percent for Black Americans and over 60 percent for
white Americans (Asante-Muhammad, Buell, and Devine 2021, 6). The poverty rate was also
racially divergent, with the white poverty rate under 20 percent and the Black poverty rate at
more than 50 percent in 1960 (Matthews 2012). White wealth become an important base of
political power, and politicians from both parties appealed to white suburban voter concerns.
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While explicitly racist policies like redlining were no longer socially acceptable, new policies
were often deeply racialized and unevenly distributed wealth and resources to suburban white
neighborhoods while concentrating institutional violence in Black and minority communities.
Many of these policies spoke to white suburbia’s racialized conceptions of safety and criminality
and were justified by increasingly popular ideas about individualism, personal responsibility,
cultural pathology, and continued patriarchal ideals of family.
Policies, agencies, and organizations first created under industrial urbanism continued to
be utilized. The most obvious example is HUD. Another that became increasingly important
was the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, later renamed Fannie Mae), originally
created in 1938. FNMA/Fannie Mae was created as a private organization that was authorized to
issue bonds to raise money to buy FHA-backed mortgages, creating a secondary mortgage
market. While not a particularly prominent force in the housing market in the 1930s through the
1960s, it is central in the expanding secondary mortgage market discussed later.
4.1 The War on Poverty
The War on Poverty sought to expand access to safe and affordable housing for poor
Americans. The industrial urbanism section above outlined the ways the policies implemented
as part of this effort aligned with industrial urban tradition, including significant growth in public
housing and the creation of HUD. This section will discuss in more depth the ways in which the
War on Poverty began to, in some of its implementation mechanisms, turn towards
neoliberalism. This occurred in the expansion and creation of programs that supported the
private construction of low-income housing and supplemented rents to private landlords. The
end of this section will discuss American attitudes toward public housing in more depth to
explain the societal rejection – aligned with neoliberal philosophy – of such strategies.
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In addition to the 280,000 public housing units built, LBJ’s policies also relied on
increasing the share of affordable housing constructed and managed by the private market.
Initially, the administration expanded two programs instituted in the late 1950s and early 1960s –
the Section 202 Elder Program in 1959 and the Section 221(d)3 Below Market Interest Rate
(BMIR) Program in 1961. The former authorized nonprofits to construct homes for elderly and
disabled people (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 210). The latter authorized nonprofits or for-profit
firms to construct homes for low-income families using FHA-insured loans, typically at three
percent interest rates, from private lenders, which then were sold to Fannie Mae at face value
(Schwartz 2015, 203). Both programs had significant flaws. Section 202 almost exclusively
served white people in white neighborhoods. For BMIR, systems to set rent and select residents
resulted in few extremely low-income families were served – eight percent of BMIR households
made less than $3,000 annually, compared to 61 percent of public housing residents. Combined,
the two programs had produced less than 12,000 units before Johnson’s presidency (Olsen and
Ludwig 2013, 210). Despite the programmatic flaws, Johnson significantly ramped up
production through these programs. About 167,000 new units were begun through programs he
inherited (other than public housing) under his tenure (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 213). In 1965,
Johnson instituted a rent supplement program and established the Section 23 Leased Housing
Program. Section 23 let PHAs rent private units then sublet them to low-income households
qualifying for assistance or enter into agreements with private developers to build, rehabilitate,
and manage housing units for qualifying low-income households (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 213).
Building on these concepts, in 1968 Johnson replaced these programs with the Section
235 Homeownership Program and Section 236 Rental Program. Section 235 subsidized the
construction of new units and the purchase of existing homes for sale to low-income households
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by subsidizing the difference between 20 percent of a household’s income and total housing
costs. Section 236 Rental Program subsidized construction and rehabilitation of units for lowincome households with annual subsidies equivalent to a one percent mortgage (Schwartz 2015,
204 and 389). One significant issue faced by these programs was the preservation of affordable
housing. For Section 236, as well as BMIR, units produced were guaranteed to remain as
affordable housing only if the federally insured mortgage was in effect (Schwartz 2015, 208).
Johnson’s policy emphasized public-private partnerships and private developers for a few
reasons. As stated earlier, direct distributions (not to state agencies) gave the federal government
more control over the implementation of programs. Another reason is fiscal. The Vietnam War
and Johnson’s domestic social programs were both highly costly, and there was concern federal
spending would surpass the debt limit. To ensure this did not happen, Johnson chose not to fully
fund Great Society programs, or to build public-private partnerships where private capital could
also fund public policies and projects (von Hoffman 2013, 177). Finally, trends in the broader
housing market made publicly supported private construction of affordable housing attractive to
the real estate market. Interest rates in the late 1960s and early 1970s rose as housing starts
slowed (Taylor 2019, 4). Additionally driving this reorientation in investment potential from
suburb to city was the invention of “[n]ew financial instruments such as mortgage-backed
securities, [which] produced an intense demand for homeowners and more money for home
financing” (Taylor 2019, 4). Mortgage-backed securities were one tool used by LBJ to respond
to budgetary constraints – Fannie Mae sold participant certificate bonds backed by its mortgage
pool (von Hoffman 2013, 177).
Although Johnson was responsible a massive growth in public housing, the political tide
was turning against such projects. Public housing projects were increasingly criticized as
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isolated, blighted, and crime ridden. The views, heavily reliant on racialized stereotypes, were
the opinion of many white Americans and were shared widely in the media (Bloom, Umbach,
and Vale 2015). Public housing opponents cited examples like the demolition of Pruitt-Igoe in
St. Louis to support these arguments (Ludwig and Olsen 2013, 206). While the dominant
narrative around public housing was of blight and disaster throughout much of the 1970s, 80s,
and 90s, this realistically represented a small subset of public housing. The National
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1992 only identified six percent of public
housing units as severely distressed (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public
Housing 1992; cited in Bloom, Umbach, and Vale 2015, 18). Critics of public housing also
failed to look at other contributing factors to its decline. White flight from cities was a loss of
people and capital, lowering the tax bases of urban areas and forcing cities to adapt to tighter
budgets. This also resulted in lower numbers of tenants for public housing projects, which cut
into their budgets and ability to make repairs and upkeep. Critically, white flight began in part
with FHA loan practices and was furthered by legislation like Brown vs Board of Education,
well before the passage of the Fair Housing Act, so this mass white migration was assisted by
FHA policies. More broadly, cities often dealt with budget crises by neglecting to provide
sufficient services to low-income and minority areas (Heathcott 2015). The institutional
hollowing out of inner cities and public housing created conditions that fostered neglect and
disrepair. These perceptions then provided something to reject and allowed for a reorientation to
other free market-based solutions to affordable housing.
4.2 The Neoliberal Response to Fair Housing
In combination with neoliberal policies, hard to enforce legislation on civil rights had
negative or unanticipated consequences for the Black community. The power given to private
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companies through neoliberal policy, and the inherently perverse financial incentives held by
private capital made the continuation of discrimination and exploitation through housing
seemingly inevitable under neoliberal urbanism. The passage of the Fair Housing Act formally
ended housing discrimination but made no significant mark on the ways racial inequality and
racial capitalism were (and are) embedded into the structure of the real estate market in the U.S.
The demand for new homeowners and sources of funding, combined with the loose regulation
and oversight, resulted in targeted and predatory reinvestment in primarily Black and lowincome urban communities (Taylor 2019).
In 1970, the homeownership rate for Black Americans was 42.6 percent, just under 43.8
percent, the rate for Hispanic and Latino Americans, and the lowest of any racial group measured
(Asante-Muhammad, Buell, and Devine 2021, 6). This meant low-income Black or Latino
Americans were an easy population to target for expanding homeownership. The Section 235
Homeownership program provided funding for the purchase of existing homes, allowing lowincome individuals to purchase these properties with a small down payment and a low-interest
mortgage guaranteed by the government. However, years of redlining and other racial
marginalization created conditions of poverty and distress in urban areas and for Black residents.
This became an excuse for major depository banks to decline to lend to Black Americans and in
such areas. This left Black Americans at the mercy of unregulated mortgage banks, often
subsidiaries of larger depository banks, whose profits were based solely on volume sales (Taylor
2019, 5). Together, these factors made Black and other low-income Americans living in urban
areas prime targets for what Taylor (2019) terms predatory inclusion.
In Taylor’s (2019, 5) words, predatory inclusion “describes how African American
homebuyers were granted access to conventional real estate practices and mortgage financing,

58

but on more expensive and comparatively unequal terms.” People targeted for predatory
inclusion were disproportionately Black, female, heads of their household, and low-income.
These people were targeted because they were likely to fall behind on mortgage payments and
into foreclosure (Taylor 2019, 5). As the mortgage banks made a profit from the volume of
sales, and as mortgages were guaranteed by the federal government, it did not matter how long
the owner was able to stay in the home; in reality, the more turnover and mortgages that could be
signed for a home the better, as it meant a higher profit for the banks. In total by 1979, 20
percent of the households originally subsidized by the section 235 Homeownership program had
defaulted on their loans (Weicher 1980, 124; quoted in Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 219).
While predatory inclusion relied on policies implemented in the latter years of the
Johnson administration, the practice would generally be carried out while Nixon was in office.
This political shift from Johnson to Nixon represented a shift from the importance placed on the
Black voting bloc towards more explicit appeals to the silent (white) majority. Critically, this
was possible because of the way the Johnson administration had responded to Black Americans’
demands for fair housing with separate anti-discrimination legislation and a new mandate for
housing and homeownership production (Taylor 2019, 16). This is to say, that while there are
real and important differences in the lived experiences of various marginalized communities
under various administrations, both democratic and republican, both operated under the broader
regimes of neoliberal urbanism and contributed to the exploitation of racial minorites and the
labor class.
4.3 Nixon’s Housing Program Freeze and its Aftermath
Nixon took office in 1969 having run on a campaign of New Federalism and appeals to
the “silent majority” of white suburban Americans. This group was not the target of many of the
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Great Society programs implemented by the Johnson administration, and by making claims of
overspending and unnecessary programs, Nixon was able to gain widespread support. Nixon’s
election left HUD and fair housing advocates on uncertain footing. HUD and the Fair Housing
Act were both quite new. The latter did not include mechanisms for enforcement the way other
civil rights legislation did. Furthermore, officials such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 8 who
oversaw welfare reform in the White House, posed a barrier to real progress (von Hoffman 2012,
45).
The most significant housing-related policy decision of Nixon’s presidency was his
housing program freeze. Responding to scandals within housing programs, questions about the
effectiveness and financial constraints, Nixon instituted a housing freeze affecting all major
subsidized housing programs in 1973, including Section 235, Section 236, public housing, and
more. Issues with the programs’ effectiveness were clear. The programs produced far fewer
units than Johnson had aimed to in the War on Poverty.9 It was also clear that Section 235
resulted in a high number of foreclosures. By 1975, ten percent of homes supported by the
program had been foreclosed on or defaulted on mortgage payments (McClaughry 1975, 4).
Similarly, 14 percent of all units produced by the Section 236 Rental Program and the BMIR
program were in projects whose owners had defaulted on FHA mortgages (Schwartz 2015,
206).10 Scholars have different interpretations of the housing freeze and Nixon’s HUD policy.

Moynihan was a sociologist famous for his notion of “cultural pathology”, a deeply racist and patriarchal belief.
Johnson’s administration had set a goal to construct or rehabilitate six million subsidized units for low-income
households over the decade. The largest programs were Section 235 and 236, which combined served 800,000
households at their peak (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 214). Counting the 280,000 public housing units Johnson built as
well, this results in a little over one million units, well below the goal.
10
Many scholars and government officials commented on these issues at the time, although there was no consensus
on why the programs failed. More neoliberal (politically conservative) views of the programs noted overall failures,
including high profile scandals, and noted a high percentage of foreclosures in the Section 235 program
(McClaughry 1975). Republican representative William Widnall explained the high foreclosure rate as indicative
that those eligible for participation in the program “were incompetent buyers of housing” (Olsen and Ludwig 2013,
220). This explanation does not account for the myriad reasons presented by Taylor and other scholars – predatory
8
9
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Many see the core of the issue as financial, with the results of programs unable to justify the
costs (Nathan 1996, 56-57). As oil prices in the early 1970s rose rapidly, operating costs rose
faster than tenants’ incomes, leaving tenants unable to afford rents and mortgages, leading to
default (Schwartz 2015, 206). Scholars also see the freeze as a way to achieve additional
political aims. Some argue it was to break down barriers that plagued low-income housing, such
as the “iron triangle of lobbyists, Congressional committees, and federal agency officials that had
grown up in housing policy” (von Hoffman 2012, 47). Others see it as a path to halt housing
desegregation where Nixon could maximize a political payoff while avoiding responsibility for a
controversial civil rights decision (Bonastia 2004, 38).
Whether motivated by these reasons or others, it is critical to examine is what followed
the freeze and who benefited most from the changes that were implemented. In 1974, two weeks
after Nixon’s resignation, President Gerald Ford signed the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 to replace the programs affected by the freeze. The Act instituted the
Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation (Section 8 NC/RC) Program and the
Section 8 Existing Housing Program. Section 8 NC/RC subsidized rent by covering the
difference between a percentage of tenet income (initially 25 percent, later changed to 30
percent) and fair market rent (FMR). The government signed contracts with developers

targeting by the private market resulting in higher rates, a deep and enduring history of racial discrimination, and
more (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, Taylor 2019). However, this individualistic, historically ignorant view does echo
neoliberal understanding of personal responsibility. McClaughry (who quoted Widnall) (1975, 7-9) offered three
alternatives for housing programs going forward following his critique of Section 235 and HUD. The first focused
on individual aspiration to homeownership for “worthy” families; the second sought to increase production by
removing artificial constraints on the housing market; and the third was a community strategy focused on
neighborhood revitalization (commonly known as gentrification or its precursor processes). Other contemporary
scholars highlighted other issues with the programs. Taking a more radical (politically liberal/leftist) view, Phyllis
Ann Wallace (1975, 33 and 41) noted the failure of the programs to address past inequities in housing policy. This
interpretation offers a very different path forward for housing, emphasizing strategies specifically designed to target
those affected by racial discrimination. Wallace (1975, 44-46) also noted the high unlikelihood of this happening
given national reluctance to fund a comprehensive program.
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guaranteeing that unit subsidies would last for 20 to 40 years. The system was flexible, as it
provided direct subsidies for individual tenants and varied based on individual incomes, but also
because developers could choose how many units of a project would be devoted to Section 8
NC/RC. Developers were free to use either market rate or below market rate financing if they
were able to secure it. Developers also were able to advantage of accelerated depreciation
allowances which reduced their federal income taxes, making NC/RC an attractive option
(Schwartz 2015, 207-211). The Section 8 Existing Housing Program provided rental subsidies in
the form of rental certificates to qualifying families with household incomes up to 80 percent of
the area median rent. Similar to Section 8 NC/RC, the program subsidized the difference
between 25 percent (later changed to 30 percent) of tenant income and FMR. There were also
stipulations for what units could be rented to ensure certain space and quality standards
(Schwartz 2015, 228).
Section 8 programs also faced issues related to costs, preservation of housing, and ease of
utilization. Many of these issues were embedded in the design of the programs. For Section 8
NC/SR, there were no incentives to keep costs low if fair market rents were high enough to allow
for profit on top of debt service and operations costs. High rents were perpetuated yearly by
HUD’s annual adjustment factor, which current rents were multiplied by to determine the next
year’s rent. Senior housing also made up about half of all NC/SR units and had additional social
services costs added which contributed to the program’s expenses (Schwartz 2015, 208). These
factors were further exacerbated by the high interest rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
There were significant preservation issues faced by the NC/SR program, where guarantees of
affordability expired with the end of the contracts (Schwartz 2015, 208). There were also
concerns when it came to who was served and who benefited. The Section 8 NC/SR program
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was successful at serving some of the poorest Americans while having a better record of
financial success than public housing or earlier subsidy programs. However, the program made
the tradeoff between financial risks and serving those with high need by eschewing many eligible
participants and serving communities traditionally considered safe – such as low-income elderly
white people living in suburban communities, (Hays 2012, 158). These issues also existed with
the Section 8 Existing Housing voucher program. It was not an effective intervention for many
who qualified – within the first five years a little less than half of enrolled households were able
to find landlords that would accept their vouchers (Schwartz 2015, 232). The Existing Housing
program was also costly for the government. Private landlords whose tenants received subsidies
were able to make money from the program. While rent burdens for tenants decreased, the total
dollar amount of rent subsidized for beneficiaries increased substantially. For tenants that moved
to more expensive units, average total rent was 70 percent higher than their rent before
participation in the program. There was also an increase in rent of 28 percent for program
beneficiaries who stayed in their same unit (Hayes 2012 158-159). As tenants paid a set
percentage of their income regardless of total rent, “the landlord had an incentive to raise the rent
to the FMR ceiling, while the tenet had no incentive to resist such as increase” (Hays 2012, 129).
Nixon had also prosed an additional program post freeze – Community Development
Block Grants (CDBG). This too was implemented under the guidance of Ford’s administration
through the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. This program is still in place
today. These grants were a “new concept in assistance […] in which communities are granted
broad latitude in using funds for a variety of development activities, as long as they complied
with some general federal guidelines” (Jacobs et. al 1986, 255; quoted in Schwartz 2015, 268).
Eligible development activities include property and real estate management activities, social
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services, economic development, and conditional construction and rehabilitation of public
facilities. Ineligible activities include any sorts of acquisition, construction, or rehabilitation of
buildings for general government conducted activities, political activities, and with some
exceptions, income payments or new housing construction (U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development N.d. c; Schwartz 2015, 269). Funds are distributed primarily to large cities
and urban counties, although some funds are distributed to state governments for use in smaller
communities (Unites States Department of Housing and Urban Development N.d.c; Schwartz
2015, 269). There is also a requirement for CDBGs that at least 70 percent of grant funds should
benefit people with at least 80 percent of AMI, with the remaining 30 percent to be used in the
prevention or elimination of urban slums and blight or for natural disaster relief (Schwartz 2015,
269).
The 80 percent AMI requirement is controversial, as AMI for an entire metropolitan area
is generally significantly higher than it is for urban core residents (Schwartz 2015, 271). Census
data from 1975 helps to illustrate this issue. For metropolitan areas with populations of at least
one million, the mean household income within the central city was $12,806, compared to
$17,103 for households outside the central city. For metropolitan areas with populations less
than one million, the mean household income for central city households was $12,938, and for
households outside of central cities, $15,030 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1977, 13 and 32). One
element of the program with roots in the more industrial urban tradition is the requirement for a
consolidated plan, laying out the housing needs of the municipality or state and laying out
specified strategies and timelines, to receive funds (Schwartz 2015, 298). Ultimately though, the
grants themselves allow for broad flexibility in their implementation and encouraged devolution
in the planning and implementation of housing and social programs (Schwartz 2015, 268).
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Setting a high AMI bar for most of the funding and allowing 30 percent to be used towards
activities without a specified income cap has the added result of allowing for projects that center
on gentrification or urban renewal (Gramlich 1998, 12; cited in Schwartz 2015, 271). These
often harm the lowest income households, allowing for the accumulation of capital by private
entities.
All in all, while the housing freeze angered many in the housing industry, including home
builders and housing interest groups (von Hoffman 2021, 46), ultimately, the replacement
programs still put these groups in advantageous positions to accumulate capital. Shifting away
from large production programs to cash-based directed assistance and state or local control
nominally promised to cut costs and increase efficiency. In reality, the new programs created
opportunities to accumulate private wealth for landlords, homebuilders, and other private
corporate entities, rather than the poorest Americans, through federal subsidies and tax breaks.
They were often still cost-inefficient for the government and ineffective in increasing the
affordable housing supply.
4.4 Reaganonomics and Housing
The favorable position of private capital was further entrenched by reforms made during
the Reagan administration. People often point to Reagan’s leadership (and Thatcher’s
simultaneous leadership in the U.K.) as the key factor in realigning national policy priorities
towards neoliberalism. His leadership certainly marked the fuller realization of neoliberal
changes in the ideological debate around policy priorities, although there were roots of these
changes in earlier administrations. (Hill 1983, 216). In his campaign and throughout his
presidency, Reagan derided welfare, championed supply-side and laissez-faire economics, and
promoted tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy. These principles would dictate his economic
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policy, but they were informed and complicated by contemporary economic and social realities
when Reagan took office. The U.S. experienced a crisis of stagflation in the late 1970s, with
high oil prices and interest rates, and a stagnating economy with little or no growth (Wessel
2017). This took place among broader trends of deindustrialization and urban population loss
(particularly in northern cities) (Bluestone 1984; Rappaport 2003), and growing trends in the
“recapitalization of capital” (Hill 1983, 216). Reagan’s solutions also continued the departure
from comprehensive programs and focused on individual-based solutions and triage-based
approaches (Hill 1983, 212-217). Considering the notions of policymakers over who was
“savable” and a continuing focus on the trifold “urban pathologies” of crime, housing
abandonment, and fiscal insolvency (Hill 1983, 211), these triage approaches raise questions
about who was served by urban policy. Reagan’s commitment to rewriting tax-law and pushing
for small government ultimately had significant effects on the mechanisms by which low-income
housing was created and the role of the government in housing.
It is important to understand which groups benefited from Reagan’s policies. One
obvious way to do this is to look at tax cuts and welfare spending. Reagan instituted a sharp
three-year tax cut in his first six months in office that was heavily targeted at reducing the tax
burden of high-income individuals and corporations (Meeropol 2001, 3). Just after the tax cut
had passed, the U.S. entered a short depression and unemployment rose to around ten percent in
1982 (Meeropol 2001). Unlike the policy response by Gerald Ford’s administration to a
similarly short depression about a decade earlier (or the Keynesian spending of industrial urban
precedent), the government did not extend any form of unemployment benefits. Comparisons of
the two depressions and policy responses highlight this lack of benefits to unemployed workers –
there was a 30-to-40-point difference in the number of unemployed people accessing benefits
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between the two administrations. Furthermore, Reagan’s tax cuts focused on the wealthy, which
did not incentivize working-class consumption which could have helped to mitigate the
depression (Meeropol 2001, 2-3). For these reasons, scholars highlight that the depression
during Reagan’s presidency did much more damage to the economy (Meeropol 2001, 3).
However, this refusal to provide unemployment was generally commensurate with Reagan’s
perception of direct subsidies for low-income people. Throughout his campaign and presidency,
welfare, and heavy use of stereotypes like the “welfare queen” provided a racialized and
villainized opponent for Reagan that appealed to the white voters who had supported Nixon. As
Susan and Norman Fainstein (1989, 42) explain, Reagan’s position was that domestic crises were
the result of bureaucratic regulation and non-productive domestic spending on a “bloated welfare
state that diverted resources from capital accumulation but investors to consumption by the lower
classes.” In the administration’s view, government retrenchment was an antidote to this
economic malaise (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1989, 41-42). From 1980 to 1986 spending on
housing as a percentage of social spending remained relatively consistent, around 2.1 percent of
GDP, although social spending overall declined six points as a share of the federal budget (Bixby
1990, 13-14).
Which affordable housing programs were funded changed as well. The Reagan
administration terminated the Section 8 NC/SR program in 1983 and introduced their own
Freestanding Voucher program as an offshoot of the Section 8 Voucher program. This program
extended flexibility, particularly as it pertained to what sorts of units could be rented. Rather
than base subsidies on pre-calculated fair market rent for any given municipality, the
Freestanding Voucher program allowed housing authorities to designate payment standards that
acted as the maximum allowable rent. However, tenants could also choose how much they
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wanted to cover. While 30 percent was standard, they could pay less if they chose a unit with
rents lower than the payment standard or cover the difference if they chose a more expensive unit
(Schwartz 2015, 228). Usage of vouchers did increase during the mid-1980s. While voucher
utilization rates were a little under 50 percent in 1979, in 1985, 68 percent of those receiving one
of the types of vouchers succeeded in using the subsidy (Schwartz 2015, 232). The increased
flexibility is generally regarded as a good thing for tenants, but it also obviously expanded the
number and type of units that could be rented out, which is also beneficial to private landlords
and developers. The Freestanding Voucher Program also furthered devolution, placing more
power in the hands of local municipalities to set rates.
In addition to beginning a new voucher program that was less reliant on the federal
government’s planning, Reagan’s administration also addressed housing as a production issue.
Reagan’s administration introduced the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. The act decreased income tax rates, most substantially for the
wealthiest Americans, and consolidated other tax brackets. 11 In terms of housing finances, the
act “eliminated the ability of individual investors to claim ‘passive losses’ (i.e. the depreciation
value of assets) as a deduction against regular income,” which was a critical funding component
of prior housing construction programs (Hays 2012, 231). This angered private investors in lowincome housing development who felt the government had “‘broken its contract’ with them by
removing one of the major financial benefits of their previous investments” (Hays 2012, 231). It
also concerned housing advocates that the production and rehabilitation of low-income housing
might stop, particularly considering the preservation challenge already faced by low-income
housing programs. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit was included to replace the tax break
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This promised to result in a seven percent decrease overall in income tax revenue that would be made up by an
increase in corporate tax revenues (Auerbach and Slemrod 1997, 601).
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incentives, ensuring that there was a continued financial incentive for private developers to build
affordable housing. The LIHTC provides a dollar-for-dollar credit. To be eligible for the credit,
at least 20 percent of the units developed needed to be affordable to households earning less than
50 percent of the area’s median income (Scally, Gold, and DuBois 2018, 2). Typically,
developers sell LIHTC credits to fund the initial development. Schwartz has described the
numerous incentives for private investment in these projects – outside investors are rewarded
with a tax credit, depreciation allowances and other tax benefits, and some portion of capital
gains if the property is sold (Schwartz 2015, 137). Overall, Reagan’s policies decreased welfare
or declined to provide additional support to the working class in times of economic hardship. At
the same time, he ensured there continued to be avenues for capital accumulation in the
production of affordable housing.
4.5 1980s Housing Crises: The Savings and Loan Crisis and Section 8 HUD Scandal
The largest housing crisis of the 1980s was the Savings and Loan Crisis, which affected
the system for financing mortgages of private real estate purchases. The mortgage system for
private housing had remained relatively consistent from the late 1930s. New Deal reforms had
created a stable mortgage system that was insulated from other financial sectors. Schwartz
(2015, 75) describes this system as “two distinct circuits”. The larger of the two involved the
savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks and were collectively referred to as
‘thrifts.’ These groups were the largest source of mortgages through the 1970s with lines to
larger regional home loan banks, and additionally offered passbook savings accounts with
deposits guaranteed by the federal government. Their profits came from the difference between
the amount of interest charged on mortgages and the amount of interest paid out to account
holders. The other circuit involved FHA-issued mortgages and institutions that supported them
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(Schwartz 2015, 75). Interest rate volatility in the 1960s and inflation and increasing interest
rates in the 1970s put thrifts under pressure. Ultimately, less funding was available for lending
(Curry and Shibut 2000, 27; Sherman, 2009; Schwartz 2015, 76-77). To address these
challenges, and with government encouragement and facilitation, thrifts began to increasingly
rely on low-yield mortgages, adjustable-rate mortgages, selling to the second-hand mortgage
market, and investment in real estate (Curry and Shibut 2000, 27; Schwartz 2015, 77).
Deregulation, as well as poor real-estate investments on behalf of the industry (Schwartz 2015,
77), led to the Savings and Loan Crisis.
The crisis began in 1986 and lasted until 1995. During this time, 1,043 thrifts, almost 50
percent of all federally insured thrifts, failed or were closed (Curry and Shibut 2000, 26). At the
end of 1986, 441 thrifts were insolvent and 533 thrifts had less than two percent of total assets in
tangible capital. The former had $113 billion in assets, the latter $453 billion. Together, this
accounted for almost half of the thrift industry’s assets. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), the thrift industry’s federal insurer was declared insolvent (Curry and
Shibut 2000, 27). The government ultimately enacted the Financial Institutions, Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989 to bail out the industry and correct the
issues. The legislation created a structure to handle the crisis, setting an asset liquidation process
for failed institutions, and new requirements and capital standards for remaining thrifts (Curry
and Shibut 2000, 28; Schwartz 2015, 78). One critical piece of the legislation was a requirement
to set capital standards at least as stringent as national banks. This required a specific amount in
reserves for each dollar that was loaned, a requirement that many thrifts were unable to comply
with. As such, thrifts increasingly sold to a secondary mortgage market, and the total share of
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mortgages controlled by thrifts declined substantially. This is partially responsible for the
massive growth in the secondary mortgage industry (Schwartz 2015, 77-78).
There was another housing crisis that hit at the very end of the decade, a scandal
involving HUD and a Section 8 program called the Moderate Rehabilitation (Mod Rehab)
program. The Mod Rehab program was different from Section 8 NC/SR or Existing Housing.
The program was begun in 1987 as an additional source of repair funding to upgrade rental
housing used by the Section 8 Existing Housing Vouchers (U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development N.d. a). The program was relatively small and thus left in a discretionary
find overseen controlled by the HUD secretary. In April of 1989, the HUD Inspector General
released a report detailing misconduct and corruption in the awarding of the funds. Richard
Allen Hays, a scholar of urban housing policy describes an example of how the scam operated:
“A developer with an idea for a project would contact a former Reagan administration
official, such as, in one instance, former interior secretary James Watt. For a hefty
consulting fee (in Watt’s case, $300,000), the official would call [the current HUD
director Samuel] Pierce, or his top assistant, Deborah Dean, who would promise approval
of the project. Then, the developer would advise the city in which the project was to be
located to apply for units through HUD’s nominally merit-based application procedure.
Within a few months, the city would be allocated the exact number of units, which
‘coincidentally’ corresponded to the exact number needed for the developer’s project.”
(Hays 2012, 243)
The pushback was swift on both sides of the aisle, and the scandal resulted in HUD reforms
including liming discretionary funds, use of regulation waivers, and consulting fees (Hays 2012,
244). However, reflecting more broadly on this scandal and others related in some way to
housing – the Keating Five, accusations against Senator Alfonse D’Amato, etc. – Hays points to
certain core features of neoliberal urbanism. In the best light, such scandals suggest a
particularly close relationship between private capitalists and elected politicians. Taking a more
cynical stance, Hays suggests that such corruption is inherent and to be expected in a system that
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relies on private, profit-motivated developers to provide affordable housing and other
government services (Hays 2012, 244-245).
4.6 Directions of Housing in the 1990s
The urban landscape of America in the 1990s followed many larger trends from the
decades prior. Urban population decline had continued in cities across the Northeast and
Midwest throughout the 1980s, apart from some major metropolitan areas like New York City
and Chicago. During this time, cities across the South and West grew (Rappaport 2003, 21).
This is in part a reflection of industrial movement to the South and overseas because of lower
unionization rates and an ability to pay lower wages (Cobb 1984; Hirsch, Macpherson, and
Vroman 2001; Rose 2018). The elimination of lower-skilled unionized manufacturing jobs
nationally and growth in non-union low wage service sector employment and high skilled
employment came with a significant shift in income distribution, increasing gaps between the
poorest and wealthiest Americans (Teitz 1998, 651). The overall poverty rate also increased
from 1980 to 1990, from 11.6 percent to 14.5 percent (Drier and Atlas 1995, 6). These sociodemographic changes occurred contemporaneously with other socio-demographic changes as
well. There was also growth in female-led and single-parent households, as well as the
immigrant population in the United States (Teitz 1998, 651). This growth did not follow the
idealized white, two-parent, patriarchal American family.
The housing environment of the time was characterized by a heavy reliance on private
market forces to provide housing. Two-thirds of Americans owned their own homes, but there
were significant issues accessing housing for low-income Americans. In 1991, 72 percent of
low-income renters were cost-burdened, spending over 30 percent of their income on housing
expenses. Over 40 percent of low-income renters were severely cost-burdened, spending more
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than 50 percent of their income on rent. From 1970 to 1989, the number of low-cost apartments
decreased by 1.3 million, all while the number of families living in poverty rose. Homelessness
was also a growing issue, with more than a million people experiencing homelessness every
year. Public housing had not been a significant funding priority since the 1960s, and there are
around 800,000 families on waiting lists for PHA units. Out of 13.8 million low-income rental
households eligible, only 30 percent received some sort of federal assistance. In total, the HUD
budget was 25.6 billion (1.7 percent of the federal budget). American homeowners enjoyed
more than double this amount in tax deductions on mortgage interest and property taxes (Drier
and Atlas 1995, 2-7).
The broader power balance within urban planning in the 1990s was shifting as well.
Planning was increasingly recognized by and reliant on public funding. This was in line with the
general devolution of housing and social programs but was also a result of the burgeoning
environmental movement. With the backlash to the 1960s Great Society programs and the
growing environmental movement, there was increasing power in the hands of local citizenry
groups, local governments, and developers (Teitz 1988 649-651). These three groups, to varying
degrees, held significant power in the development decisions of their local areas. Access to such
power was heavily racialized and classed, exemplified by the suburban rich’s ability to build
gated communities or the growth of the NIMBY movement, two examples often out of reach for
poor urban residents. While the suburbs were still a significant force in housing and urban
development, environmental concerns about the wastefulness of urban sprawl, threats to open
space, and energy waste made higher-density urban development more attractive (Teitz 1988,
660). These anti-sprawl concerns, along with concerns about social and spatial race and income
segregation, were critical in the development of the New Urbanism movement. Through high-
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quality mixed-use, mixed-income, compact (often infill) developments, that supported various
types of housing and relied on alternative modes of transportation, New Urbanism promised to
stimulate social and economic diversity, economic activity, and create an enhanced sense of
community (Garde 2020). However, many scholars look cautiously or critically towards the
New Urbanism movement. They cite concerns over who is served, raising questions about
gentrification (Smith 2002; Day 2003; Stein 2019).
Housing and urban policy in the 1990s responded to these factors, and there were several
important changes in housing policy throughout the 1990s that are particularly critical to
understanding how housing in the U.S. works today. The first important change was a
reinvigorated focus on community development rather than just individual project development.
This can be understood partially in response to the focus on human capital and on individual
betterment as it pertains to education and specific skill production. It also reflected the adoption
of New Urbanism ideals by local municipalities across the U.S., and national officials, including
Henry Cisneros, Clinton’s HUD secretary. The second was the growth of the secondary
mortgage market and new lending practices, and the third is the legislation included in the
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998. These policy developments were to
some extent facilitated by the 1980s crises mentioned above but were also parts of a broader
trend within neoliberal urban policy to respond to urban crises and indicative of the democrats’
agenda in the White House.
In the 1990s there was an increasing reliance on community-based development
strategies. These strategies allowed for local control, and designated spaces for private capital
investment and accumulation, generally through processes like revitalization and gentrification.
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There were several community-based grant programs established by the federal government.12
Block grants were a critical funding source for community and regional development in the early
1980s and 90s, making between 60 and 90 percent of community and regional developmentbased federal aid to local and state governments (Finegold, Wherry, and Schardin 2004, 3). The
HOPE, standing for either Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere or Homeownership and
Opportunity for People Everywhere, programs also began in the early 1990s with the goal of
promoting homeownership opportunities for low-income Americans. 13 The largest and most
prominent HOPE project was HOPE VI. Hope VI was enacted through an appropriations bill in
1993. Originally called the Urban Revitalization Demonstration, the project grew out of
recommendations from the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing
released in the 1992 report (Hays 2012, 271; Schwartz 2015, 184). The Commission found
commonalities in distressed public housing projects, including disrepair, the need for social
supports, and distress in the surrounding community (National Commission on Severely
Distressed Public Housing 1992, 3). They suggested solutions to these issues through a set of
overall policy priorities including addressing the needs of residents, the physical condition of the
public housing stocks, management and operational needs, and a focus on other ‘nontraditional’
strategies. HOPE IV originally focused primarily on resident empowerment and addressing the
physical condition of public housing. It aimed to replace distressed public housing with higher

12

This included many block grants, including Community Development Block Grants, the HOME Investment
Partnership Program, and Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA). HOME focused exclusively on
affordable housing subsidies for low- and mid-income households (Schwartz 2015, 272), while HOPWA focused on
individuals with HIV and AIDS and could be used for housing, medical care, and support services related activities
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. d).
13
HOPE I envisioned the sale of public housing projects to tenet management organizations. HOPE II applied the
same scheme to privately owned developments receiving public funding. HOPE III funded the construction and
rehabilitation by non-profits that could ultimately be purchased by low-income Americans (Hays 2012, 247-249).
HOPE IV, also known as HOPE for Elderly Independence, combined Section 8 rental assistance and support
services to allow low-income elderly individuals to continue living independent of nursing communities (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. e).
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quality, lower density mixed-income developments (Schwartz 2015, 184). Eventually, the
program’s goals became broader and more ambitious to include “economic integration and
poverty concentration, ‘new urbanism’; and inner-city revitalization” (Popkin et a1 2004, 14;
Cisneros and Engdahl 2009; quoted in Schwartz 2015, 184).
A variety of practices were put in place to enable this expanded focus on attracting
capital from slightly higher-income individuals and wealthy private developers or firms. The
program encouraged the use of public housing authority financing in combination with other
strategies, including the use of other block grant or LIHTC funding, market-rate rentals, and
homeownership opportunities to finance mixed-income development. This meant issues inherent
to the funding sources, like affordability preservation concerns with LIHTC-funded units, would
transfer to the new project. Concerns over resident safety – a significant issue in the
systematically underfunded and neglected public housing projects – lead to a reliance on
concepts like defensible space14 and increasing privatization of space. The concept was lauded
as the physical planning answer to social ills, enabling and empowering residents to take control
of their communities (Newman 1995). In the nominal pursuit of attracting middle- and higherincome families, these projects also included more “attractive” features: lower-rise structures
with porches, bay windows, gabled roofs, and amenities like central air, dishwashers, and
washers and dryers. These were designed to make them look less like the monolith structures
associated with public housing and to provide amenities commonplace in other market-rate units
(Schwartz 2015, 185). These types of amenities often furthered privatization, as encouraged by
defensible space concepts. For example, the inclusion of a porch expanded the footprint of

14

The idea of defensible space relies on the idea that large public spaces were ones in which people did not feel
responsibility for what occurred, leading to crime, and that privatization imposed a sense of responsibility on the
owner and would isolate and confine the criminal by diminishing their territory (Newman 1996).
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private property, and the presence of a washer and dryer in the home negated the need to go to a
central laundry room or out for laundry facilities. Yes, this eliminated spaces of plausible danger
for residents, but it also eliminated spaces of possible connection and community.
HOPE VI ran from 1993 to 2010. Although public housing residents were already by and
large some of the lowest-income Americans, the program targeted PHAs with extremely
disadvantaged residents. Over a third of the households made less than $5,000 annually,
compared to about a fifth of all public housing residents. They were also disproportionately
households headed by Black women (Duryea 2006, 581). Through revitalization grants, the
program was responsible for demolishing 96,226 public housing authority units (Schwartz 2015,
198). These were replaced by 107,800 units, roughly half of which are affordable for lowincome families. To account for the remaining net loss of PHA units, HUD issued 78,000
vouchers (Hays 2012, 272). This was necessary because much of the housing that HOPE VI
replaced, about 80 percent, although categorized as distressed, was occupied (Schwartz 2015,
188). There were also an additional 56,755 PHA units torn down as part of a demolition-only
component of HOPE VI that lasted from 1996 to 2003 (Schwartz 2015, 198).
One of the most significant critiques of the HOPE VI program is that it did not
adequately serve the PHA residents displaced in the revitalization process. Only 16 percent of
the original residents relocated back to HOPE developments (Popkin, Levey, and Burton 2009).
Newly imposed standards to qualify for revitalized housing – such as a clear criminal
background check, work requirements, poor credit history, imposed one challenge to return
(Schwartz 2015, 188). Another was the long timespan of the redevelopment projects, which
meant that some families who moved just decided not to return. Research from 2003 found that
one in five residents studied did not receive relocation assistance or new subsidies (Schwartz
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2015, 189). Significant portions of the original residents did not enjoy the benefits of their
specific redevelopment, and about a third were not able to gain any benefits from relocation
either (Popkin, Levey, and Burton 2009, 496). While some surveys of former PHA residents
who moved because of HOPE VI reported high resident satisfaction, research also raised
concerns about affording utilities or groceries, disconnection from former social support systems,
and whether the program truly encouraged racial integration (Popkin et. al 2004, 29-31;
Schwartz 2015, 189; Kost 2012). The latter two concerns also reflect the broader neoliberal
tendency to internally disconnect those with the least power.
The program also offered increased control and opportunities for financial gain by private
capital. PHAs awarded HOPE VI funding often contracted out the management of the final sites
and allowed each project to be managed independently. The budgetary and project tracking
models were both taken from the private real-estate sector and allowed lenders to have
accountability for their project-specific investments (Schwartz 2015, 187-187). HOPE VI
projects also allowed for higher per-unit development costs. This created opportunities for a
greater accumulation of capital for private development and building firms. These changes are
particularly striking because unlike other federal subsidies that rely on private capital to develop
low-income housing, this subsidy is also combined with a replacement for pre-existing, often
occupied, public housing units. These changes were justified by expected lower maintenance
costs from decreased vandalism and better wear on well-constructed buildings (Popkin et. al
2004, 21; Schwartz 2015, 185).
This redevelopment, and the luring of wealthier, often white residents back to urban
centers has been critiqued for facilitating gentrification (Duryea 2006, 570). One report, aiming
to address the effect on crime displacement, noted in addition to significantly positive effects on
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crime, that areas surrounding the sample of HOPE VI projects studied saw an increase in
redevelopment in areas surrounding the target sites (Cahill, Lowry, and Downey 2011, 74).
Statistical analysis of a spatial gentrification index in the 250 largest metropolitan statistical
areas and HOPE VI tracks show mixed results of HOPE VI’s impact on gentrification within
target neighborhoods. Because of the localized implementation and varying local conditions, in
some places, HOPE VI had the impact of growing gentrification, while in others it reduced the
degree of gentrification (Lee 2017) Another possibility is that while these changes may not
have caused gentrification, it might have been the precipitating factor for HOPE investment.
Scholars have argued that gentrification in areas surrounding distressed public housing, and the
subsequent pressure put on local government’s real estate interests and new residents provided
the catalyst to address distressed public housing. Local governments then made use of HOPE VI
as a tool to further assist the revitalization/gentrification process (Wyly and Hammel; Goetz,
2013; Newman 2004; quoted in Lee 2017, 17-18). Either way, HOPE VI displaced public
residents from their homes, often left them without new support or subsidies, and created spaces
for private housing creation of units that would serve wealthier people.
The 1990s also saw further growth in the secondary mortgage market. Fannie Mae,
Freddy Mac, and Ginny Mae continued to be significant forces in the secondary mortgage
market. These three government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) had strict underwriting standards
for loans they bought. In the 1990s, continuing into the 2000s, other, non-GSE investment firms
began issuing mortgage-backed securities, called private-label securities. These firms did not
utilize the same strict underwriting standards and invested in higher-risk subprime or
“Alternative A-paper” mortgages (Schwartz 2015, 82). This was possible because of the
introduction of risk-based pricing. Through subprime mortgages, borrowers who were
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considered a higher risk – who lacked consistent income, already had high debt, or had low
credit scores – and may not have been approved for mortgages before were now able to secure
one, but with higher fees and interest rates. These subprime mortgages represented a new type of
predatory lending (Schwartz 2015, 85-87 and 350-354). They were disproportionately issued to
minority homebuyers. By 2006, 53.4 percent of loans made to Black people to purchase homes
and 52.7 percent of loans made to refinance were subprime (Schwartz 2015, 355). These
mortgages were increasingly offered by mortgage banks, which were not regulated as strictly as
depository banks. Mortgage banks had incentives to bond those borrowers to higher interest
rates even if borrowers were qualified to receive lower rates based on their risk index, which
exacerbated the issues of subprime lending. These banks also typically sold their loans to the
secondary mortgage market (Schwartz 2015, 87). While the secondary mortgage market held 17
percent of single-family mortgages in 1980, that had increased to 44 percent in 1990, and 59
percent in 2000 (Schwartz 2015, 82), in part because of the growth of subprime loans.
The final significant event in the housing environment of the U.S. in the 1990s was the
passage of the 1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act. The Act created the Housing
Choice Voucher (HCV) program by combining Nixon’s Section 8 Existing Housing certificate
program with Reagan’s Freestanding Voucher program. The system allowed PHAs to set
payment standards, depending on the area, between 90 and 120 percent of FMR. It also retained
the flexibility of Freestanding Vouchers, allowing tenants to choose to spend above 30 and up to
40 percent of their income on rent, and for vouchers to be used anywhere in the U.S. once
awarded. It also rolled back earlier provisions to give landlords more leeway in choosing not to
rent to voucher-holders (Schwartz 2015 229-231). Early in the 1990s, 81 percent of those
receiving vouchers were successful in using them. However, by 2000, utilization success rates
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had fallen ten percent. The voucher program continued to grow throughout this time, adding a
little over 200,000 households in the four years following 1998. Part of this growth is because
vouchers were used to replace other types of housing assistance, as seen in the case of HOPE VI
(Schwartz 2015, 229-231). The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act further aided in
creating new spaces for capital investment and accumulation in the process. The Faircloth
Amendment limits the construction of public housing, prohibiting the use of public funds to
construct units if it will increase the number of units a given PHA operates. It also struck down
the one-for-one replacement rule, allowing the mixed-income development plans to be
unrestrained by the number of units held prior (Hays 2012, 272). The passage of the Quality
Housing and Work Responsibility Act ensured affordable housing would continue to be provided
by private landowners, subsidized by the federal government, and once disinvested in
communities would be targeted for private capital gain.
In all, the political tide in the 1990s further prioritized creating spaces for private capital
to invest safely in urban areas. Through the HOPE VI program, this wide urban renewal practice
targeted occupied public housing, converting it into privately owned mixed-income
developments. The curtailing of public housing was furthered by the Faircloth Amendment,
which ensured the U.S. would inevitably remove itself from any state provisioning of affordable
housing. Finally, the growth of the subprime mortgage industry set up the mortgage market, and
the economy as a whole, for catastrophe in the decade to come.
4.7 2008 Housing Crisis and Choice Neighborhoods
There were two major events affecting housing between 2006 and 2012. The first was
the Great Recession; the second, which is in some ways connected, is the continued rise of
austerity politics limiting many government housing interventions. To address the recession,
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this section will first discuss conditions in the housing industry and the role of subprime lending
to provide context for additional discussion of the scope of the recessions’ fallout and the
government response. The second event must be understood through a few lenses. Austerity
measures fit squarely within the realm of neoliberal policy. There was growing support for
austerity measures prior (e.g. Reagan tax cuts), but the financial crisis of 2008 provided a
precipitating moment to respond with such measures (Baker 2010; Peck 2012; Theodore 2020).
These specific austerity measures were also a result of partisan motivated reasoning, specifically
increased concern for national debt by politicians whose party does not hold the White House
(Kane and Anson 2020). Importantly, in this case, it is also a reflection of the conservative
backlash to the election of Barack Obama 15. Conservatives vowed to block Obama’s legislation
from the beginning of his term. With the combination of these factors, there was an effective
turn to greater austerity measures by conservatives during these years (Schwartz 2010; McGahey
2013; Williamson 2013). Post-depression recovery was slow, a result of the austerity-inspired
limited response to the 2008 crisis (Baker 2010; Madowitz 2014). In the housing sector, many
programs to fund housing and community development were cut significantly. Those that were
succeeding in being funded aligned with a heavily neoliberal vision. This section will address
one program – the Choice Neighborhood Initiative, the Obama-era HOPE VI replacement
program that began in the aftermath of the recession (Schwartz 2015, 444-446) – laying out some
of the broader austerity background, the roots of the program, its overall goals, and the way it is
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Many political commentors have referenced this backlash. Prominently, Ta-Nehisi Coates has commented
extensively, including in his book Eight Years We Were in Power. Coates comments on the prevalent racism in
America, making sure to clearly separate backlash faced by Obama from the President’s moderate political stances.
He wrote an accompanying article published in The Atlantic sharing many of the same thoughts, which can be found
at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/the-first-white-president-ta-nehisi-coates/537909/.
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implemented. The subsequent two chapters of this thesis will focus in-depth on Lewiston,
Maine’s Choice Neighborhood Implementation Plan.
The housing market had grown steadily from the 1990s until 2006. In the first five years
of the decade, the value of residential real estate grew by two-thirds, from $15 trillion to $25
trillion. In 2006, the market began to decline by measures of prices, sales volume, and new
production. Within the first 10 months of the year, annual housing starts fell by around 800,000
from a high of 2.27 million to 1.47 million (Case and Quigley 2008, 161-163). There are two
dominant narratives explaining the events leading up to the recession. The first primarily
concern first-time home purchases, while the second points to refinancing as the heart of the
issue. Both highlight the subprime mortgage industry for its central role in the crisis (Goodman
and Zhu 2018). The former argument is that subprime mortgages were allotted to homebuyers
who would have failed to qualify for a prime loan and that these home purchasers then failed to
repay, instigating the crisis. Depending on ones’ ideological affiliation, the root cause of this is
any number of things. In a more leftist to centrist take, the blame rests at the feet of the
government for its policies aiming to increase the number of home buyers and the unethical
practices of corporations (Lewis et al. 2010, Goodman and Zhu 2018). More conservative (and
racialized and classed) takes point to the irresponsibility of borrowers who took out difficult to
repay mortgages. As discussed above, these subprime mortgages were a type of predatory
lending, often specifically targeting low-income, minority groups who had few other options.
The other significant argument is that subprime refinancing loans played a much more
significant part in the crisis (Foote et al 2008; Goodman and Zhu 2018). Although there is not
extensive scholarship on why people chose to refinance, one HUD study conducted from 2001 to
2003, during the height of subprime lending and the housing boom, offers some context. First,
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the analysis notes that households of all income levels took advantage of refinancing
opportunities, which is aligned with other researchers’ findings that subprime refinancing loans
often went to those with better credit (Goodman and Zhu 2018, 3). Second, HUD approximates
that 35 percent of cashed-out equity from refinancing was used for home improvements, while
almost 50 percent was used to pay off high-cost consumer debt or make investments (Office of
Policy Development and Research 2004, 1-2). This is indicative of the wider connections
homeownership has in the American economic system and the ways that individual
homeownership monetizes on the exchange value of a home.
2008 marked the beginning of the worst recession in the United States since the Great
Depression. Sparked by the bursting of a housing bubble in the U.S., and the widescale
defaulting on mortgages, the effects were felt worldwide. Between 2007 and 2012 over 12.5
million homes in the U.S. were foreclosed upon. In the aftermath, foreclosure rates have
remained at historical highs (Schwartz 2015, 411). Subprime mortgages were delinquent and
foreclosed upon at higher rates, but with significant unemployment, prime mortgages were also
foreclosed on as homeowners facing lost income could no longer afford to pay (Schwartz 2015,
414). There were human consequences to the 12.5 million homes foreclosed upon. Foreclosure
eliminated access to equity and damaged credit scores, which has relegated many to the rental
market. Schwartz also points to increased stress, tension, conflict, and disruptions, which affect
health, childhood development, and more (Schwartz 2015, 21-22). A report by the Center for
Responsible Lending in 2010 quantified the demographics of the crisis up to that point.
Unsurprisingly, given the disparate racial composition of subprime loan holders and the deeply
ingrained discrimination and segregation of the housing market, communities of color were
disproportionately impacted by foreclosure. According to this report, by 2010, nearly eight
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percent of Black and Latino Americans had lost their homes to foreclosure, more than 3 points
more than non-Hispanic white Americans (Bocian, Wei, and Ernst 2010, 2). On top of those
already foreclosed on, more than 20 percent of Black and Latino borrowers were likely at
imminent risk of foreclosure, seven points more than white borrowers (Bocian, Wei, and Ernst
2010, 3). There were also effects on the neighborhoods in which foreclosures occur. The Center
for Responsible Lending estimated that foreclosure caused the value of approximately 95 million
other homes in neighborhoods where foreclosures occurred to decline by around $2.2 trillion.
The average loss for families near foreclosures was a little over $23,000, or nine percent of home
value. In this loss too, the Center found that minority neighborhoods were impacted
disproportionately. Minority families lost on average over $40,000, or 16 percent of their
homes’ values. In total, half of the spillover loss (1.1. trillion) was associated with communities
of color, reflecting the high rates of residential and class segregation (Center for Responsible
Lending 2013). These estimates only accounted for losses in direct proximity to foreclosure and
did not include the estimated $7 trillion loss of home equity resulting from the crisis overall.
The government’s response, which spanned two administrations, was primarily
concerned with economic stabilization and preventing further foreclosures. There were three
significant pieces of legislation passed in 2008 and 2009, a series of modifications to assist the
anti-foreclosure efforts made between 2010 and 2012, and a legal settlement that are important to
understanding the general atmosphere and trends in how the government approached the housing
and financial crisis. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) provided $300
billion to a program that helped people with subprime mortgages refinance their homes with 30year fixed-rate FHA mortgages. It also created a block grant program for neighborhoods in for
attempt to mitigate the negative effects of foreclosed properties through acquisition, renovation,
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sale, or demolition (Schwartz 2015, 424). The 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
established the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP),16 authorizing up to $700 billion to
purchase troubled assets, primarily from large financial institutions. Fifty billion dollars in
TARP funding went to the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program launched in 2009. MHA
had two pieces – the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable
Refinancing Program (HARP). The former creates direct subsidy incentives for mortgage
servicers to reduce debt payments of individuals at risk of default and foreclosure. The latter
enabled homeowners who were current on mortgages with negative equity to refinance
mortgages held by GSEs (Schwartz 2015, 424). Finally, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) was a stimulus package that had provisions for a wide array
of social and infrastructure investments. At the time, the Congressional Budget Office estimated
it would cost $787 billion, which included $13.61 billion for various housing concerns (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2010; Congressional Budget Office 2012, 1).
Additional programs created between 2010 and 2012 included a fund to assist states in their
foreclosure prevention programs; a program to encourage foreclosure alternatives, such as deedin-lieu of foreclosure17; a program to modify second mortgages for homes already participating
in HAMP; a program to assist unemployed homeowners in making mortgage payments; and
amendments to HAMP to expand access and reduce the total amounts owed (Schwartz 2015,
429-431). The last significant piece of the political response to the foreclosure crisis came in
2012, with a legal settlement between the federal government and 49 state governments, and the
five largest mortgage servicers. The agreement acknowledged the abusive and unethical lending
practices the banks had engaged in and stipulated reforms to future loan and foreclosure

16
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This is what is often called the bank bailout.
Deed-in-lieu of foreclosure is where outstanding debt is forgiven if the homeowner surrenders the property.
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practices. Part of the settlement included $25 billion paid out by the banks (Schwartz 2015 432433; U.S. Department of Justice 2021), which was portioned out for various uses. The lion’s
share – $17 billion – went to reducing the principal owed and short-sale assistance for
homeowners at risk of foreclosure. A significantly smaller sum – $1.5 billion – was allotted for
households who had lost their homes due to foreclosure. There was also $2.5 billion allotted to
the 49 states. While this was supposed to go to foreclosure prevention, at least $1 billion went to
other, non-housing-related activities (Schwartz 2015, 432-433). Other legal settlements followed
generally in the same vein.
There were several issues with the government’s policy response, in part because of
increasing calls for austerity. As programs to stop foreclosures were implemented over a multiyear period, foreclosures continued throughout the period in the absence of swift comprehensive
action. Additionally, bailout legislation focused on failing banks and institutions. There was
legislation enacted, most notably Dodd-Frank, that sought to prevent a similar financial
meltdown in the future and protect consumers going forward. However, much of the broader
policy response prioritized institutions, then homeowners, leaving renters or those already
foreclosed upon with comparatively little support. When there was recourse taken against the
banks whose unethical practices led to the crisis, the capital settlement still went primarily to
further foreclosure prevention, and parts were used for activities totally unrelated to the
foreclosure crisis. Ultimately, as Schwartz (2015, 423; partially quoting Immergluck 2013, 201)
writes, the government’s response to the foreclosure crisis was “‘tentative, marginal, and
incremental’” and that “[h]ad the government taken a bolder, more aggressive approach, fewer
homeowners might have lost their homes.”
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In the aftermath of 2008, there was another change in urban housing and community
development – the introduction of the Choice Neighborhood Initiative. Choice came about in the
face of significant growth in austerity politics. The election of the nation’s first Black president
ignited the conservative movement, which made it their aim to block Obama’s legislative
agenda. The was additional anger after the passage of ARRA, which was seen as government
overreach and overspending. The government approved less than half the budgetary increase
requested by HUD in 2010, and the department was awarded $43.6 billion. This was the highest
budget awarded during the Obama administration. Between 2010 and 2013, almost every federal
housing program lost funding. Not accounting for inflation, public housing capital grants
decreased 29 percent, and operating subsidies decreased 15 percent. CDBG block grant funding
decreased almost 30 percent, while funding for HOME block grants and subsidies for the elderly
and people with disabilities all fell by between 47 and 57 percent. There were increases in
project-based rental assistance (a subsidy for private developers) and programs to address
homelessness. Choice Neighborhoods was also granted funding, beginning in 2010 in this
highly partisan and competitive atmosphere (Schwartz 2015 445-446).
Choice is the successor to HOPE VI. Explained as a continuation of the positive,
bipartisan pieces of the HOPE program, the overall goals remain very similar (U.S. Congress
Senate Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development 2013). The
program has three core goals along three areas of focus – housing, people, and neighborhood.
The goals are:
“1. Housing: Replace distressed public and assisted housing with high-quality mixed
income housing that is well managed and responsive to the needs of the surrounding
neighborhood;
2. People: Improve outcomes of households living in the target housing related to
employment and income, health, and children’s educations; and
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3. Neighborhood: Create the conditions necessary for public and private reinvestment in
distressed neighborhoods and offer the kinds of amenities and assets, including safety,
good schools, and commercial activity, that are important to families’ choices about their
community.” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.)
Choice maintains the emphasis on public-private partnerships, mixed financing structures, the
creation of low-income housing within a mixed-income setting, and an emphasis on more
holistic social services, all elements, at least in theory, of HOPE VI. There are a few notable
changes. Choice expands the types of properties that can be the central housing element to
include privately-owned low-income housing that received federal development subsidies. It
also instates a one-for-one replacement rule requiring replacement properties must have at least
one subsidized affordable unit for every one demolished unless market analysis suggests there is
not a need (Pendall and Hendey 2013, 2). There are two types of grants Choice awards. The
first is planning grants that help to fund planning for revitalization around the three core goals.
The second is implementation grants, which help to realize these plans as initial funding to then
leverage private funds (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.).
It is difficult to draw a holistic picture of the Choice Neighborhood grantees because
there is wide discretion for each applicant to present plans that align best with their needs. There
has not been significant research to compare plans across the 10 years the program has run.
There have been two studies looking at the first round of implementation grants. These studies
found that some cities targeted public housing while others targeted private housing for
replacement and that there was a large range in the number of units in these sites. The sites
targeted for replacement also had very different demographic compositions, although there were
high populations of minority residents, either Black, Hispanic, or foreign-born, across all sites
(Pendall et al. 2015, 13-14). There were four broad conclusions drawn about housing in the
neighborhoods three years after the grant was received. These were that (1) the grants had
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successfully been used to begin housing redevelopment at all sites; (2) that housing quality
would improve and were likely to be financially sustainable; (3) that mixed-income was
developed differently at each site; and (4) that increased private interest or a weak market was
effecting affordability and implementation plans in at least two areas (Pendall et al. 2015, 17).
They also point to concerns in the short term about tent welfare during the transition process, and
rates of attrition from replacement targets (Pendall et al. 2015, 98). In the longer term, they raise
concerns around effective creation of community within the new neighborhoods, how to ensure
goals are achieved, and the ways Choice interacts with local and state policy (Pendall and
Hendey 2013, 12; Pendall et al. 2015, 99-100). These are only two studies, done on the earliest
iterations of the program, and should not be taken as prescriptive or predictive when considering
future Choice Implementation sites and plans. However, they do highlight possible points of
friction within a plan, its broader goals, the broader goals of Choice, and the state of residents
living in a site targeted for replacement or the community at large.
As a whole, the Choice Neighborhood program reinforces the dominant neoliberal
paradigm. The program posits housing issues within communities as a market failure and
proposes the introduction of limited public investment to spur broad private reinvestment.
Perhaps the most significant concern here is that neighborhood revitalization and gentrification
are two sides of the same coin. The sorts of “amenities and assets” important to families’
choices about neighborhoods described in the program’s goals are the same as those leading to
gentrification. Choice was supposed to bridge some of the large gaps that HOPE VI had in
ensuring that residents from the existing community were being served. However, Pendall et al.
found that established tenants from replacement targets were losing housing assistance at
comparable rates to HOPE VI (Pendall et al. 2015, 98). In terms of the neoliberal devolution of
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housing management, Pendall et al. found that two of the first grantees maintained their private,
for-profit model in post redevelopment management, two switched to this model from PHA
management, and one grantee maintained PHA management (Pendall et al. 2015, 33).
4.8 The Covid-19 Pandemic and Housing Today
Today, housing generally operates within the broader neoliberal paradigm detailed above.
Over the past 50 years increased austerity, privatization, and devolution, have recentered the
production and management of housing (and its related infrastructure and social services) away
from the government. In its place, is a network of private actors, some for-profit, some nonprofit
has grown to fill the gaps. Anthropogenic climate change also poses an ever-increasing threat to
the nation’s housing. Recent events of the foreclosure and financial crisis in 2008 and the global
pandemic have posed challenges for homeowners and renters. The section will first address the
broad outlook of homeownership and renting, and then discuss the dominant provisions for
affordable housing.
In the aftermath of the 2008 foreclosure crisis, homeownership rates declined.
Homeownership was at a historic high in 2005 of around 69 percent. Rates fell for the next
decade to a low of 63 percent, comparable to 1965 rates. Rates began to increase again in the
latter half of the 2010s, and currently sit around 65 percent, equivalent to 1980 (U.S. Census
Bureau N.d.). Throughout this time, there have remained deep racial disparities in
homeownership rates. The white homeownership rate is around 70 percent, around 30 percent
more than the Black homeownership rate, and 25 percent more than the Hispanic
homeownership rate (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2019, 2020, and
2021). Overall, rates of housing production remained relatively low after 2008. This has
resulted in low rates of housing vacancies across both owner-occupied and rental units prior to
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the pandemic. This has also resulted in worsening affordability, with the median home price
about four times more than the median income nationwide. In urban areas, affordability varies
greatly. About one in seven metro areas had rates of more than five times incomes, while one in
three had rates of less than three times incomes (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard
University 2019, 1-2). Researchers also point to issues in accessing homeownership financing.
Fixed interest rates dropped substantially after 2008 (Freddie Mac 2022), but the availability of
mortgages also dropped. The Urban Institute’s Housing Policy Finance Center keeps a Housing
Credit Availability Index (HCAI). They measure reasonable lending standards for the mortgage
market at around 12 percent – roughly nine percent borrower assumed risk and three percent
lender assumed risk. In the aftermath of 2008, the HCAI has hovered around five percent, made
up almost entirely of borrower risk (Urban Institute 2021).
Homebuying has further surged in the pandemic, adding to the strain of this already tight
market. Existing home sales grew by more than 20 percent from the year before between
September 2020 and January 2021. This was fueled in part by very low mortgage interest rates,
although mortgage availability as measured by HCAI has also remained low. There was also a
pattern of outmigration from urban centers into the suburbs for both ownership and renting (Joint
Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2021, 15). There remain many financial
advantages to homeownership in the U.S. Analysis shows that returns on homeownership from
purchase in a normal market outperform stocks and bonds. There are also the tax incentives for
homeownership. While homeownership does not represent the best option in every case, for
many, it represents an opportunity to build equity and wealth. Presently, there remains a strong
incentive for those that can afford the upfront costs of purchasing a home to do so (Goodman and
Mayer 2018).
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While about two-thirds of Americans own their homes, the remaining one-third of the
country rents. From 2006 to 2016, the number of renters increased by, on average, just under
850,000 households annually. In 2016 and 2017, as homeownership rates began to grow again,
the total number of U.S. renters began to marginally shrink. The actual conditions for renters
though remain mixed. There has been a significant loss in low-income rental units, with a
decline of four million units renting for less than $800 a month between 2011 and 2017. Prior to
the pandemic, 47.4 percent of renter households were to some extent cost-burdened, spending
more than 30 percent of their income on housing expenses. For lowest-income renters (making
less than $15,000), four in five are cost-burdened. Renters, despite being a much smaller portion
of the population than homeowners, made up more than half of all severely cost-burdened people
in the U.S., spending more than 50 percent of their income on rent. Rates of homelessness
declined nationally between 2008 and 2015 but rose significantly in high-cost states and
metropolitan centers (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2019, 3-5). While
there was a significant affordability crisis for renters before 2020, the pandemic has further
strained many people’s abilities to afford rent and other basic necessitates. Disproportionately,
those households most affected are low-income households and people of color. By and large,
those experiencing issues affording rent and who were behind on payments also faced additional
challenges. For those behind on rent and mortgage payments, almost 80 percent had difficulty
affording other expenses, almost 40 percent had moderate or severe food insufficiency, and one
in four struggled with inconsistent employment related to Covid-19 (Joint Center for Housing
Studies of Harvard University 2019, 33).
The government response, in terms of both eviction moratoriums and stimulus payments,
did keep people in their homes. These moratoriums, direct assistance, and rental supplements
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were provided through the CARES Act in March of 2020, the Consolidated Appropriations Act
in December of 2020, and the American Rescue Plan in 2021. These pieces of legislation had a
significant impact. Along with state regulations and subsidies, they helped people afford basic
necessities. The CARES Act first put in place a partial eviction moratorium from March to July
of 2020 and a foreclosure moratorium until June of 2020. The CDC then put in place a
nationwide eviction moratorium in September of 2020 (Joint Center for Housing Studies of
Harvard University 2021, 31-32). This moratorium lasted until late August of 2021 when the
Supreme Court sided with a coalition of landlords and real estate groups who argued the ban lay
beyond the CDC’s authority under Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §
264). There is no data available on nationwide eviction rates, but some smaller subsets of data
suggest how this change may have impacted evictions. Data from Princeton’s eviction lab,
which measures eviction rates in 31 cities, showed that eviction rates rose after the moratorium
expired, but did not reach parity with historic levels in many places. To explain this, they point
to a variety of factors, including rental assistance, stimulus payments, lower rental demand acting
as a deterrent for landlords, changes in property management strategies that rely less on the
threat of eviction, and an increase in informal evictions or lease expirations (Haas et al. 2021).
Even before the moratorium was suspended, there were issues with the policy
interventions the government implemented. Dissemination of information was a large problem.
Research suggests that extensions on eviction moratoriums were not well known and that renters
had lower rates of awareness than landlords. There was even lower awareness (less than 50
percent of landlords and renters) of rental assistance availability (Joint Center for Housing
Studies of Harvard University 2021, 32). There were also issues accessing government
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assistance due to convoluted application processes, narrow eligibility requirements, and lack of
awareness of available support (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2021, 5).
Governmental involvement in affordable housing is by and large the domain of HUD.
A relatively small share of federal spending goes to programs related to housing. In 2021, HUD
was allotted less than one percent of the federal budget (Data Lab 2022). With this funding, the
agency oversees a variety of programs discussed in this chapter. These include insurance from
the FHA, CDBG, HOME block grants, Section 8 vouchers, public housing, subsidized housing,
and homelessness assistance. Programs focus on the direct provision of affordable housing,
broad neighborhood improvements, the mortgage industry, and more. However, most of the
department’s budget is spent on the provision of affordable housing and housing for specific
minority groups. The Office of Public and Indian Housing and the Office of Housing oversee
most of the housing programs. Combined, these offices were allotted just over 80 percent of the
agency’s budget in 2021. Certain programs account for much of this spending. Section 8 Rental
Assistance was allotted just over half of the budget for these two offices (around 40 percent of
the overall budget) (U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development 2022a, 6). This has
been even higher at times, accounting for almost 50 percent of the overall budget in 2012
(Schwartz 2015, 261). In comparison, the public housing capital fund accounted for roughly 13
percent of the 2021 budget. HUD estimates that currently, about 1.7 million Americans live in
public housing, while 5.2 million receive Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers (U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development 2022b).
Additional affordable housing is provided through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.
LIHTC is the largest subsidy for affordable low-income housing production. From 1987 to
2018, the credit has helped construct around three million units (Scally, Gold, and DuBois 2018,
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v) across almost 50,000 projects (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development N.d. b).
HUD collects property and tenant data about the program, but it is administered by the IRS with
tax subsidies written in the internal revenue code. The LIHTC has undergone iterations since its
inception, but the current system is as follows: credits can be claimed in equal amounts for the
first ten years after construction. There is a compliance period that lasts an additional five years
after, where the IRS can reclaim credits if the properties are not in compliance with household
affordability requirements. The federal affordability period on the credits lasts 30 years. To
qualify for the credit, the project must meet one of the following affordability requirements:
1. 20 percent or more of units are occupied by tenants making 50 percent or less than the
AMI;
2. 40 percent or more of units are occupied by tenants making 60 percent or less than
AMI; or
3. 40 percent or more of units are occupied by tenants making on average 60 percent or
less than AMI, with no units occupied by tenants making more than 80 percent of
AMI (Scally, Gold, and DuBois 2018, 2).
There are currently two types of credits developers can claim. The first is commonly referred to
as the “nine percent credit”, which is supposed to deliver a 70 percent subsidy and is generally
granted to new construction projects (Keightley 2021, 1). The process to obtain the nine percent
credits are competitive. They are awarded by state agencies with funds provided by the IRS
(Scally, Gold, and DuBois 2018; Keightley 2021). The second is known as the “four percent
credit”, designed to deliver a 30 percent subsidy, and generally used for rehabilitation projects
that make heavy use of tax-exempt bond financing (Keightley 2021, 1). 18 The credits are often
sold to investors, either large financial firms or corporations, who receive the tax credits in return
for their investment. This results in a limited partnership where the developer builds and
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Despite references to nine percent or four percent, the amount of the credit is determined monthly by the U.S.
Treasury based on the weighted average of “long term debt with maturities comparable for with those for tax credit
projects” (Schwartz 2015, 137).
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manages properties but with a relatively small percentage of ownership, and the investor is
uninvolved in day-to-day activities but has a much larger ownership percentage. There is a large
syndication industry that has grown up around the tax credit, with many firms specializing
specifically in LIHTC investments (Keightley 2021, 5-6).
Inclusionary zoning is another strategy to provide affordable housing that is growing in
popularity. Unlike many of the programs discussed in this chapter which at least originate at the
federal level, inclusionary zoning is completely implemented by states and local governments.
Begun in Virginia in the early 1970s, some 850 plus jurisdictions now have inclusionary zoning
ordinances (Thaden and Wang 2017). Inclusionary zoning utilizes zoning ordinances to create
affordable housing, but there are many different approaches to this task. Policies vary
significantly by jurisdiction, with variation in whether laws are mandatory or voluntary, for
rental or sale properties, amount of affordable units, time limits, definitions of eligibility, and
more. Because of this lack of constancy, much of the research on inclusionary zoning is mixed.
Some studies have found that inclusionary zoning raised the price of housing or discouraged
development in an area, while others found no effect. Some research also suggests that
inclusionary zoning increased access to economic opportunity for low-income residents living in
units constructed through inclusionary zoning. However, there is still resistance out of concern
about private market impacts in some places. (Ramakrishnan, Treskon, and Green 2019). With
such little constancy, it is difficult to make broad judgments about inclusionary zoning policies.
However, they do continue to rely on the production of affordable housing by private capital, and
some mechanisms written into the ordinances – not mandating construction, providing
incentives, or allowing purchase out – are particularly kind to capitalist interests.
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These are fundamentally neoliberal ways of providing affordable housing. The
government subsidizes and encourages the construction of low-income housing by private
developers and the rents of low-income people paying for privately owned units. These
subsidies are also connected – many of the families that reside in LIHTC properties, just under
40 percent based on one 2018 study, are also receiving another type of housing subsidy, such as
Section 8 rental assistance (Scally, Gold, and DuBois 2018, 10). These ways are also not
effective in providing housing for all that are in need. There are still many people receiving no
type of aid who are significantly cost-burdened (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard
University 2019, 2020, and 2021). The cost of living has continued to grow faster than wages,
worsening the issue. Median rent and utilities have grown ten percent from 2001 to 2019, while
median renter household income grew only three percent in total during the same time and fell
for a significant part of the period (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2022).
Recently, HUD has been increasing funding for community initiatives, possibly
indicating a growing reliance on these types of strategies. In 2020, the Choice Neighborhood
initiative had $175 million in funding. This increased to $200 million in 2021 and $250 million
in the President’s Budget in 2022. For the Community Development Fund, which funds CDBGs,
funding was $3.425 billion in 2020, $3.475 billion in 2021, and is funded at $3.77 billion in the
President’s Budget in 2022 (U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development 2022a, 8).
HUD is also increasingly looking toward climate resiliency efforts. This is in response to the
ever-increasing risk posed by climate change. Relief from major climate disasters has become
increasingly expensive, and this is by and large subsidized by the government. Aging housing
infrastructure is also less energy-efficient and resilient in the face of these disasters, centering
focus on the nation’s aging housings stock (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard
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University 2021, 6, 28, 34-35). The president’s 2022 budget proposes $800 million across a host
of climate initiatives, including the $50 million increase in the Choice Neighborhoods Program
(U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development 2022a, 6). While it is critically important
to address these issues, this chapter has raised concerns that these types of HUD investments are
often disproportionately to the gain of private capital.

5. Radical Urbanism
Overview
While dominant traditions of housing in the U.S. have generally worked for capital and to
reinforce existing state power structures, there are exceptions that take a different approach.
Domestically, these more radical urban policy traditions are limited, but there are more
expansive radical urban housing traditions abroad. Radical urban housing traditions reconfigure
structures of power and rethink the purpose of housing. These traditions are expressed
differently throughout time and place, as each tradition responds to the material conditions of a
given situation. Labor takes a central role in the system, and the reproduction of urban spaces is
defined by those living in them. The state may be involved in these processes, but this is not
always the case. In either situation, capital is taken out of the decision-making structure; a key
tenet of radical urbanism is the decommodification of housing. In this tradition, housing is a
human right, and thus cannot be commodified. In radical urbanism, housing strategies are often
coupled with more holistic social programs, either government-sponsored or through mutual aid
networks, and other reforms. This reorientation to center labor also necessarily reinvigorates
democratic processes. This may come in the form of a socialist revolution, as seen in Red
Vienna, detailed below, but may also be a group of tenants making and enforcing the rules and
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regulations within their building, or preventing the imposition of capital’s desires by state
violence.
Radical urbanism develops in opposition to dominant capitalist urbanity, in ways
contingent on material conditions within time and place. As such, and because it has at no point
been the preeminent way to provide housing in the U.S., this section will not move linearly like
the others. Instead, it will mention five historical events or broad strategies. These are: (5.1) the
Paris Commune; (5.2) Red Vienna; (5.3) American municipal socialism; (5.4) the Finnish
Homebuilding Association, New Communities, Inc., and Cooper Square (to illustrate housing
cooperatives, community land trusts, and community-directed planning); and (5.5) a right to
housing in the 21st century. The first two subsections occur outside of the U.S., while the next
three all focus on American radical housing strategies or movements. Within each of these
groups, the events are generally arranged chronologically. Each section involves labors’ seizure
of urban decision-making process from capital and its traditions. The conditions inspiring the
Paris Commune may seem far removed from present U.S. urban housing struggles, but the event
was critical in the formation of a broader radical urban philosophy outlined by Lefebvre and
Harvey. Red Vienna may seem similarly foreign but has been included to offer a fundamental
alternative to the housing system created in the U.S. Municipal socialism offers a more radical
governmental response to the issues America experienced at the end of the gilded age and the
turn of the 20th century from industrial urbanism. The rise in housing co-ops, community land
trusts, community-directed planning, and a right to housing movement has been by and large a
response to the neoliberal policies instituted post-1960.
While the dominant planning mechanisms and entities of industrial urbanism did not plan
in ways that centered the working classes, this dynamic has been pushed to new extremes with
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the curtailing of labors power and the further rise of the real estate and financial industry under
neoliberal policy. Reflecting on the 1970s to today, Stein wrote, “[n]eoconservative planners
starved their cities; neoliberals begged capitalists to feed off them” (Stein 2019, 25). Together,
these impulses worked to slowly stifle the democratic process and ideals that the U.S. professes
but has often failed to embody. Reflecting on this same process, Wendy Brown notes:
“neoliberalism’s accidental unleashing of the financial sector and the ways that financialization
profoundly undermined neoliberal dreams of a competitive global order lightly tended by
supranational institutions, on one hand, and facilitated by states fully autonomous economic
interests and manipulation, on the other” (Brown 2019, 16). Private capital ensures a system that
works for itself above all. The crushing of competition eliminates one of the few resources that
the working class has, both as consumers and employees. In this system there is a radical
impulse, led by labor, to regain control over housing – its articulation, creation, management,
and control.
Historical Analysis
5.1 The Paris Commune
The Paris Commune was a revolutionary government that controlled the city of Paris
from March 18, 1871, until May 28, 1871. Leftist, socialist, communist, and feminist strains
underpinned the rebellion. The commune’s establishment was precipitated by the Third
Republic’s attempts to remove cannons from the city, and subsequent armed fighting between
members of the National Guard or other armed Parisian groups and the country’s regular forces.
However, the roots of the movement were much deeper (Schulkind 1974). Paris was already
much more republican and democratically leaning than the surrounding rural areas. There were
many more industrialized workers in the city, making up a large population of poor and working101

class people. The city already had a reputation among the ruling class for disorder and
disturbance, which they characterized as a particular urban pathology of Parisian residents,
particularly coming out of the 1830s revolutionary period (Shafer 2005, 4-6). Leading up to the
Commune, the city also fared poorly during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, where the
Germans surrounded and besieged Paris. To aid in the city’s defense, national guard units from
working-class neighborhoods were called to serve. These groups became increasingly
radicalized during their defense of the city. The new Third Republic government’s actions
increasingly isolated the city socially and politically, until the attempt at disarmament on March
18th when violence broke out. The National Guard’s central committee sized control of the city,
elections were held, and the Commune was established (Schulkind 1974, 19-23; Shafer 2005, 2062).
The Commune was in power for relatively little time – just two months, one week, and
three days. During this time, they instituted a variety of radical ideas, including the remission of
rents from the time of the besiegement, among other economic and debt-related initiatives. More
importantly for the purposes of this analysis is the Commune’s lasting impact on revolutionary
urban philosophy and critical urban theory. Scholars point to the critical development of a
collectivist class identity – as urbanites, as laboring workers (Gould 1993, Shafer 2005,
Gluckstein 2006) and to the ideal of “fraternité – to a République universelle” (Schulkind 1974,
44). Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey, among others, have drawn heavily on this camaraderie
and the process of revolution and claims to governance in their writings on the right to the city,
as described early in this chapter. Marx and Engels also wrote about the Commune. While they
did not consider it a socialist enterprise, they concluded that the Commune was an early iteration
of “dictatorship of the proletariat.” This event was seen as a significant advancement in genuine
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rule by the majority (Schulkind 1974, 52-54). Subsequent revolutions and protests, such as the
French May 68, have referenced the commune. It also continues to be raised in relation to
current neoliberal urban crises, with scholars searching for answers to present injustice in the
event (Gluckstein 2006).
5.2 Red Vienna 1918-1934
Between 1918 and 1934 Vienna, Austria implemented a revolutionary social program in
the city. The main components of this program were widespread production of housing and the
institution of social housing in the city, as well as significant tax reform to redistribute wealth.
This period termed the Austrian capital Rotes Wien, or Red Vienna. Conditions preceding Red
Vienna were difficult for the working class. Housing in Imperial Vienna had been deeply
unhealthy, resonant of the tenements that inspired progressive reformers in the United States.
There were high rates of poverty, disease, and infant mortality. This was further exacerbated by
a shortage of housing in the city generally (Lewis 1983, 336). Taxation was also
disproportionately levied against working-class families. Estimates are that 45 to 50 percent of
the municipal budget in the city came from taxes on rent, and another approximately 30 percent
came from taxes on food, drink, or municipal monopoly revenue (Lewis 1983, 343). This was
compounded during World War I with significant homelessness, unemployment, and hunger. By
the end of the war these conditions led to rising labor, feminist, and council movements,
expressed through demonstrations, striking, and ultimately elections (Duma and Lichtenberger
2017). The declaration of Austria as a democratic republic at the end of WWI established
elections, allowing men and women to vote. The Social Democratic Worker’s Party (SDAPÖ)
won the first election in Vienna in 1919, while a coalition government of SDAPÖ and the
Christian Socialist Party (CSP) made up the national government. By 1920, this coalition had
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failed, and while the SDAPÖ continued to govern Vienna, it was generally in conflict with the
national ruling CSP and its wealthy local supporters (Lewis 1983).
Once elected, the SDAPÖ council instituted a variety of measures to address the housing
crisis. This included the immediate requisition of all empty units and unused rooms in occupied
apartments, to house the homeless and housing insecure. In three years, the council was able to
reallocate more than 25,000 rooms through this requisition. The city council also acquired
significant amounts of land and built additional units on these sites (Lewis 1983, 338). Between
1919 and 1934, the city constructed more than 60,000 units, housing roughly 220,000 individuals
(City of Vienna n.d. a.). These units were often in apartment complexes, which were considered
holistically. They were planned in relation to local amenities like schools, and many also
included central kitchens, laundries, childcare, and more – demands stemming from the feminist
and labor movements (Duma and Lichtenberger 2017). This construction was financed through
increased municipal taxation, as the national government was generally opposed to the
democratic-socialist program and had relatively little capital in the national housing and
settlement fund due to inflation (Lewis 1983, 337). The imperial taxation program was heavily
revised – the rent tax became a progressive tax, a welfare tax was levied on employers, and a
series of luxury taxes were implemented (Lewis 1983, 343-345). These housing measures and
luxury taxes were heavily opposed by the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois classes. They argued
that the council was “interfering in the land market and forcing down prices,” while the council
argued that the land was needed for housing (Lewis 1983, 338). This dynamic is precisely what
makes social housing a radical response to urban crisis. It prioritizes housing for all, rather than
free market mechanisms – whether the market truly functions as such or just prioritizes any
private provision of housing. Lewis (1983, 338) describes the cyclical system this provision of
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housing created saying “[t]he private sector would not risk capital in building until rent
restrictions were removed, something which the Social Democrat Party ardently resisted. In the
circumstances the only alternative was for the city council to buy land itself and build on it.”
Dollfuss fascism, growing out of the CSP and its values, effectively ended Red Vienna in 1934
when it removed the city’s administration (Duma and Lichtenberger 2017).
Although the new government after 1934 reversed much of the SDAPÖ’s policy
program, and there has been some recommodification of housing in the city (Novy et al. 2001;
Kadi 2015), the legacy of Red Vienna continues in the city’s current housing system. The city
continues to maintain 220,000 city-owned units. There are a further 200,000 cooperative units in
Vienna (City of Vienna n.d. b). This subsidized housing makes up 44 percent of the rental stock,
and the city is the largest landlord. This housing is available not just to the lowest-income
people, but also to those in the middle class and is funded by income taxes. The scale of social
housing also has the effect of maintaining affordability even in privately owned, non-co-op units
(Peacher 2021). Vienna’s model is consistently pointed to as a prime example of sustainable,
high-quality, attractive, affordable housing (Schweitzer 2020; Peacher 2021; U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development N.d. g).
5.3 American Municipal Socialism
American municipal socialism came about contemporaneously with the progressive
reform movement detailed in the industrial urbanism section. It grew out of many of the same
problems – decrepit tenement housing, lack of social supports, tension between labor and capital
classes. However, this was a bottom-up response which proposed different methods to address
these issues. While progressive reformers were often part of an educated, wealthier, white
Anglo-Saxon class (Foglesong 1986, 57; Shi 2020, 1446), municipal socialism was defined by
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industrial laborers the urban working class. The municipal socialism movement grow out of
broader labor movements, initially spearheaded by German immigrants in the style of European
socialism in the 1870s, growing more widespread with the Knights of Labor in the early 1880s,
and finally the American Federation of Labor and the Socialist Party (Judd 1989, 19-20).
Historians explain the rise of municipal socialism through both external and internal factors.
These include changes in mechanized labor that created deepening divides between management
and workers which inspired labor radicalism, and the power of universal male suffrage in voicing
that displeasure in the political sphere (Judd 1989, 6-7).
In 1911, the Socialist party elected more than 1000 candidates across thirty-six states and
324 municipalities. Socialists had majority control in 23 communities. Some were small
communities, such as Star City, West Virginia (population 318), or mid-size communities like
Martins Ferry, Ohio (population 9,133). Others were in major American cities, including
Schenectady, New York (population 72,826, 77th largest city in the U.S.), and Milwaukee,
Wisconsin (population 373, 857, 12th largest city in the U.S.) (Judd 1989, 19; U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1998). The dominant social agenda for municipal socialist politicians and organizers was
“municipal control of public utilities, union labels and better conditions in city work,
unemployment relief, heavier taxation for corporations, free legal and medical service for the
needy, free schoolbooks, and slum housing reform” (Judd 1989, 22). The call for public
ownership over utilities and transit was echoed even in cities that did not have socialist
politicians in office (Radford 2003). There were efforts to socialize housing, but in many cities,
socialists worked with progressive reformers on housing efforts, leading to housing alighted with
progressive reformism. Several factors contributed to the decline of socialism in the U.S. These
include internal rifts within various factions of the socialist party, wartime repression, the co-
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opting of the socialist agenda by middle-class reformers who had a wider base of support, and
the broader tide of American liberalism (Judd 1989, 1-7). Ultimately, municipal socialism in the
early twentieth century shows that a grassroots base of support existed for socialist policies in
America – particularly in the face of huge wealth inequality, poor working conditions, and
dismal housing. In the 21st century, we have begun to see a revival, albeit limited, of these
socialist and democratic-socialist strains in America, echoing calls for housing and economic
reforms towards a more equitable system (Dreier 2013; Judis 2019).
5.4 The Finnish Homebuilding Association; New Communities, Inc.; and Cooper Square
When considering the radical housing strategies that are currently used to decommodify
housing in the U.S. and maintain affordability, three come to mind. These are housing
cooperatives, community land trusts (CLTs), and community-determined planning. Each of
these strategies allows for determinative community control but does so in very different ways.
CLTs and co-ops address the provision of housing specifically. 19 Community-determined
planning aims to effect resident-led change within a broader community. This often involves
housing, sometimes utilizing co-ops or CLTs, and has direct effects on affordability. I will
expand below on the model of each strategy, and briefly mention the history of such measures in
the U.S. These three strategies are largely localized. While they have proved quite successful on
a local scale for residents, these strategies have not been implemented on a mass scale through
any widespread nationalized policy or program. This is likely in part a reflection of the high
level of community control. However, these strategies also significantly disrupt the real estate
apparatus and directly challenge the conceptualization of housing and land in the dominant
neoliberal housing paradigm in the U.S. today.

19

Both are also used for non-housing purposes as well.
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Housing cooperatives are a system of housing where residents collectively own their
building. Through the pooling of individual members’ resources, the collective significantly
increases its buying power. In the long run, this is beneficial, as the residents then have the
ability to determine rents, make building improvements, and more, while keeping individual
costs lower than in a unit rented from a private landlord or developer. When purchasing into a
co-op, rather than purchasing an individual unit, residents purchase a share in a corporation that
owns real estate. This share comes with certain expectations, generally around paying rent or
abiding by some building-wide contract. It also entitles that resident to a unit in the building,
and a say in the democratic decision-making process (Sazama 2000; National Cooperative Law
Center 2017a). There are some additional distinctions within types of housing cooperatives,
including limited equity cooperatives, or specific restrictions such as affordability restrictions
limiting re-sale to those in certain income brackets (Sazama 2000). For the purposes of this brief
history, these distinctions are largely unimportant. What is critical to understand is that this is a
strategy that grants communal ownership and democratic choice to the building’s residents,
removing and isolating them from the system of housing commodification. This can mean the
avoidance of mortgages, rent hikes, and other threats to traditional homeowners and renters.
The earliest cooperatives were established in the UK during the mid-eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries and were primarily consumer cooperatives. One of these cooperatives,
located in Rochdale, created a set of governing tenants.20 Many subsequent cooperatives were
organized aligned with these principles. The first housing cooperatives came about in Germany
and Scandinavia in the mid-1800s (Sazama 1996, 2000). In the United States, the first housing

These were: (1) open membership; (2) democratic control – specifically one member one vote; (3) distribution of
surplus in proportion to trade; (4) payment of limited interest on capital; (5) political and religious neutrality; (6)
cash trading – no credit extended; and (7) promotion of education (National Cooperative Law Center 2017b).
20
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cooperatives were established in New York around the turn of the 20th century. The earliest
iterations were “home clubs” that catered to luxury clients, providing the advantages of
homeownership with little of the responsibility (National Cooperative Law Center 2017b). The
first true affordable housing cooperative in the U.S., adhering to the Rochdale principles, was the
Finnish Homebuilding Association. It was established in 1918 in Brooklyn New York but a
group of Finnish artisans. Subsequent affordable cooperatives were established on behalf of
workers in various industries to provide affordable housing in New York and other American
cities. These early affordable housing cooperatives fared well through the Great Depression, but
housing cooperatives were not a strategy that was given significant attention in the aftermath of
WWII. However, in 1960 and beyond, there was a resurgence in cooperatives formed to provide
for middle and lower-class housing.
Housing cooperatives today are often associated with large cities like New York, but
exist in urban and rural areas, large and small throughout the U.S. Raise-Op Housing
Cooperative, in Lewiston, Maine is one such example. Federal policy has been used to support
cooperatives at different times. Federal policies discussed in the other urbanisms section,
including BMIR, Section 8, and other state and national programs, were used to fund housing
cooperatives in the 1960s and 1970s. There have also been conversions of public housing to
cooperatives as part of increased neoliberal privatization. This occurred in the 1980s and 1990s
and was funded by the federal government. However, the promotion of housing cooperatives has
never been a widespread part of national policy strategy, and funding for these endeavors has
often come from community organizing, unions, or nonprofit funders. (Sazama 1996, 2000).
Community land trusts are a system of creating housing affordability by decoupling the
price of housing from the price of the land below. In this system, a nonprofit entity (the
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community land trust) purchases the land, which they own in perpetuity. This nonprofit then
leases the land and any improvements made on it to individuals. These ground leases are for
quite a long time – 99 years is typical – and come with an agreement of rights and
responsibilities between the two parties. Often, the owner has the right exclusive use of the plot,
to make improvements, to bequeath the lease. However, if the owner wants to sell, the CLT has
the right to purchase the house, so the buildings can remain affordable in perpetuity. Community
land trusts are governed by boards made up of three equally balanced interests. One group
represents the interest of community residents living on the CLT, another represents residents in
the area who do not live on CLT land, and last are representatives of the public interest, often
municipal government representatives or bureaucrats (Greenstein and Sungu-Eryilmaz 2005;
Center for Community Land Trust Innovation N.d.). CLTs have often been used in high-cost
areas and competitive markets to preserve affordability. However, research also suggests CLTs
can be used to stabilize neighborhoods with weak housing markets (Nelson et. al 2020).
The first community land trust, New Communities, Inc., was established in Albany,
Georgia in 1969 to provide farmland to poor black farmers. This CLT was a direct outgrowth of
the civil rights movement. The CLT model also has deeper roots in progressive era thinking
about poverty and economic progress, early land-lease communities, American
conceptualizations of land stewardship, and international movements like garden cities in
England and the Gramdan movement in India (Davis 2014; Center for Community Land Trust
Innovation N.d.). Like New Communities, Inc., early CLTs in the U.S. were generally rural.
The first urban CLT was established in 1980 in a Black neighborhood in Cincinnati, Ohio (Davis
2014, 28). Nationally, the movement grew somewhat slowly, and as said earlier remained highly
localized. There were some advocacy groups, including the Institute for Community Economics,
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that helped to proliferate knowledge about CLTs. This group also successfully lobbied to get the
definition of CLTs included in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, enabling
CLTs to receive federal funding and technical support under the HOME program (Davis 2014,
40-41). Today, there are more than 250 CLTs across the U.S. (Center for Community Land
Trust Innovation N.d.). In 2019, HUD pointed to their usefulness in expanding housing
affordability, particularly given the national rise in housing costs. It also noted the strategy’s
versatility – “the CLT model can be adapted to a range of contexts and organizational goals,
from developing a praxis of communal land ownership to promoting family homeownership”
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2019).
Both housing co-ops and CLTs offer solutions that ensure affordability in specific
buildings. This affordability could have spillover effects into the surrounding housing market,
but this is by no means guaranteed. For residents to have power in the determination of
community changes and effects, there must be a democratic process in place within community
planning. There are many levels of community engagement when it comes to planning.
Arnstein’s (1969, 217) ladder of citizen participation is often used to evaluate citizen
engagement and control in urban planning. This framework has eight levels of participation,
which are sorted into three further categories. At the bottom of the ladder are (1) manipulation,
and (2) therapy, which are considered non-participation and “contrived by some to substitute for
genuine participation.” Next are (3) informing, (4) consultation, and (5) placation, which are all
considered tokenism, which involves some extent of participation by community members but
continues to have ultimate decision-making ability rest at the feet of powerholders. Finally, (6)
partnership, (7) delegated power, and (8) citizen control, are all varying degrees of citizen power,
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bringing citizens to decision-making spaces in roles to negotiate or as primary decision-makers
(Arnstein 1969, 217).
Common elements of participatory planning, introduced during industrial urbanism as
part of the capitalist-democracy contradiction, include public comment periods, community
boards, planning commissions, and more (Stein 2019, 32). These fall into the tokenism section
of the ladder – Stein (2019, 31) describes many of these participatory processes as “open but
rigged;” something asked of planers to ensure the vail of democracy while ultimate control rests
with capital. Participatory planning is a required component of the Choice Neighborhood
initiative, which will be discussed in the case of Lewiston in the next chapter. While no such
analysis has been done of where Lewiston’s planning process falls onto these eight rungs, an
analysis of a different Choice city concluded that the planning process did not sufficiently reach
levels of citizen power (Harling 2020). What does an example of citizen power in decisionmaking look like? It is useful to look at the case of the Cooper Square Neighborhood in New
York City. The neighborhood first organized the Cooper Square Committee in 1959 to oppose
urban renewal plans. In response to these plans, committee members created their own
community development plan around three basic tenets – minimized displacement, staged
development, and priority in any newly developed housing for site tenants. The residents were
able to force a vote on their new plan, which was officially adopted by the city in 1970 (Cooper
Square Committee N.d.). This was not a case where the government came to citizens asking for
their input on prior planning. In this case, residents of the community had full control over the
goals and strategies of the plan, which was then brought before the relevant governmental actors.
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5.5 A Right to Housing in the 21st Century
In broad political and social discourse, a right to housing is a widely known, if not widely
accepted, ideal. The U.S. has put forward and signed a variety of international treaties that have
upheld access to safe, affordable, healthy housing as a human right. 21 Within the U.S., this
mantle has been furthered by many housing advocates and scholars in the U.S., through protest,
policy, and scholarly work. Examples include The Right to Housing: A Blueprint for Housing
the Nation in 1989, and A Right to Housing: Foundation for a New Social Agenda in 2006. The
former crafted a comprehensive housing program, partnered with a significant expansion in the
social section, and monumental shifts in the financing, development, ownership, and
management arrangement of housing (Hartman 1998). The latter lays out the importance of
housing – physical, emotional, symbolic, and in the context of a broader neighborhood – before
advancing the legal and institutional changes needed to make this vision a reality (Bratt, Stone,
and Hartman 2006). The right to housing is advanced in response to several factors. Primary is
increasing financialization and what Bratt, Stone, and Hartman (2006, 8-9) refer to as the
“illusions of the market,” which asserts the best way to achieve social welfare is through the
pursuit of one’s own self-interest in the market and the government stepping in only for the
common defense of the nation. Additional major drivers include pervasive and persistent
housing discrimination, increasing economic inequality, heavy dependence on debt and capital
markets in the provision of housing, and a wholly inadequate public policy response (Bratt,
Stone, and Hartman 2006, 9-13).
In the 1940s, FDR’s Second Bill of Rights set out the right to a decent home, and the U.S. signed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes housing as a component of adequate living to which all people have
a right. In the 1960s, the U.S. signed, but did not ratify, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights. This treaty set seven elements making up adequate housing. These are: (1) security of tenure; (2)
availability of services, materials, and infrastructure; (3) affordability; (4) accessibility; (5) habitability; (6) location;
and (7) cultural adequacy. The U.S. has also supported other, more recent, treaties upholding the rights to housing
(Tars 2020).
21
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The past 15 years primed the 21st century to be an inflection point in American housing
praxis. Two major crises – the foreclosure and financial crisis of 2008 and the Covid-19
pandemic have highlighted extensive flaws in current systems of housing. These flaws have
very much aligned with the factors that Bratt, Stone, and Hartmann identify, as seen in the
neoliberal urbanism section of this framework. It is clear that the current housing system and
social safety nets are not working for a significant number of Americans. At the same time,
there are still somewhat limited opportunities for involvement in established housing co-ops,
CLTs, and public housing, and dominant systems of housing continue to keep Americans tied to
a financialized system of housing. The Occupy Wall Street Movement, anti-eviction protests,
protests demanding the cancellation of rents, and a growing right to housing movement have
given an outlet for people to voice their displeasure with this system. Academics, advocacy
groups, and policy centers have also reestablished the right to housing as a priority in response to
these crises (Tars 2020; Fallon 2021). States are increasingly adopting housing and
homelessness bills of rights, and local and state representatives are introducing right to housing
legislation (Tars 2020). Nationally, the still unpassed Green New Deal for Public Housing
includes a provision enshrining a right to housing.
5.6 Radical Urbanism Going Forward
An active decommodification of housing and decoupling from the systems of
financialization could come about in several ways. This section detailed several radical housing
strategies that provide alternatives to the dominant housing paradigms of today. While very
different in their methods and scope, each strategy responded to similar perceptions of inequity,
inequality, and disenfranchisement by granting determinative control of housing and
communities back to the working class. However, as Drier and Keating have argued, localized
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housing strategies have limits. Although writing in the context of Boston’s urban populism, in
the 1980s, many of their critiques remain true.
“Unless the federal government is fully committed to a major housing program, cities
will continue to suffer housing shortages, displacement, racial discrimination, uneven
development, and homelessness. […] Only a major reordering of federal spending
priorities and resolution of federal budgetary deficits could produce truly adequate
resources for the federal aid necessary for local governments in progressive cities like
Flynn’s Boston to address their affordable housing problems in a successful and equitable
way.” (Drier and Keating 1990, 214)
A lack of instituted government support keeps cities trapped by the decisive power of the real
estate state (Stein 2019). Halfhearted measures or strategies that don’t make fundamental
changes to the provisioning of housing by seriously curtailing or eliminating the power of forprofit businesses will ultimately continue to further the same neoliberal dynamics. Any of the
strategies described in this radical urbanism section, implemented on a wide enough scale and
with legal enforcement behind them, would constitute a radical shift in American housing. This
would be a fundamental challenge to the power of the real estate apparatus and could expand
access to safe, healthy, affordable housing.
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CHAPTER II: RESULTS
In this chapter, Lewison’s Choice Transformation Plan is examined in greater detail. As
discussed in the theoretical framework, the Choice Neighborhood Program is focused on three
core goals. Through the leveraging of specific and limited public dollars and additional private
capital, Choice aims to (1) “[r]eplace distressed public and assisted housing with high-quality
mixed income housing that is well managed and responsive to the needs of the surrounding
neighborhood”; (2) “[i]mprove outcomes of households living in the target housing related to
employment and income, health, and children’s education”; and (3) “[c]reate the conditions
necessary for public and private reinvestment in distressed neighborhoods to offer the kinds of
amenities and assets, including safety, good schools, and commercial activity, that are important
to families’ choices about their community” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development n.d. f.). The use of public funding to replace public housing, through a process
that creates opportunities for private investment, necessarily raises questions about who accrues
benefits, who is empowered to make decisions, and who oversees implementation in a
neighborhood.
This chapter asks these questions of Lewiston’s Growing Our Tree Streets Choice
Transformation Plan through a review of the sections of the plan pertinent to housing –
including the overall goals, core strategies, and partners – with a focus on who benefits and who
is empowered to make decisions. It highlights tensions that arise around providing safe, healthy,
affordable housing in Lewiston and identifies potential contradictions that could emerge from the
plan’s various implementation strategies (i.e., how the plan’s goals will be accomplished) as well
as from the returns on investments expected by various partners responsible for enacting these
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strategies. Specifically, it highlights what these contradictions could mean for current residents’
democratic control over and right to return/remain in their homes and neighborhood.

Study Area
Lewiston, Maine has a population of a little over 37,000 (U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts
2020e). It is a former industrial city, with much of the downtown urban core constructed around
the mills along the river. Lewiston’s mills operated from the 1840s to the 1990s. The last mill,
significantly downsized, closed in 2001. In the 1800s tenement housing was hastily erected for
mill workers, which has left lasting implications on the area’s housing today (Healthy
Neighborhoods 2020a, 26). The Tree Streets Neighborhood is a 30-block area that encompasses
a significant amount of the downtown residential area and old tenements. The area is bounded
to the north by Ash Street, the west by Park Street, and the east by Jefferson Street. The southern
boundary is comprised of sections of Maple, Pierce, and Birch Streets (Healthy Neighborhoods
2020a, 25). Mill closings led to a decline in population and significant poverty and
unemployment. The population decline has recently been arrested by an influx of new
immigrants, primarily from east and central Africa, who began arriving in 2001 (Healthy
Neighborhoods 2020a, 26).
Today, residents of the Tree Streets Neighborhood continue to face significant
disadvantages. The community is very low-income, with a mean income of just over $22,000
and a median income of under $20,000. Ninety-six percent of residents are renters (Healthy
Neighborhoods 2020b, 69 and 105). Significant portions of the community are not part of the
formal labor market. In a Community Household Survey done as part of the Growing Our Tree
Streets plan, 41 percent of residents reported that they were unemployed, and 23 percent reported
they were underemployed. For the former, disability was a common reason cited. More than 40
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percent of respondents to the community survey report receiving SSI or SSDI, meaning large
portions of the neighborhood are living on fixed low incomes (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b,
54). Less than half of residents are food secure and only a fifth are satisfied with housing in the
neighborhood as it stands (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b, 53-54). A residential market
assessment done as part of the planning process found that there were no vacancies in affordable
and mixed-income properties, with closed waiting lists and vacancies quickly filled (Healthy
Neighborhoods 2020b, 124). The tight market for affordable housing is complicated by the
significant issues caused by an older housing stock and low levels of replacement and
rehabilitation (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b, 105). Currently, 90 percent of housing units in
the Tree Streets neighborhood were constructed prior to 1978, when a ban on lead paint was
instituted. The need for lead remediation is a significant issue within the community. On
average from 2013 to 2017, there were 42 new cases annually of elevated blood-lead levels in
children in Lewiston. More than 70 percent of these cases occurred in the Tree Streets (Healthy
Neighborhoods 2020a, 42).

The Plan
Lewiston’s Growing Our Tree Streets Choice Transformation Plan envisions a future
with a safer, healthier, more welcoming, equitable, and vibrant community. The plan’s language
is aligned to correspond to Choice’s three interconnected spheres of change – people, homes, and
neighborhood. To achieve this vision, the plan sets out nine overarching goals addressing health,
infrastructure, diversity, education, employment, and more (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, ii).
Three goals explicitly relate to housing concerns within the neighborhood. These are Goals One,
Four, and Five. Each of these goals, their core strategies, and partners are detailed below.
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Goal 1: Lead-Free
The first goal of the plan is to grow a healthy future through a holistic lead-free Lewiston
effort rooted in the Tree Streets. This goal grew out of community action and has been an issue
that galvanized significant community support in the past. To address community concerns, the
goal focuses on lead remediation, increased knowledge of the dangers of lead and affected
properties, and health outcomes for children. There are three subgoals:
1.1. Engage community navigators to increase education and screening to foster bright
futures for children and families with children;
1.2. Remove lead from the Tree Streets Neighborhood and eliminate incidents of
childhood lead poisoning; and
1.3. Develop resources, policies, and guidance for creating safe, healthy housing within
existing properties. (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, ix)
This chapter’s analysis mainly focuses on subgoal 1.2, which concerns housing-specific physical
infrastructure changes. To meet this goal, the city proposes to rehabilitate or replace all of the
1,451 units built before 1950 at a rate of 70 units a year. This will include the replacement
housing built as part of Goal 4. To address the many other units that will need replacement, the
city proposes leveraging Choice funding and using the LIHTC or new Opportunity Zone 22 to
fund other new mixed-income projects. For units that will be rehabilitated, the Plan proposes
using batch rehab and homeowners’ personal labor, or “sweat equity”, to keep costs lower. The
city aims to have all affected units fully converted by 2043 (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 110113).
In this pursuit, the city names several partners. These include Lewiston-Auburn
Community Housing (LACH), Community Concepts Inc (CCI), Healthy Homeworks, Local

22

Opportunity Zones were created in 2017 by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. They are designated areas that are
generally disinvested in and predominately occupied by low-income communities. Individuals or corporate entities
can invest in economic growth and job creation in return for tax benefits.
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developers, and Take 2 Goodwill. LACH is a subsidiary of the nonprofit Community Concepts
Inc. and a HUD-recognized Community Housing Developing Organization (CHDO), which
controls the sites of the Maple Knoll replacement units. Healthy Homeworks is another local
nonprofit, which has been heavily involved in the community planning aspects of Choice. They
also operate the “Renter 2 Owner” program, which provides paths to homeownership of healthy
homes through education and sweat equity. Finally, Healthy Homeworks also oversees the
Property Health Report, a comprehensive database that helps potential owners and renters
understand the health and hazards of downtown properties. The Take 2 YouthBuild Goodwill
nonprofit program will provide a skilled workforce for rehabilitation and replacement projects.
The plan does not name specific local developers, but these entities are presumably private and
for-profit (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 113).
Goal 4: Homes
The plan’s fourth goal reads – Grow an inventory of healthy housing and offer housing
choices for all. This goal mainly concerns the replacement sites for Maple Knoll, the HUDassisted property targeted as distressed and in need of replacement. All Choice grantees, as with
HOPE VI before, have such a property. The construction of new homes also responds to a larger
issue of a weak housing market with low rates of new construction. Along with the construction
of new units, Goal Four has additional subgoals addressing other new housing and shifting
policies around hard-to-house families and individuals. These subgoals are:
4.1. Redevelop sites in the choice neighborhoods with different types of homes and
selective density;
4.2. Encourage strategic infill of new homes with building designs that are responsive to
the neighborhood; and
4.3. Develop supportive housing for people experiencing homelessness and other hard-tohouse persons and families. (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, xii)
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New construction will de-densify housing in the Tree Streets with single-family units, in addition
to some smaller multifamily units or larger apartment buildings. The sizing of these homes will
respond to the needs of those living in the community – larger units with multiple bedrooms for
those with children, units with elevators for those with mobility challenges – and create a more
cohesive look to housing in the neighborhoods. The plan notes the need for additional serviced
units for the elderly, and the need to house those experiencing homelessness, but does not plan
housing constructed explicitly for the latter group (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 150- 151).
The analysis will focus mainly on subgoal 4.1. Goal 4.1 includes the Maple Knoll replacement
construction of apartments along the northern edge of Kennedy Park and medium-scale multifamily infill units around the intersections of Pine, Pierce, Bartlett, and Walnut streets. These
units will be evenly split between market rate and affordable units. It also includes the relocation
of families living in Maple Knoll, and the ultimate demolition and redevelopment of that site.
For the initial construction in goal 4.1, LACH and Lewiston Housing Authority (LHA),
will partner with private developers. For the Pine, Pierce, Bartlett, and Walnut apartments, the
city has selected Hebert Construction, a statewide private construction company.23 Locally,
Hebert oversaw the recent construction of Hartley Block. For both Maple Knoll Replacement
sites, funding to purchase the land came from the John T. Gorman Foundation, a private
foundation, and the Genesis Fund, a Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI).
Construction will be funded by a combination of Choice funding, nine percent LIHTC funding,
historic preservation tax credits, and private debt (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 152-167).
Currently, LACH is a part co-owner and the manager of the properties. However, it is not yet

Lewiston Housing “Lewiston Choice Neighborhood Initiative Selects Hebert Construction for First Phase of Tree
Streets Transformation” press release, February 3, 2022. https://lewistonhousing.org/lewiston-choice-neighborhoodinitiative-selects-hebert-construction-for-first-phase-of-tree-streets-transformation/
23
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clear who will manage the properties once construction is complete and do the associated longterm monitoring once construction is complete (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 178). Other
subgoals address policy changes around the housing of people struggling with substance use
issues, homelessness, or in need of other services; attracting investments from small developers;
and zoning changes. There is one plan to recapitalize 15 apartments at Mount David Housing for
residents with disabilities or in recovery. This will be in partnership with LACH, LHA, and TriCounty Mental Health, a nonprofit service provider, and is slated for a long-term timeframe
(Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 168-171).
Goal 5: Ownership
Goal five aims to grow commitment to and influence in the neighborhood from local
owners, long-term investors, and residents. This goal addresses the lack of resident stability and
ownership in the neighborhood. The three subgoals are:
5.1. Increase the number of long-term homeowners and community-controlled homes in
the Tree Streets;
5.2. Strengthen tenants’ voices; and
5.3. Build neighborhood leadership and organization, and increase community control.
(Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, xvi)
Responding to the overwhelming number of renters, the goal prioritizes creating systems that
bolster homeownership opportunities and empowering renters in their relations with landlords
and the broader housing system. The strategies to increase ownership include financial
coaching, connecting first-time homebuyers to homeownership assistance programs, increasing
the prevalence of rent-to-own financing structures, expanding housing co-ops, and increasing
home-buying incentives. To better support tenants, the city hopes to re-establish a tenants’ union
and mediate issues between landlords and tenants. Finally, to increase community control, plans
are set for a resident-led neighborhood governance structure, a network of block captains, and
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increased resident leadership in ongoing development of the Tree Streets (Healthy
Neighborhoods 2020a, 172-178).
Partners on goals to increase homeownership are often nonprofit entities, including CCI
and their subsidiary Community Concepts Finance Corporation (CCFC), LACH, New Ventures
Maine, Maine Community Integration, and the Cooperative Development Institute. It also relies
on the participation of local credit unions and Raise-Op housing cooperative. For strategies to
increase renter voices and community control, partners are again primarily nonprofit community
entities. These include LACH, Immigrant Communities, Root Cellar, Promise Early Education
Center, and more. Raise-Op is also a partner in these goals. These strategies generally do not
have specific funding mechanisms allotted, as in Goal Four. Rather, they rely heavily on local
community nonprofits’ social networks to organize these strategies, and donations to fund any
labor, supplies, or infrastructure needs (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 174 – 178).
Lewiston is in some ways similar and in others dissimilar to other Choice implementation
grantees in demographic characteristics and Choice proposals. It is the only city with a
population of under 50,000 to have been awarded an implementation grant during the program’s
tenure. In Fiscal Year 2020, HUD awarded implementation grants to five cities in total. In
addition to Lewiston, these were Camden, New Jersey; Fort Myers, Florida; Cleveland, Ohio;
and Detroit, Michigan. Camden and Fort Myers are closest to Lewiston in size with populations
of roughly 70,000 and 85,000 respectively. Cleveland and Detroit are much larger with
populations of about 370,000 and 640,000 (U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts 2020a, b, c, d, and
e). The grant sizes vary slightly, with Camden and Cleveland receiving awards of $35 million
each and Lewiston, Fort Myers, and Detroit each awarded $30 million. The plans will replace
between 87 and 487 units, with between 185 and 841 units. Some replace publicly owned
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housing, while others replace housing that is HUD-assisted. The amount of committed financial
leverage each plan brings for housing varies as well. Lewiston, which is creating the fewest
units in total, has $25.6 million in committed housing leverage. In contrast, Detroit, which has
the most units slated for construction through their plan, brings $119.7 million in committed
housing leverage. In describing the target neighborhoods, three of the cities use the word
“disinvestment”, while the others describe patterns of disinvestment or failed instances of
opportunistic capitalist investment. Lewiston explicitly addresses its industrial past and the
problems it has caused, while other industrial cities, like Detroit, generally paint a rosier picture.
The Lewiston neighborhood description section mentions the diversity of languages spoken,
alluding to the significant immigrant population. Part of Camden’s official plan name is in
Spanish, but otherwise, no plan speaks specifically to serving diverse clientele, although in
reality, they all serve a variety of institutionally disadvantaged groups (U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development 2021).
It is also important to contextualize these plans in terms of implementation partners. The
section below will go into a greater analysis of Lewison’s partners, but this paragraph will briefly
compare the implementation partners for the FY 2020 plans. These conclusions are based on
publicly available information on the partners listed for each plan on the Notice of Funding
Availability (NOFA) released for the five grantees by HUD. More information can be found in
Appendix A. As seen in Figures 1 and 2 below, when split by public, nonprofit, and private forprofit status, there is no obvious trend amongst grantees in 2020. For total partners, the two
largest categories were non-profit and public partners. There were some for-profit partners as
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well for at least four of the five plans. 24 Private partners were often involved in housing, with
five of the eight total private partners being real estate investors or developers, and one being a
housing co-op (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2021).

Figure 1: Choice Implementation Plan Partner Organization Types for Lewiston and Other 2020 Choice Grantees.
Data gathered by the author based on HUD FY 2020 Choice Implementation Grant Awards NOFA

Figure 2: Choice Implementation Plan Partner Organization Types for Other 2020 Choice Grantees. Data
gathered by the author based on HUD FY 2020 Choice Implementation Grant Awards NOFA
24

While it appears that Cleveland has no for-profit partners, there was an LLC listed in the HUD NOFA that was
untraceable online. It is quite likely this could have been a for-profit enterprise, but because this is unverified, it was
filtered from the data used to create these figures. More information is available in Appendix A.
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By and large, Lewiston aligns with other grantees in its housing partners based on the key
Partners listed in HUD’s NOFA. Most grantees in other cities utilize PHAs, nonprofit housing
providers, and real estate investors or developers. More notably and uniquely, Lewiston also
partners with Raise-Op Housing Cooperative. None of the other plans have a comparable entity
listed. Camden is the only other city that lists partners centered on democratic control of
housing, listing two resident organizations or resident advocacy groups as key partners in their
plan (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2021). A full table of key partners
involved in Lewiston’s plan, noting housing involvement, is below.
Lewiston, Maine Key Choice Partners
Partner Name

Partner Type

Housing Involvement

Lewiston Housing Authority
(Lead Choice applicant)

Public Housing Authority

Involved in provision of public and
public assisted housing

City of Lewiston
(Lead Choice applicant)

City Government

No direct involvement

Community Concepts Inc.

Nonprofit Service Provider

CCI subsidiary Lewiston-Auburn
Community Housing is heavily
involved in housing plan

Avesta Housing

Nonprofit Service Provider

Involved in construction and
management of affordable housing

John T. Gorman Foundation

Private Foundation

Has provided funding to purchase
the land for Maple Knoll
Replacement sites

Bates College

Private Institution of Higher ed.

No involvement

Boston Financial

LIHTC investor

Involved in the portfolio
management and syndication
services of LIHTC properties

Costal Enterprises, Inc.

Community Development Financial
Institution

No involvement

Community Clinical Services, Inc.

Nonprofit Service Provider

No involvement

Genesis Community Loan Fund

Community Development Financial
Institution

Has provided funding to purchase
the land for Maple Knoll
Replacement sites

L.A. Metro Chamber of Commerce

Community Development
Organization

No involvement
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Maine State Housing Authority

Public Housing Authority

Involved in provision of public and
public assisted housing

Promise Early Education Center

Nonprofit Service Provider

No involvement

Raise-Op Housing Cooperative

Housing Cooperative

Organizes Lewiston’s first housing
cooperative; named as a key partner
in housing coop expansion

St. Mary’s Health System

Nonprofit Service Provider

No involvement

To understand points of possible tension between different partners’ interests in
Lewiston’s plan, it is useful to explore the various expected returns on investments (ROIs), both
financial and non-financial. This will inform an analysis of potential synergies and
contradictions that might arise from their divergent interests, as well as how these potential
conflicts may or may not be resolved through differential access to power and related questions
of differing degrees of democratic control over change in the neighborhood. With Choice, HUD
envisions non-financial returns on investments across people, housing, and neighborhoods. For
each goal, the Growing Our Tree Streets Plan sets out an Implementation Matrix. This includes
a condensed summary of much of the information written within each goal, but it also includes a
list of non-quantified, although quantifiable, goal metrics. For Goal 1, these “returns” center on
reduced rates of elevated blood lead levels in both children and adults and lay out intermediate
metrics concerning quantifying progress in the creation and rehabilitation of lead-free units
(Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 236). For Goal 4, the plan lists the percent of housing inventory
receiving a grade of Good or Better on the Property Health Report, the number of housing types,
and the number of beds available within each type of housing (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a,
242). For Goal 5, the returns concern internal perception by residents and investors of their level
of ownership and influence in the neighborhood and decision-making processes. These metrics
are particularly reliant on self-declaration of these feelings and commitments (Healthy
Neighborhoods 2020a, 244).
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There are also specific financial returns expected from this investment. HUD is awarding
the city $30 million. This initial investment is expected to generate at a minimum between $100
million and $142.8 million in additional investments.25 At least $25 million will be investments
in housing (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2021). The plan also states
that the LIHTC is “expected to be a primary source of funding for all multifamily residential
development phases” which includes all Maple Knoll replacement units. The plan proposes
using nine percent credits as subsidies for the construction of these units. To obtain the ninepercent credits, Lewiston will have to work with the Maine State Housing Authority, which
grants the credits and is another key partner in the plan. It also proposes making use of the more
easily accessible four percent credits, which do not have to be awarded by the Maine State
Housing Authority, to enable more rapid redevelopment (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 233).
The LIHTC, both nine and four percent, comes with its own set of expected ROIs. A summary
document prepared by the Congressional Research Service in 2021 reports that while there is
some fluctuation, the market price of tax credits is generally between $0.80 and $0.90 for each
tax credit dollar. Investors can purchase tax credits by providing equity for LIHTC properties.
What does this mean for a possible investment in a Tree Streets LIHTC property? It is useful to
consider a hypothetical scenario. Suppose you are investing in a LIHTC property that has
$10,000,000 in eligible (depreciable) items. This would mean you have an eligible basis of
$10,000,000. Because the Tree Streets are designated as a qualified census tract (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development N.d. h.), this basis gets a boost of 30 percent,
and your adjusted eligible basis would be $13,000,000. If, like in the case of Kennedy Park and

25

Francis Eanes, primary academic advisor on this thesis, gave me the number of $100 million based on his
involvement throughout the Choice process and participation is many of the planning meetings. $142.8 million
comes from the committed leverage as reported in the HUD NOFA.
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the other replacement units, half of the units in the development will be designated as affordable,
you will take 50 percent of the eligible basis to get the qualified basis of $6,500,000. If you are
utilizing the nine percent credit, you would be granted an annual tax credit of the qualified basis
times the IRS determined current rate for the nine percent credit. Suppose that this current rate is
nine percent – for this project you would be awarded $585,000 in tax credits annually, or
5,850,000 over the full ten-year subsidy period. Suppose the market price for a credit is $0.90.
For the full ten years, you would spend 5,265,000, giving you a total savings – or profit,
depending on how you consider it – of $585,000. If the market price for the tax credit is $0.80,
this profit would be $1,170,000 (formula from Wallace and Wilson 2018; author’s calculations).
The lower the market price, the higher the ROI for the investor (Keightley 2021, 6). These are
financial returns are from the tax credit alone. Research focuses on the tax credit benefits, but
there may be additional benefits as well. Investors are generally passive partners but have large
ownership percentages over the projects. The CRS summary report highlights that investors are
often corporate financial firms reaping additional benefits through the Community Reinvestment
Act (Keightley 2021, 6). Additionally, the LIHTC sets a threshold for affordability rates based
on the area median income. While the credit is designed to create profits outside of rental
incomes, there is nothing that ties rents to the tenant’s specific affordability range. This is to say,
it is feasible that rents may increase in the units designated affordable, staying under AMI but
past what is affordable for the tenant within the regulations set out by the LIHTC.
LIHTC investing is the space we must assume Boston Financial will occupy in the
implementation of the Growing Our Tree Streets Plan. Boston Financial describes itself as “a
national leader in the [LIHTC] industry, with a proven track record in syndication services as
well as asset and portfolio management” (Boston Financial Investment Management, L.P.
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2022a). Nationally, the firm manages about $15 billion of equity invested in 2,300 properties
nationally. In Maine, they have just under $188.5 million in 40 properties with just under 2,000
units across the state (Boston Financial Investment Management, L.P. 2022b). The Growing
Our Tree Streets Plan never actually names Boston Financial, or their parent company ORIX.
However, the firm is listed fifth among the key partners on HUD’s NOFA. Their participation
was also confirmed to me by Francis Eanes. Eanes recounted an instance where the firm’s
representatives attended a planning meeting at the Root Cellar also attended by Senator Susan
Collins and HUD Secretary Ben Carson. Eanes said outside of this meeting, Boston Financial
was noticeably absent from the planning process. This is aligned with the role private
investment firms generally occupy in LIHTC investing and syndication.
Boston Financial also markets to potential clients their skill at 15-year exits from LIHTC
investments. On their website, they advertise that they “have significant experience in 15-year
exits” and have “completed more than 1,600 dispositions and made over $940 million in
distributions to investors” (Boston Financial Investment Management, L.P. 2022c). While
LIHTC properties are supposed to remain affordable for 30 years, the tax subsidies only last for
the first 15. HUD commissioned a study in 2012 to understand what happens to LIHTC
properties at year 15. The study found that changes in ownership were particularly common
around year 15, with limited partners (LPs) choosing to end their role when the subsidies and
compliance period have ended. Generally, the LPs sell their interests to a general partner, who
has been operating the property and will continue as an owner-operator (Khadduri et al. 2012,
xiii). The study notes this is overwhelmingly true for nonprofit developers, but it is common
with for-profit developers as well. The study found that for LIHTC properties reaching year 15
by 2009, most continued to be owned by the original developer and operated as affordable
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housing. This was because there were other funding restrictions, often imposed through other
funding sources like CDBG or new recapitalization with LIHTCs, or because the market was too
weak to support charging higher rents. The study also found that in limited cases, rents were
raised to market rates. This was generally in cases where the market was strong enough to
support higher rents (Khadduri et al. 2012, xii and xiv-xvi).

Analysis
Contradictions in the desired returns on investment detailed above represent plausible
points of tension within Lewiston’s Choice initiative. While none of these plausible tensions
represent guaranteed points of conflict – that is, this thesis aims to avoid making overly reductive
and deterministic claims – it is nevertheless useful to consider critically the implications of
divergent interests and differential power of those who will carry out the Choice work. These
contradictions, outlined below, flow from a central antagonism between tenants and those who
own housing, whether directly (e.g., owner-occupants and absentee landlords) or indirectly (e.g.,
financial investment firms who own stakes in larger developments). The first contradiction is
between the improvement of housing quality, safety, and overall desirability of a neighborhood –
literally making the Tree Streets a “choice” neighborhood, versus maintaining permanent
housing affordability that ensures the right for current residents to return or remain in place. The
second contradiction emerges from Choice’s overwhelming reliance on privately directed capital
to finance the Transformation Plan (the $30 million-dollar HUD grant is expected to leverage
three to four times that amount in private investments), versus the Transformation Plan’s core
aim of increasing community control over investment and change in the neighborhood.
Although sweeping claims about how these contradictions will be resolved would be
inappropriate and highly suppositional, these contradictions are unpacked below and this analysis
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section closes with a closer look at the distribution of power and resources – both in the plan’s
strategies and partners – to speculate about potential trajectories we might see in the
neighborhood in the short and medium term.
Increasing Neighborhood Desirability versus Right to Return/Remain
Lewiston’s Transformation Plan proposes several strategies in pursuit of a core goal of
the national Choice program: “offer[ing] the kinds of amenities and assets, including safety,
good schools, and commercial activity, that are important to families’ choices about their
community” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.). Increasing choices
in a community and offering amenities that make neighborhoods more attractive to live and work
in has the capacity to greatly increase the overall quality of life for that neighborhood’s residents.
The most charitable reading of this Choice program goal is that it genuinely seeks to increase the
quality of life for current residents. Indeed, if the housing and neighborhood improvements
envisioned by the plan – including lead remediation, the construction of new units, increased
homeownership opportunities, increased investments in public spaces, neighborhood
beatification, and unspecified improvements to education and other local services – are
successfully implemented, they will arguably make the Tree Streets more attractive to current
and prospective residents alike. Given the intensive and bottom-up community participation that
went into the creation of the plan, it is both fair and important to assume that the strategies
connected to these planned improvements legitimately reflect sincere community wishes rooted
in broadly felt needs.
At the same time, “making improvements,” however legitimate, and increasing “choice”
are critical if euphemistic components of gentrification, which is itself a somewhat euphemistic
term that obscures both its underlying forces (e.g., logistics of capital accumulation) and material
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effects on everyday residents. (e.g., displacement). While the Choice program as a whole aims
to ensure that all families in the site targeted for housing replacement are given priority for an
affordable unit in a replacement site, it doesn’t lay out provisions for others in the broader
community who may be affected should the neighborhood become more desirable. The Tree
Streets neighborhood is not a case of a single “blighted” development (The Maple Knoll housing
complex) among what is otherwise a well-resourced neighborhood with a strong-enough housing
market unlikely to be affected by the redevelopment. After all, the material conditions of the
neighborhood beyond Maple Knoll – 96 percent of residents are renters, many of whom are
already rent-burdened and marginalized from formal employment avenues due to a variety of
factors – place most residents at risk of displacement in a scenario where wealthier people with a
capacity to pay higher rents begin to move into the neighborhood.
The question at the heart of this right-to-remain contradiction is this: will current
residents be able to enjoy the Transformation Plan’s intended improvements, or will those accrue
to a future cohort of wealthier newcomers whose arrival is enabled by the displacement of
current residents? There is reason to worry that the Tree Streets will experience
gentrification. After all, the Transformation Plan’s housing initiatives are being implemented to
correct a weak housing market, with the premise that this intervention will make the housing
market stronger (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 150). Curiously, however, neither the
Transformation Plan itself nor the residential market survey completed prior to the plan say
much about the potential (un)intended effects of this transformation – specifically the long-term
affordability of the neighborhood and accompanying possibilities for gentrification and
displacement. The introduction to the market survey, for example, says that estimates for the
Tree Streets indicate limited future demand for housing from in-migration or the formation of
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new households. Instead, the survey anticipates higher levels of demand will stem internally
from the need to replace deteriorated housing stock (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b, 98 and
118). However, it also notes that new replacement housing and ancillary improvements to the
Tree Streets’ housing stock overall are likely to attract residents from outside the neighborhood.
These knock-on effects are cast in purely beneficial terms – i.e., as contributing to net economic
growth in the neighborhood and city – rather than as exactly the sort of conditions that enable
gentrification. Critically, the survey also fails to factor in the neighborhood-level effects of a
massive exogenous housing market trend, such as the rapid rise in home sales and rental rates in
Maine spurred by fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic. In other words, a less charitable reading
of both the housing market study and aspects of the Transformation plan is that gentrifying the
neighborhood by making a “weak” housing market “strong” is arguably the whole point.
The Transformation Plan’s implementation metrics place significant weight on healthier
housing and growing the total number of housing units in the neighborhood, but do not explicitly
address affordability nor specify whether current residents will be able to still live in these
“improved” and healthier housing units. For current residents to be able to enjoy these
neighborhood improvements, however, maintained affordability will be a critical component. In
this maintenance of affordability, conflict may arise within the central renter-landlord
antagonism. Consider the properties financed through the LIHTC. Rents within a LIHTC
property are determined as a percentage of area median income (AMI). This means that so long
as AMI rises – whether by newer, wealthier residents or a rise in incomes for current residents –
that LIHTC property becomes a more valuable asset and higher rents can be charged. For their
part, and despite frequent use of mantras like “patient capital,” “social impact investing,” and the
de rigueur “doing well by doing good,” private real estate developers and investors – including
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those involved in LIHTC financing – have a material interest in maximizing the financial gains
they can attain from their investment in the neighborhood. In addition to the tax break these
partners gain through the LIHTC program, their profit derives from rising property values or
rents collected. Although this “doing well by doing good” model of financing affordable
housing allows participating investors to literally buy into a myth of advancing an urgent societal
need, the existential necessity of making a profitable return on their investment elides the
structural likelihood that “doing well” will often conflict with – if not subordinate – “doing
good.” To a greater or lesser extent, these dynamics hold true for other property owners in the
neighborhood. Whether we are speaking of DIY house-flippers, absentee landlords who hold
long-term investment properties, or “mom and pop” owner-occupant landlords who own a few
housing units for the purpose of supplemental income, their interests are structurally more
aligned with each other than with the individuals and families who live in their buildings. Put
another way, although Tree Streets renters and owners/investors all seemingly share a superficial
interest in making the housing stock lead-free, rehabilitating “distressed” housing, and otherwise
“improving” the neighborhood, the latter have every reason to celebrate the increased rents and
property values that flow from these improvements while the former will be the ones who pay
for it – either with their pocketbooks or with their displacement.
There are two core strategies the plan proposes that could exert pressure to maintain
affordability. These are the creation of a tenant’s union and an expansion of housing cooperatives. Both strategies will be also considered in greater depth in the final subsection of this
chapter. However, it is useful to briefly consider the ways these strategies interact with the
possible gentrification forewarned above. Tenants’ unions seek to provide greater power to
tenants in mediating disputes within the renter-landlord antagonism. This role is often to limit
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the excess of property owners, particularly within a gentrifying neighborhood. Through protests,
rent strikes, eviction prevention, and more, tenants’ union actions highlight and publicize the
rental-landlord antagonism. Participation in such actions has the capacity to politicize everyday
renters in productive ways. Tenants’ unions have been able to assist renters in purchasing their
buildings from landlords and the creation of housing cooperatives to decommodify the building.
Cooperative entities do not have the same drive for profit creation as the private entities outlined
in the paragraph above. This means that in cases of neighborhood gentrification, there is not the
same impulse to increase costs just because there are now those who can pay higher rents.
Through their ability to address imbalances in determinative power, tenants’ unions and housing
cooperatives also relate to the contradiction around attracting privately directed investments
versus increased community control over changes and decision-making processes discussed
directly below.
Attracting Privately Directed Investments versus Increased Community Control
Goal 5 of Lewiston’s plan centers around the creation of systems to increase community
control. These strategies include increased ownership – either individual or collective – over
homes or apartments and creating paths to direct action and decision-making roles for renters. In
the context of gentrification, this will allow current residents to have a greater say over changes
occurring in the neighborhood and could help to isolate residents from the increasing financial
costs of gentrification. Specifically, the Transformation Plan proposes connecting residents to
first-time homeownership programs, reestablishing a tenants’ union, and expanding housing
cooperatives. It also includes the creation of a community-based development organization
(CBDO) through subgoal 5.3.d which that plan promises “will lead and promote new
development in the neighborhood by connecting developers, owners, and partners with capital
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resources to develop property in a manner consistent with the goals of this plan.” This CBDO
“will create the terms, conditions, and support systems for property owners and lessors who
access capital resources through Choice, Healthy Neighborhoods, and other programs operated
and controlled on behalf of the Tree Street Neighborhood” (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 178).
Additionally, in the pursuit of community input, subgoal 5.3.c calls for community participation
through LACH – although otherwise unspecified – in the owner-entity of the Choice replacement
housing.
This is directly contradictory to much of what is discussed in Goal 4 – both in the explicit
wording of the strategies themselves and in the interests of the partners named to implement
them. For example, the Growing Our Tree Streets Plan does not designate a specific entity to be
the owner and manager for the replacement housing financed directly by Choice. Although the
plan implies that this entity will be a nonprofit housing provider such as Avesta, and that there
will be room for community participation (e.g., Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 156, 162, and
178), what exactly “community participation” looks like is never explicitly articulated. While
Avesta or a similar housing nonprofit may in fact manage the units developed for the
replacement housing, the “private development entity” who will finance and own the
development will almost certainly be the unnamed Boston Financial (Healthy Neighborhoods
2020a, 156 and 162). Regardless of whoever ends up owning and managing the new housing,
there are no systems concretely in place that hold these entities accountable to the desires of the
tenants, let alone residents of the broader Tree Streets neighborhood. Subgoal 5.3.c. does
propose community participation in the replacement housing’s owner-entity but does not detail
what this would consist of. Such participation is also a challenge to the firm’s interest in their
profit if it increases the power of tenants. This could heighten the renter-landlord antagonism,
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particularly when considering the possibilities that could arise around increased living costs
described above.
While the matter of community control over future replacement housing – and the role of
nonprofit versus for-profit entities in enabling or impeding this – is important in its own right, it
illuminates a broader front where the “community control” contradiction will likely manifest: the
outsized role that nonprofit organizations play in the Transformation Plan’s implementation. It
may be tempting to assume that the disproportionate involvement in the Transformation Plan by
entities ostensibly organized around principles other than profit-making would bode well for
bottom-up, democratic control over future development and change in the neighborhood.
Compared to (often) nameless, out-of-state for-profit ventures like Boston Financial, this may be
true. However, the category “nonprofit” is broad and includes organizations with different aims,
interests, and levels of democratic community participatory decision making in these aims and
interests. These nonprofit groups generally come in with a specific mission and look to make
grants based on projects or provide services aligning with that mission. These entities often
operate in the absence of meaningful government intervention in those fields but do have an
inherent interest in maintaining consistent sources of funding to continue their work. In an ideal
world, these entities' goals and actions would grow directly from the communities in which they
operate. However, this is often not the case. There may be issues that arise for both for- and
nonprofit entities in creating spaces within their organizations and systems for determinative
community control. At the same time, their funding and support are critical to creating the
overall improvements proposed through Choice, particularly for strategies not receiving Choice
funding that may not be profitable for private entities looking to make a profit.

138

Explicit Funding versus General Support
Ultimately, it makes little sense for HUD to fund a plan whose interventions in the
housing system seem likely to fail. As such, we must take seriously the possibility that the steps
outlined in Growing Our Tree Streets could result in a more desirable neighborhood and a
stronger housing market, and that the risk of gentrification and displacement is very real. With
no additional intervention, this might include higher median incomes and an ability to charge
increased rants, in tension with residents’ affordability desires. As stated above, many of the
housing solutions for tenants in the Tree Streets relate to increased homeownership. There are
two solutions that the plan puts forward to explicitly address maintaining affordability in the
long-term and increasing democratic influence by renters in the Tree Streets. These are the recreation of a tenant’s union and an expansion of housing cooperatives. As potentially effective
and transformative as these two strategies could be – particularly the role of cooperatives in
transcending the contradictions outlined above – it is useful to consider whether either of these
strategies has been allotted sufficient funding and support to succeed.
In the plan, the housing cooperative expansion is part of goal 5.1, subgoal d. This
includes a 15-unit expansion of the Raise-Op housing cooperative over five years. It also
proposes that Raise-Op and the Cooperative Development Institute – a regional nonprofit
that aims to increase democratic ownership in communities, housing, and business – lend their
support to other homeownership programs to support the creation of new housing
cooperatives. The widespread expansion of housing cooperatives, or other democratic strategies
that decommodify land like community land trusts, would offer a fundamental shift in the power
dynamic currently dominated by landlords. However, there is no funding set out for this
endeavor, and the time frame assigned is long-term, somewhere from 5 to 25 years. The
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expansion of Raise-Op itself is limited (only 15 units), and there are no specifically laid plans for
new cooperatives. This creates a potentially unfortunate feedback loop, in which underresourcing the formation of cooperatives in the near term blunts their moderating effects on
neighborhood affordability, which as property values rise makes it even more resource intensive
to convert existing housing into new cooperatives. Additionally, if cooperatives are being
implemented once rental affordability in the neighborhood has already begun to worsen, a
reactive rather than proactive measure, it may be too late to ensure that residents are not
displaced.
The re-establishment of a tenant’s union, Goal 5.2 subgoal a., offers a more immediate
solution to this issue. Tenants’ unions, and tenant activism more generally, have been a largely
disconnected and underfunded movement in the US. Tenant organizing activity tends to grow
during periods of internal strife but is generally tied to the other struggles faced by marginalized
groups (Marcuse 1980b, Drier 1984). Recently, there has been a resurgence in tenant organizing
and union activity during the pandemic. These organizations help to redistribute the balance of
power between tenants and landlords. Given that 96 percent of Tree Streets residents are renters,
there could be a significant amount of power in an organization that captured even a segment of
this group; just as labor unions raise labor standards for non-union workers throughout a given
economic sector, well-organized tenants unions can have similar spillover effects in their
immediate neighborhoods. Lending the expertise of Pine Tree Legal Assistance and the
networks of LACH means there are networks in place to disseminate information and gather
support for a union, as well as the legal expertise around tenants’ rights issues. This is not to say
there will not be difficulties that could be encountered by the tenant’s union. As with a housing
co-op expansion, this tenants’ union is unfunded through the Choice plan. This will make the
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work of recruiting and hiring organizers, covering administrative costs, and other necessary
elements to get such a union off the ground difficult. Both Drier and Marcuse raise additional
challenges to private tenant organizing. Drier (1984, 257) mentions the reluctance of a certain
class to participate in tenant’s unions during the post-WWII housing boom as they considered
themselves future homeowners rather than renters. The expectation of homeownership created a
set of interests that preceded their interests as tenants. There are significant efforts to bring
greater rates of homeownership to the Tree Streets as part of this plan, opening the possibility of
homeownership to those where it may have been inaccessible before. However, as the
overwhelming majority of residents are currently renters, inclusion of even a fraction of tenants
into a union provides a real avenue to advocating for change. Marcuse (1980b) warns that even
when tenants unions can gain power, there may be difficulties in correcting mistakes, particularly
with little capital investment or significant disrepair in units. In this too, Choice offers a
somewhat unique opportunity in that it has set routes to funding for remediation, and connected a
variety of partners, including Raise-Op, with experience in tenant-centered
management. However, with scant financial resources allocated to this task, efforts could falter
or prove incomplete.
This lack of financial support stands in contrast to new housing construction in the Tree
Streets. For the three housing goals, the plan explicitly funds, using Choice dollars, the
construction of the Maple Knoll replacement sites. This ensures that the plan’s central housing
element will be built. By designating a specific investment, it is significantly easier to attract the
additional capital needed. This also opens an opportunity for a firm like Boston Financial to
profit from LIHTC investments in Lewiston. Whether purposefully or indirectly, this attraction
of additional capital may create the conditions necessary for the displacement of current
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residents in the Tree Streets. Without proper funding or policy support, it could be difficult for
Raise-Op or a tenants’ union to effectively counter increasing economic pressure and represent
the desires of community members.
As with any contradiction and antagonism, the ultimate question relating to these
contradictions and the renter-landlord antagonism in Lewiston is: how and in whose favor might
these tensions be resolved? While in no way prescriptive or deterministic, the following
discussion chapter explores this question by reflection on how these tensions have historically
resolved in various urban traditions introduced in the theoretical framework chapter.
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CHAPTER III: DISCUSSION
The following discussion chapter addresses how the Growing Our Tree Streets Choice
Transformation Plan’s strategies and possible outcomes conform to or depart from the housing
paradigms established in the theoretical framework chapter. Like the analysis presented in the
results chapter, these comparisons are not meant to be predictive of Lewiston’s housing
future. Rather, as the theoretical framework shows, housing policy is historically contingent,
with broad urbanisms responding to and evolving in consideration of different material
conditions. It follows that current iterations of broad housing traditions, in the Tree Streets
neighborhood and beyond, will likely respond similarly to contemporary political-economic
conditions as well. This chapter also discusses broader implications of the contradictions
between financial and social returns on investment, and what this says about plausible near-term
housing futures in the Tree Streets. The chapter closes by considering what the dominant
housing system asks us to assume or accept, and assesses whether these are indeed inevitable
aspects of providing housing in a democratic society. After a brief review of the dominant
neoliberal housing paradigm and contextualizing of the present housing moment, this discussion
is structured around four questions. These are: (1) In what ways does Lewiston’s plan echo the
dominant neoliberal housing paradigm?; (2) In what ways does Lewiston’s plan depart from or
challenge this paradigm?; (3) What does the dominant housing paradigm ask us to assume or
accept?; and (4) What do the ways the U.S. structures housing say about our society and systems
of valuation writ large?
As discussed in the theoretical framework, housing and urban planning praxis in America
has been primarily and disproportionately organized by private capital (principally the real
estate, finance, and construction and manufacturing sectors) for its own benefit (Foglesong 1986,
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Stein 2019), even as the scope of beneficiaries has widened at various historical junctures (e.g.,
white homeowners in the postwar era (Rothstein 2017; Nelson 2021)). As a result, today’s
dominant housing and related community planning paradigm consists of three core pillars. First,
US policy from 1945 onwards prioritized homeownership and suburbanization as the preferred,
although always exclusive and incomplete, means of providing housing – all underwritten by
things like federally-insured 30-year mortgages, federal interstate highway investments, massive
“urban renewal” projects, and preferential tax policy (Reily 1958; Drier 1982; Schwartz 2015;
Rothstein 2017; Taylor 2019). These policies are in part what created the conditions for the
ascendence of the dominant neoliberal political-economic framework guiding housing policy in
America today. There were myriad reasons why these policies were put in place and perpetuated
– e.g., to stimulate postwar economic growth, to encourage individual citizens to personally
invest in the dominant capitalist system, to satisfy the powerful real estate lobby, to secure
municipal budget solvency through increased property valuations and tax revenues, etc. (Drier
1982; Marcuse 1995; Nelson 2021). Despite significant challenges (e.g. the 2008 recession and
foreclosure crisis) U.S. housing policy has continued to prioritize single-family homeownership
(Goodman and Mayer 2018), with the surge in home buying purchases during the pandemic
providing evidence for its persistence even today. Second, with the exception of large public
investments during the interwar and WW2 periods, the provisioning of affordable housing has
been done largely through the private sector (Hays 2012). Today, this system is dominated by
LIHTC financing and Section 8 rent subsidy models (Schwartz 2015). Both homeownership and
affordable rental units from private entities have created spaces for private corporations in
various industries – construction, real estate, and finance (both investing and banking) – to
accumulate wealth (Stein 2019). The day-to-day work of navigating this landscape and resolving
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these contradictions has largely been left up to urban planners, who as largely unelected
bureaucrats with their own funding pressures, unsurprisingly favor the needs of capital
groups. Third, urban planners’ dominant housing practices, particularly relating to community
engagement, favor the desires of capitalists. Although capitalists and planners must contend
with both the property contradiction and the capitalist-democracy contradiction, urban housing
policy has long looked to create safe spaces for capital investment (e.g., redlining, HOPE VI,
Choice Neighborhoods) (Foglesong 1986, Stein 2019). Even when planning has elements of
community engagement, as is statutorily required in many situations (e.g., the creation of
municipal comprehensive plans), levels of participation based on Arnstein’s ladder of citizen
participation often fall into the non-participation or tokenism categories (Arnstein 1969). At the
intersection of planning and affordable housing provision lies inclusionary zoning, an
increasingly popular practice to encourage or require the creation of affordable units by private
markets.
While this neoliberal paradigm structures housing in the US today, there are growing
calls from an increasingly broad set of constituencies for changes in these systems. The Covid19 pandemic has highlighted deep and long-standing issues with the nation’s housing. Before
the pandemic, many renters and homeowners already faced high housing costs, with 30 percent
of all Americans cost-burdened. For renters, these rates were even higher, with 46 percent of all
renters cost-burdened, and 24 percent of renters severely cost-burdened (Joint Center for
Housing Studies of Harvard University 2020 and 2021). The pandemic further strained many
families’ ability to pay for housing (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2020
and 2021; Wong 2021). Although many parts of American life are returning, albeit slowly, to
something resembling pre-pandemic normal, there is still significant housing insecurity. For
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week 42 of the pandemic, January 26 to February 7, 2022 (the most recent publicly available
data), 35.4 percent of Americans reported they were behind on their rent or mortgage with
eviction or foreclosure likely or very likely in the next two months (U.S. Census Bureau
2022). Insecure housing throughout the pandemic has disproportionately affected non-white
Americans, particularly Black and Hispanic Americans (Joint Center for Housing Studies of
Harvard University 2020, 2021). The housing market also constricted significantly during the
pandemic. Home sales and prices both grew to peaks of about 20 percent more than the previous
year (Dowell 2021; Duca and Murphy 2021). This has put the ideal of homeownership even
further out of reach for low-income Americans, who are more likely to be affected by pandemic
job losses and unable to save money.
These events, as well as general housing trends throughout the 2000s, have prompted
Americans to reconsider the provisioning of housing, and these failures could create an
opportunity for the 2020s to become an inflection point in national housing policy. The
question, though, is how and which parts of historical housing paradigms will shape today’s
policy solutions enabled by this opportunity. Maine, for example, is currently rethinking how
affordable housing is provided in the state. Already hit by worsening affordability, particularly
in southern and coastal counties, the state experienced an influx of new residents during the
pandemic. Even as rates of home purchases have begun to subside, prices have stayed
high. This inspired a host of new legislative actions on affordable housing, including the recent
creation of the Maine Affordable Housing Tax Credit program. More legislation is working its
way through the legislature now as well. A draft report by the Commission to Increase Housing
Opportunities in Maine by Studying Zoning and Land Use Restrictions called for the use of more
open zoning and bonuses to encourage affordable construction. The cutting of regulations for
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the purpose of “freeing” the housing market follows the general neoliberal playbook, as does the
prior creation of the Tax Credit program. Other measures in Maine’s draft report, including
amendments to how the Fair Housing Act and the state appeals board operate, would increase
state power in housing decisions in ways that echo industrial urbanism’s central government
focus. The specific mention of expanding farmworker housing also follows the industrial legacy
of governments’ targeting the creation of workforce housing necessitated by the needs of specific
sectors of capital.
Since Lewiston’s Transformation Plan was created and adopted in 2019, large national
issues around housing – e.g., clarity about who the current housing systems leave behind, and
what working-class Americans are demanding from housing – are changing in significant
ways. In the case of Maine, and America as a whole, safe, affordable housing is rightly thought
of as an urgent need. However, these dominant neoliberal precedents for providing housing –
tax credits, zoning changes, etc. – do not guarantee the creation of affordable housing. At best
they create financial incentives, but other factors in housing markets, including localized rent
increases, can quickly erase any motivation. For the past 50 or more years, the expectation has
been that the private sector and free market will provide healthy, affordable housing. Ultimately,
investments in housing by the private sector have not come at the speed or scale that is
required. With the understanding that (1) changes to the housing landscape, at both the state and
national level are continuing to occur in real time; (2) many of these changes continue to echo
the prior neoliberal approach to housing policy; and (3) there are much more radical tendencies
that continue to underpin housing-focused social movements, where are there echoes of
dominant historical paradigms in Lewiston’s plan, and what does this portend for possible
housing futures in the Tree Streets?
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Echoes of Neoliberalism in the Transformation Plan
In what ways does Lewiston’s plan echo the dominant neoliberal housing paradigm?
There are echoes of the dominant housing paradigm throughout the Transformation Plan,
particularly in the emphasis on homeownership and the broader structure of Choice. Goal 5 of
the plan explicitly emphasizes increasing individual, long-term homeownership in the Tree
Streets. Widespread homeownership has its roots in the federal government’s postwar policies
extending mortgages through the FHA and VA, which had the effect of pacifying large parts of
the working class. In doing so, the government played a heavy hand in the creation of the
American middle class, giving working Americans access to an appreciating asset they had
incentive to protect from interference by the state or other individuals. This, particularly
combined with the 75-year project to crush unions post-Taft Hartley, also created conditions
fostering the rise of neoliberalism more broadly. Lewiston’s plan seeks to extend the purported
benefits of homeownership to low-income individuals through financial assistance and
education. This is a group otherwise left behind in housing programs, and considering the Tree
Street’s relative economic and racial diversity, would mark a departure from who has historically
been extended homeownership opportunities, even as the commitment to the core myth of
homeownership (i.e. as a vehicle for wealth-building and upward economic mobility) remains
unchanged. Even a scenario in which the homeownership myth proves true for a lucky subset of
residents, could have potentially destabilizing effects in the Tree Streets.
Furthermore, the benefits of secure individual homeownership within the current sociopolitical landscape provide homeowners with strong incentives to oppose more radical housing
change, such as the decommodification of housing. If Lewiston experiences gentrification,
having been able to purchase a home could insulate that individual from the possible
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displacement experienced by renters – assuming, of course, that the homeowner is also able to
cover other cost increases (i.e., cost of living, property taxes, etc.). Moreover, if one has
purchased a home and can absorb these related costs, gentrification in the neighborhood will be
financially lucrative for that individual. Financial benefits could accrue in the sale of the home
or in opportunities to refinance. Simplistically, these financial incentives could split the interests
of current working-class Tree Streets residents – those who own land and could accrue benefits,
and those who are renters at risk of displacement. Creating a nascent class of owner-occupant
landlords – e.g., the Transformation Plan envisions large immigrant and refugee families
purchasing Tree Streets buildings for their large families and later converting the upstairs to
rental units once their kids grow up – could have a similarly divisive effect, even within tightly
knit communities of recently arrived immigrants. This is precisely because it gives some select
subset of residents a very understandable interest in protecting a valuable financial asset,
reorienting their interest to the realization of profit from this asset. This possible splitting of an
idealized labor class also echoes core neoliberal tenets, even if it would arguably be an
unintended outcome of the Transformation Plan and its authors.
More broadly, parts of the Transformation Plan are consistent with core parts of
neoliberalism because the national Choice Neighborhoods Program is deeply neoliberal. Choice
as a whole is designed, much in the style of redlining and HOPE VI before it, to create safe and
stable places for private investment. With a limited initial public investment, an opportunity is
created for private businesses to step into a community, make investments, and then collect
financial returns. The national Choice program also echoes core neoliberal values in the wording
of its goals. The focus on people – “[i]mprove outcomes of households living in the target
housing related to employment and income, health, and children’s education” (U.S. Department
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of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.; emphasis added) – prioritizes those in housing
targeted for replacement but doesn’t extend the same goals to a neighborhood’s other
residents. This limits the number of residents whose right to return or remain prospects are
addressed in the plan, giving a green light to the broad displacement of current residents living
beyond the targeted developments. Furthermore, the focus on individual betterment through
increased formal employment and wages aligns with ideas of individual responsibility, erasing
the structural and systemic inequalities that disproportionately benefit some (those with
privileged identities) at the active expense of others. The focus on the individual also connects
back to the neoliberal goal to decimate a sense of collective identity and social commitments –
my interests, rather than our interests. Choice’s neoliberal philosophy is also seen in the
neighborhoods goal – “[c]reate the conditions necessary for public and private reinvestment in
distressed neighborhoods to offer the kinds of amenities and assets, including safety, good
schools, and commercial activity, that are important to families’ choice about their community”
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.; emphasis added). Again, the
explicit mention of family prioritizes the individual and their closest relations over a group. The
use of the term choice, both in this goal and in the program’s name, is also of note. The
language of choice is that of people who believe in the power of markets, and of consumerism,
as the arbiter of what is good or right. In this system, markets, rather than democratic processes,
are where choices get made. This is critical because, unlike in the one-person-one-vote ideal of
the democratic process, within markets the few with the most power and privilege can wield the
accompanying wealth and influence to exert disproportionate power. Within the fetishization of
choice, there is no actual unified public, only individuals making decisions aligned with their
own self-interest.
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Departures from Neoliberalism
In what ways does Lewiston’s plan depart from or challenge this paradigm?
Although parts of the Transformation Plan are consistent with core aspects of neoliberal
urban policy, many other parts of the plan find roots in a more radical tradition. These more
radical strategies suggest the opportunities for a very different future in Lewiston, one that while
free of many of the issues the community currently faces, is not defined by the interests of
private for-profit actors but by the community of current residents. The bottom-up nature of
much of the community plan, the possibility of tenant organizing, and the use of housing co-ops
to decommodify housing all offer a more radical departure from neoliberalism. Continued
community input – aligned with one of Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation’s top three
rungs (partnership, delegated power, or citizen control) – would be a significant break in
neoliberal planning precedent. This would be the resolution of the capitalist-democracy
contradiction in favor not of capitalists, but current residents. However, it would also require
significant follow-through on the part of those actors currently responsible for implementing the
plan. The undefined sections of community input would need to be solidified into concrete
pathways for residents to not just express their desires, but to have determinative control around
how changes are implemented in the neighborhood. The results chapter discussed at length the
ways in which housing co-ops and a tenants’ union could help to resist changes in the
neighborhood that displaced current residents. It also raised the concern that these strategies
were relatively unresourced and completely underfunded, particularly compared to other more
neoliberal parts of the plan. What might it take to scale up these measures? Funding is an
important place to start. For the tenants’ union, specific financing to hire and support the work
of organizers is critical. For the expansion of housing cooperatives, funding to secure land, or
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the purchase of land or buildings are both crucial steps. Additionally, this funding and land
purchasing should occur as soon as possible, to avoid more costly implementation of these
strategies down the line. If implemented on a wide enough scale, these two measures,
particularly in combination, would exert significant pressure on private landlords to maintain
affordability. The union would do this via direct action, which, coupled with the co-operative
housing, would set a market standard for rents and quality of units.
Assumptions in the Neoliberal Housing Paradigm
What does the dominant housing paradigm ask us to assume or accept?
As shown through many crises (e.g. the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, the 2008
financial and foreclosure crisis, and the ongoing economic fallout from the pandemic), the
dominant neoliberal paradigm has been unable to provide either a stable housing system, or a
system that provides safe, healthy, affordable housing for everyone. Considering this, and
looking towards the future of housing, it is useful to consider what this current paradigm asks
us26 to accept or assume. Most obviously, current neoliberal policies and those who support
them ask that the American public accept this neoliberal paradigm as the “best” way to consider
and provide housing. Given this, there are two core possible assumptions based on the
aforementioned crises, and on ongoing issues with affordability, homelessness, and aging
housing stock. Both assumptions rely on general knowledge of these issues, but do not
necessitate any sort of special education. Living in or having visited an American city, or having

As a note – us, we or our, in this question and the next, refers to people with some stake in American housing –
American citizens, those who live in the U.S., homeowners and renters alike. This is particularly true for those who
might not have to think of housing often, who live places that are safe, comfortable, who don’t have to pay – or can
easily afford – rent or mortgage payments.
26
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exposure to mainstream media, will probably reveal a variety of these issues, implicating many
“everyday” Americans in the perpetuation of these issues.
The first assumption is that it is not possible to provide safe, healthy, and affordable
housing to everyone in America. If this is true, we as a society are making decisions, either
explicitly or by forfeiting responsibility, about who has access to this housing. The second
assumption, which is not mutually exclusive from the first, is that some people are not deserving
of, or are somehow unfit for safe, healthy, affordable housing. This latter belief exposes deep
prejudices, and is often reliant on deeply harmful stereotypes, classism, and racism. This also
ties into the neoliberal narrative of personal responsibility – positing that somehow people must
be fully responsible for their housing circumstances at any given time. This implies that housing
exists in a vacuum apart from broader political-economic structures. These two assumptions also
connect to and can be expanded to more general assumptions about access to safe, healthy,
affordable communities. Together they create a false choice between, on the one hand,
continued disinvestment in unsafe housing for the sake of preserving a de facto if pernicious
affordability, and on the other hand, large-scale reinvestment that revitalizes dilapidated housing
(and neighborhoods) at the expense of gentrification and displacement. This false choice
obscures urban policy alternatives, including more radical and industrial approaches, where the
state can play a larger role on behalf of residents of disinvested communities, both in the Tree
Streets and beyond. The government could create policies to invest in disinvested in
neighborhoods, through strategies that decommodify housing, support tenants’ rights, limit rents,
prioritize social returns on investment, and more.
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Broader Societal Critiques Arising from Housing Systems
What do the ways the U.S. structures housing say about our society and systems of valuation writ
large?
The radical urbanism and industrial urban sections of the theoretical framework chapter
lay out two other ways to consider housing, aligned with the different power structures of
idealized class types in each system. These policies advance different kinds of housing visions
and policies dependent on the values of the most powerful entity. To answer this question, it can
be helpful to consider historical manifestations. In industrial urban policy the state utilized
housing – public housing, and access to private housing through state-backed mortgages – for the
creation of jobs, economic growth, and more. This thesis has argued that this was all with the
ultimate aim of controlling the middle class and perpetuating the State’s more centralized
role. In radical urbanism, housing is articulated as a basic right, which is provided by and for the
common person, as seen in the case of Red Vienna, Cooper Square, CLTs, and housing coops. These strategies and systems have come about in response to the failure of private capital to
act in labors’ best interest and provide this housing. In a system of neoliberal urbanism, housing
is another market to accrue wealth for the capital class. If this doesn’t provide for the needs of
many in the labor class, there is no recourse, as nothing holds capitalists democratically
accountable to labor. This places value wholly on the ability of an asset – in this case housing –
to appreciate, centering on the exchange value of an object. Consider the assumptions that are
outlined above. If one’s view of housing is that it should be a basic right for all people, rather
than a market to encourage capital accumulation, not only are the assumptions neoliberal policy
asks society to accept unacceptable, but there are better examples, contemporary and historic, for
how to realize this vision of housing. More radical housing visions – social housing, CLTs,
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housing co-ops, and more – prioritize the use value of housing – as a home, as part of a broader
community, not as a purely financial asset.
What might this mean for the 2020s as an inflection point in American housing
praxis? Considering changes to housing going forward will require honest answers about larger
societal implications of the ways we structure housing and communities. It will also require
deeper introspection by American society about what we owe each other, where our collective
values lie, how those are expressed in policy. Does the current paradigm reflect our collective
values? Are we comfortable with the way that American housing policy has structured society,
both historically and today? The answers to these questions concern all levels of American
society, but for those privileged enough to live in stable housing and communities, this question
is especially pertinent. Those already affected by housing insecurity are already fighting against
neoliberal policy and the valuation systems that allow it. Continued ignorance, deliberate or not,
among more wealthy elites allows for continued isolation from housing struggles. However,
isolation from is not erasure of. The issues inherent in neoliberal housing will continue to persist
without deliberate action to address these issues and their consequences, historic and
contemporary.
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APPENDIX A
The data on key partners for the fiscal year 2020 Choice Implementation grantees displayed in
Figures 1 and 2 and the Table in the Results Chapter (pages 125-126) is based on the HUD
Choice Implementation Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) (U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development 2021). The NOFA listed 99 total key partners or lead applicants across
the five cities.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Lewiston, Maine had 15 (two applicants and 13 partners);
Fort Myers, Florida had 22 (two applicants and 20 partners);
Detroit, Michigan had 16 (one applicant and 15 partners);
Cleveland, Ohio has 27 (two applicants and 25 partners); and
Camden, New Jersey has 19 (two applicants and 17 partners)

Based on the names of applicants or partners provided for each of the five; the author then
gathered data on each entity. Data was recorded on:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

The name of the entity;
the city they were affiliated with for the grant;
the fiscal year (2020 for all observations);
the type of organization (coded by “public”, “nonprofit”, or “private for-profit”);
the specific partner type (coded by “City Government”, “Public Housing Authority”,
“Government Agency or Program”, “Real Estate Investor or Developer”, “Community
Development Financial Institution”, “Institution of Higher Ed.”, “Nonprofit Services
Provider”, “Foundation”, “Consulting Group”, “Housing Co-ops or Community Land
Trusts”, “Resident Organization or Advocacy Group”, “Community Development
Organization”, or “Private Corporation (other)”);
the sector (coded by “housing”, “some housing”, or “other”);
the organization’s geographic scope (coded by “local”, “state”, “regional” (meaning
multi-state in the same region of the country), “national”, or “multinational”); and
whether or not the entity was a lead applicant (coded by yes/no)

The name of the entity, city, fiscal year, and lead applicant variables were all gathered from the
NOFA. The type of organization, specific partner type, sector, and scope were all determined by
googling each of the entities.
Data was available on all but two key partners or lead applicants. These two were
NeighborhoodGreen, LLC, named as a key partner for the city of Cleveland, and Ablett Village
Resident Council, named a key partner for the city of Camden. As such these two entities were
not included in the data displayed in Figures 1 and 2 (page 125).
In the course of researching key partners, there were four other notable mentions of changes or
differences from the HUD NOFA. Three were name changes. The entity listed as “The Sky
Family YMCA” in the NOFA is now called the “YMCA of Southwest Florida.” The Southwest
Florida Community Foundation is now called “Collaboratory.” Finally, the Coopers Ferry
Partnership’s name was changed to the Camden Community Partnership. Additionally, the entity
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listed as the “Economic Development Corporation” as a key partner for the city of Detroit is
assumed to be the Michigan Economic Development Corporation.
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